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THE

CHARMIDES, LACHES, AND LYSIS

OF

PLATO

EDITED BY

BARKER NEWHALL, PH.D.
PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN KENYON COLLEGE



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CHARMIDES.

E-P 1

PREFACE.

AMONG the dialogues of Plato, whose literary excellence might lead to their selection for reading in college, the Symposium and Phaedrus are hardly suitable for the classroom, the Gorgias and Republic are too long, and the Phaedo too abstruse, while others lack the charm of dramatic setting. The three dialogues, however, which are included in the present edition, seem to be free from the disadvantages just enumerated. The Charmides has been given the most extended treatment, with the hope that this dialogue may be made the center of more thorough study, though the Laches may be put in its place. The Lysis is intended for sight-reading, and is annotated accordingly. If time is short, the more abstruse portions of the Charmides, such as the treatment of the ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης, may be omitted. The works which have been used in the preparation of this edition are enumerated in the Appendix. In treating the philosophic contents of the dialogues, I have followed F. Horn's Platonstudien (Vienna, 1893) very closely, and Cron's edition of the Laches has been freely utilized in the commentary to that dialogue. Professor Gildersleeve, moreover, has kindly made very valuable suggestions while the book was in press, and I must acknowledge my constant indebtedness to the inspiration and illumination received from this eminent scholar, who has imparted by means of the bitter root of Greek syntax a higher appreciation of the sweet fruit of Greek literature.

BARKER NEWHALL.

GAMBIER, OHIO, December 1, 1899.

References to page and line of this edition are printed, *e.g.*, 3.22.

Acknowledgment of more special indebtedness to Professor Gildersleeve is indicated by the abbreviation, Gild.

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INTRODUCTION.

PLATO.

I. LIFE.[1]

PLATO was born 427 B.C., and his disciples celebrated the 7th of Thargelion (May 27) as his natal day.[2] His father, Ariston, was descended from Codrus, the mythic king of Athens, and from the god Poseidon, while his mother, Perictione,[3] was in some way related to Solon. After trying his hand at poetry, at the age of twenty he devoted himself to philosophy, under the guidance of Socrates. Soon after his master's death in 399 he began his travels, and visited Egypt, Cyrene, Italy, and Sicily. Returning to Athens in 387, he bought a house and garden near the precincts of the hero Academus, where he taught for the remaining forty years of his life. He was never married, and, what was unusual for an Athenian, took no part in public life. He died in 347, and was buried near his home. Such are the bare outlines of Plato's life, but they suffice to indicate his environment. His aristocratic birth endowed him with fine sensibilities and generous tastes, which were cultivated and perfected by a thorough education in gymnastics and mathematics, in both of which he gained distinction, in music, rhetoric, and philosophy. His extended travels broadened his vision and brought him into contact with the wisdom of other lands, while his wealth and his freedom from the cares of family and politics allowed him to devote his entire attention to literary pursuits.

II. WORKS.

In classical literature nothing but the Homeric question has caused so much discussion among scholars as the genuineness and chrono-

[1] The authority for Plato's life is Steinhart. v. App. I., C.

[2] This day was probably chosen because it was the festival of Delian Apollo, to whom later legends ascribed the parentage of the philosopher.

[3] v. Note 3. 8.

logical order of the Platonic dialogues, and opinions are often widely at variance. The arrangement of Christ, however, with which, in the main, the following list agrees, represents a conservative mean. I. *Socratic* (before 392) : Lysis, Charmides, Laches, Hippias Minor, Apology, Crito, Euthyphro, Ion. II. *Transitional* (392–380?) : Protagoras, Gorgias, Meno, Euthydemus, Menexenus, Cratylus, Theaetetus, Phaedrus, Phaedo, Symposium. III. *Constructive:* Republic, Parmenides, Sophistes, Politicus, Philebus, Timaeus, Critias, Laws. The position of the dialogues in I. and III. is certain, but there is much dispute about the order of those in II. (especially the Phaedo and Phaedrus). Many scholars reject the Ion, Menexenus, and Parmenides. Besides the above list of 26 genuine dialogues, the manuscripts contain 16 others, some of them probably written by contemporaries of Plato, and also 13 letters, of which one or two are perhaps genuine.

III. STYLE.

It may safely be said that Plato is the greatest of Greek prose writers; for, though Aristotle may have been a greater philosopher, his extant works have no literary value, and though Demosthenes rivals Plato in his diction, the subject-matter of his orations has lost much of its interest to the modern world. Plato, however, excels both in content and form, and to-day no Greek author is so widely studied in all departments of learning. The philosopher, the literary critic, the political economist, the philologist, the pedagogue, and the moralist, all find something of value in his pages.

The ancients, too, recognized his preëminence, and the great Roman critic declared *omnium quicumque scripserunt aut locuti sunt extitit et suavitate et gravitate princeps Plato* (Cic. Orat. 62, cf. Top. 1. 24). The sweetness which Cicero admired, the elegance and finish which Aristotle noticed, the grace and simplicity of his style perhaps impress the reader before anything else. It is this which leads Taine to a comparison with Correggio, and which Dionysius praises for its clearness like the most transparent stream, its fragrance like a breeze from flowery meadows (ad Cn. Pomp. 2). Even the satiric Timon (Diog. L. III. 7) likened his works to the sweet song of the cicadas hidden

among the trees of Academus, and his biographers fabled that bees filled his lips with honey, as he lay on the slopes of Hymettus.[1] This sweetness blended with dignity[2] and elevation, the "supreme serenity and smile of divine wisdom" (Cousin), justify the title "Homer of philosophers."[3] Indeed so rich and full is the stream that flows softly from the Homeric source, that some declared that such would be the speech of great Zeus himself. Plato rivals the great poet also in his dramatic power, exhibited in the vivid and powerful delineation of character and the variety and beauty of his scenery. In this (ἦθος) he excels all writers, and even Demosthenes is but an imitator.[4] This makes his dialogues a faithful mirror of the best Athenian society and imparts refinement by the association of the reader with cultured people. So brilliant are his pictures, so rich in color and warm with sensuous feeling that the ancients thought that, like Euripides, he must have been a painter in his younger days.[5] At any rate he was once a poet; indeed, fragments of his elegies remain, and he never wholly lost his poetic character.[6] It was a true dream of Socrates when he saw Apollo's swan fly from his bosom and soar singing to the clouds. The vocabulary is largely poetic (Longin. 13), and the wonderful extended similes as well as the myths, to which he resorts when dialectic fails, exhibit the power of the poet as well as of the rhetorician. The rhythms, too, are often poetic,[7] yet their perfection is praised by Dionysius (De Adm. Vi, 41), and the periods are harmonious, flexible, and smooth, though judged inferior to those of Demosthenes. Parataxis is the foundation principle of his composition, and we sometimes find as many as nine or ten clauses strung together, so that we scarcely realize the periodic structure;[8] yet he often blends longer sentences with shorter. Anacolutha and parentheses at times interrupt grammatical sequence and skilfully imitate the movement of conversation, while the participle and the infinitive, of which Plato, like Herodotus, is so

[1] Ael. V. H. X. 21. [2] Long. 13, Cic. Brut. 121.

[3] id. Tusc. I. 79. This combination of qualities led Cousin to compare Plato with Bossuet.

[4] Dionys. Rhet. X. 2 [5] v. Note 58. 31.

[6] Aristotle ap. Diog. L. III. 37 μεταξὺ ποιήματος καὶ πεζοῦ λόγου.

[7] Quint. IX. 4. 77 notes especially the Timaeus.

[8] Demetr. de eloc. 21.

fond,[1] contribute to the smooth flow of clause and sentence. Yet though the style seems so easy, it was elaborated with great care, and till the day of his death[2] he revised and corrected and rearranged the words and phrases.

All these details show that Plato excelled not only in the quality but the number of his beauties (Longin. 35. 1). Simple narrative is used in the introductions and the myths, then more ornate or lofty style in the solemn discourse or extended simile, in one dialogue rapid question and answer, in another continuous dialectic, where the answers are merely formal. There is an endless variety of moods and tones, which blends gravity with vivacity, comedy with tragedy, profound reasoning with irony or satire, poetry with prose. As Chaignet says, he makes not only his characters but his philosophy live and breathe. It is in his earlier dialogues that these literary elements are most prominent. In his later works his advancing years and maturing mind lead him to neglect somewhat the beauty of external form. The style becomes more precise and didactic, at times even heavy and obscure,[3] the periods are more elaborate and the order of words less natural, the witty sallies and the poetic grace are lacking, the dramatic setting is almost lost. Moreover, the minuteness of distinction makes the style exceedingly dry and monotonous, while it causes the formation of many new words and endows others with new shades of meaning.[4] Certain formulae of question and answer, certain phrases and particles, and certain verbs of saying (A. J. P. X. 470) are used for the first time, or much more frequently. There is a marked tendency to revert to Ionic and Old Attic words and forms, and to employ tragic diction. The latest works also show considerable care in the avoidance of hiatus.[5]

It is beyond our province to speak of the importance, the original-

[1] Engelhardt, de period. Pl struct. II., pp. 27, 29, notices that we sometimes find whole pages of infinitives.

[2] Cic. de Sen. V. 13.

[3] Dionys. ad Cn. Pomp. 2.

[4] The Soph. and Pol. have 270, the Tim., Crit., and Laws 1492 words not used elsewhere by Plato. v. Campbell, Introd. Soph. and Pol., p. xx; Jowett and Campbell, Rep. II. 46–61.

[5] Average 2–3 to a Teubner page. Blass, Att. Ber. II. 426.

ity, or the breadth of Platonic philosophy. Emerson calls his works "the Bible of the learned, out of which come all things that are still written and debated among men," and another writer says, "The philosophy of Plato rises before us as the mightiest and most permanent monument ever erected by unassisted human thought."

THE CHARMIDES, LACHES, AND LYSIS.

I. Literary Form.

In the same sense that Herodotus was the father of history, Plato may be called the creator of the philosophic dialogue, and moreover he was the first to clothe it in dramatic form, so that it is, to a certain degree, the forerunner of the modern prose drama. The analogy is so well sustained by the numerous indications of time and place, by the movements and emotions of the interlocutors, and by occasional parody of style or dialect, that we see the likeness to a tragedy in the Phaedo, to a comedy in the Protagoras, we may call the Euthydemus a satyr-play, or the great Republic a tetralogy. Indeed, the Protagoras was actually put on the stage in Roman times. The action is localized sometimes in a private house (Rep., Prot.), sometimes in a public square (Euth'o), in the palaestra (Char., Lys.) or at a banquet (Sym.), in the confinement of a prison (Crito, Phaedo) or in the freedom of the country (Phaedr.), but in every case the scene is presented clearly, and the surroundings often accurately and fully described (so Char., Lys.). Time is treated with poetic freedom, and we often find anachronisms,[1] of which the most famous are the dispersion of the Arcadians (385 B.C.) in the Symposium, and the bribing of Ismenias (395) in the Menon, dialogues in which Socrates (ob. 399) participates. Since the persons of the dialogue are drawn from everyday life, they seem more real than the characters of the drama itself, but as their delineation is only a means to an end, they are few in number and are not allowed to distract attention from the thought presented. Since they are typical of intellectual and moral tendencies, they have a universal and lasting value, and the lines are more subtly drawn than for the mere individual.

[1] Zeller, Berlin Academy, 1873.

Plato's own rule was σμικρόν τι μέρος ἐν πολλῷ λόγῳ τῆς μιμήσεως (Rep. 396 E). The chorus, which the later comedy discarded entirely, survives here only in the audience, whose presence is indicated by applause or by occasional comments in the mouth of a minor interlocutor, such as Chaerephon in the Gorgias. Furthermore, the dialogues have a unity of action, complete in itself and limited in extent,[1] which distinguishes them from the continuous memoirs of Xenophon, as the dramatic representation from the historical account. It is not alone by the external form but also by the internal structure that the analogy to the drama is maintained. There are definite divisions in the dialogues which correspond roughly to the acts of a play, and these are usually marked, as in tragedy, by the entrance or retirement of an interlocutor; sometimes the change is announced beforehand (so 2. 15, 10. 32). The acts are not necessarily five in number, any more than in the drama, although this is usually the case (v. Analysis of Char., Lach., Lys.). At any rate within the frame of an introduction and conclusion some difficulty is developed, and then partially or completely solved. Doubt and perplexity are created in the mind, just as tragedy inspires fear and pity in the heart, that by their removal the purifying effect may be produced, which Aristotle prescribed as an essential of the tragic drama. Although in structure tragedy furnishes the model, and the irony and word-play belong to this sphere, the dialogue is closer to comedy in its tone and mode of treatment as well as in the humor, the parody, and the satire, although much more delicate and refined. As an early critic observed, Aristophanes excites our laughter, but Plato provokes a smile. We know, in fact, that he was a careful student of the great comedian, as well as of the prose mimes of the Sicilian Sophron.

Although the greatest perfection is attained in the longer dialogues, the more youthful works, like brief interludes, often exhibit many features of dramatic art. The Charmides and Lysis present the same typical Athenian scene; the young men, as eager to develop the mind as the body, leaving their athletic sports to cluster around Socrates and learn the lessons of abstruse philosophy, admiring now the wisdom of the teacher, now the beauty of the pupil. Both these dialogues are

[1] Ar. Poet. ch. 7.

enlivened with the same humor and adorned with the same richness of dramatic setting, but the Charmides has the more perfect form and a calm and statuesque dignity that gives somewhat the effect of sculpture (Taine). When we remember that these are perhaps the earliest works of Plato that we possess, and that he is said to have written dramas in his youth, we see that he is still under the inspiration of Dionysius, and still employs the methods of composition which were consecrated to the honor of the god. In the Laches the youthful vivacity and playfulness are lacking and the scenery is less prominent, but irony and witty repartee enliven the discussion, in spite of the more serious and earnest tone. Though the introduction of the Charmides seems long in proportion to the rest of the dialogue, it not only lays down foundation principles for the philosophic discussion (v. p. xxi), but it serves to present living examples of temperance, alike in the youthful Charmides to whom the world is yet untried, and in the more mature Socrates, who has withstood the temptations of his own perverse nature (v. Note 3. 22). So the Lysis shows us the two friends, the Laches the two generals, who, in each case, typify the virtue about to be discussed, as in the opening of the Republic we see the incarnation of justice in aged Cephalus. Finally, each of our three dialogues consists of two parts, a popular and a scientific, and each section is discussed by a person especially adapted to that mode of treatment.

II. Characters.

In the Charmides and Lysis, as in all the earlier dialogues, the chief interlocutor and the conductor of the investigation is the great teacher in whom Plato has merged his own personality, the wisest and best man of ancient times. Socrates,[1] son of Sophroniscus, a sculptor, and Phaenarete, a midwife, was born about 469, and drank the fatal hemlock in the Athenian prison, May, 399. Though by birth belonging only to the middle class, he associated intimately with the most aristocratic families, as our own dialogue shows. Nor did he neglect his duties as a citizen. He fought bravely at Potidaea, Delium, and

[1] The best sketch of his life is found in Grote's History of Greece, ch. 68.

Amphipolis (v. Note 30. 3); as prytanis in 406 he defended the generals returned from Arginusae; he married a wife, the famous Xanthippe, and reared children for the state. But his chief concern in life was the search for truth, everywhere, at all times, with all people, and, making mankind his study, he feared neither tyrant nor sophist, but resolutely attacked all error, conceit, and sham, that he might find the real and abiding essence.[1] Barefooted at all seasons and awkward in his gait, a single dingy cloak covering a robust figure hardened to heat, cold, or fatigue, a face so ugly as to be a byword, yet showing the strength of mastered passions,[2] a hard but steady drinker, playful and witty, yet devout, he had a homely eloquence that caused the hearts of young men to throb and their tears to flow, and despite his rough exterior, he was, like the king's daughter, "all beautiful within."[3] His modesty (56. 5), real or assumed, that led him naïvely to profess his ignorance (Note 14. 5–6), and the keen and subtle irony (v. 42. 1, 46. 23, etc.), which was so powerful an instrument in his dialectic method, are his most prominent characteristics. The two principles of investigation which Aristotle ascribes to Socrates as his peculiar property are induction and definition. The first step in induction is the example, which is often drawn from the most ordinary spheres of action (Notes 18. 20, 46. 26). His refined friends objected to his vulgarity, but its familiar character added to its force, and the great teacher of Galilee consecrated it by frequent use. The usual result of the inductive example is the definition (v. Note 40. 28), which is necessary to the exact knowledge demanded by Socrates, and the dialectic portion of our dialogues is made up largely of these two elements. Since Socrates, like Christ, left no written memorial, we must depend on the testimony of his disciples, Plato and Xenophon. Though the former often blends his own thought with the conceptions of his master, and develops as well as reproduces, his powers of dramatic presentation are so great, and his appreciation so refined, that he gives a more vivid and sympathetic account, and so paints a

[1] v. Notes 10. 31, 13. 11, 15. 23.

[2] v. Note 3. 22.

[3] The *locus classicus* for Socrates' personality is Alcibiades' description, Sym. 215–222.

truer picture than does Xenophon. Following the indications given by the earlier dialogues, we learn how eminently familiar and conversational was the language and style of Socrates. The modest litotes (Note 13. 33), the sportive fancy that led to mock solemnity (Notes 3. 22, 18. 14) or to a clever play upon words, the abundant proverbs (Note 2. 17) and the many cases of etymological construction (Note 16. 31), contribute to the familiarity of his discourse. His fondness for oaths and interjections (Note 2. 31) illustrates the same tendency. The carelessness of compact structure and the lack of grammatical consistency, which he himself confesses in the Symposium (199 B), are manifested in frequent anacolutha (Notes 4. 16, 20. 29, 42. 17) and parentheses (Note 18. 14), in the omission of conjunctions (asyndeton), and in careless repetitions (Note 4. 34), all of which imitate the movement of easy conversation.

Chaerephon's function, as in the Gorgias, is merely introductory and mediatory, and after presenting Socrates to Critias he retires from the field. He must have been nearly as old as Socrates, for he was the friend of his youth, and the same enthusiastic devotion which he displays in our dialogue led him to ask the Delphic oracle to indorse the wisdom of his master (Apol. 21 A). He was ridiculed by Aristophanes as the model Socratic pupil, and in the Gorgias he imitates his master's manner. His lean figure, his sallow face, and his hasty movements won him the nickname of "the bat." His hot temper got him into difficulty with his younger brother, but he was easily reconciled (Mem. II. 3). He did not survive his friend and teacher.

Critias and Charmides were both near relatives of Plato, the former being his mother's cousin, the latter her brother (Note 6. 8), and he was naturally disposed to present them in a favorable light. He gives Critias an honorable place in the Timaeus as well as in the dialogue that bears his name, where he relates the traditions of Athens' earliest history with such skill and learning that he wins the praise of Socrates (Tim. 20 B). In our dialogue Socrates treats him with great respect and delicately alludes to his poetic skill (11. 7). Indeed, Critias was one of the most versatile and gifted men of Athens, for he was not only successful in tragedy and elegy, but he was an able orator and historian; so the famous Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία in the Xenophontean cor-

pus was ascribed to him by Böckh. He gave, moreover, such attention to abstract knowledge that he was called 'a philosopher among dilettanti, though a dilettante among philosophers.' So, although Critias is known to history as the most greedy and cruel of the Thirty Tyrants, there was a more agreeable side to his character, and this Plato wishes to bring to our notice. Critias was, however, as much devoted to the sophists as to Socrates, as appears in the Protagoras, where he mediates between them (336 E), and we may notice indications of sophistic training in our dialogue (Note 11. 30). Thus he employs longer and more artistic periods (13. 8 ff.), he is confident of success (Note 12. 23), he follows Prodicus in the distinction of synonyms (12. 12), and he refuses to acknowledge his own definition (9. 29, cf. Prot. 331 E). Moreover, he betrays his aristocratic prejudices by his preference for τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, since if each man minds his own business, the nobles will rule and the rest must obey. Xenophon maintains that Critias frequented Socrates' society merely in order to be better equipped for his political career, and we know that when he came into power, he showed little respect for his former teacher, but rudely bade him quit his prating of artisans and shepherds, of justice and virtue, lest he suffer for it.[1] There has been an attempt to identify Callicles in the Gorgias with Critias, and the theory seems plausible. Both change ground and object to Socrates' dialectic method[2] or the vulgarity of his examples,[3] both defend πλεονεκτεῖν,[4] both enter the discussion suddenly at a critical moment; they entertain the same aristocratic sentiments, yet use democracy to further their ends.[5] Still other points of similarity might be mentioned.

Charmides and Lysis belong to a class of young men[6] of which Phaedrus is the type. Modest and retiring (59. 5), prone to blush when disconcerted (v. Note 6. 28) yet eager for discussion (58. 16–19), rich and aristocratic (6. 7, 57. 10–17), beautiful in form and pure in heart (5. 33–4, 59. 1), their fresh and buoyant natures enliven the

[1] Xen. Mem. I. 2. 37.
[2] 13. 11, 14. 22, 15. 8–13, Gorg. 497 A.
[3] 11. 32, Gorg. 491 A.
[4] Gorg. 483 D, Xen. Hell. II. 3. 16.
[5] Gorg. 489 C, 481 E.
[6] Taine, *Les jeunes gens de Platon, Essais de critique*, pp. 155–197.

Platonic pages and endow them with a special grace. Charmides added to the natural advantages of his position some skill in poetry (3. 6) and was enough of an athlete to train for the Nemean games (Theag. 128 DE). It may have been in sports that he lost his fortune, for he jokes about his poverty in Xenophon's Symposium (IV. 29). There is a trace of mischievous humor in his suggestion of Critias' ignorance (10. 30–32, cf. 26. 1). Though he went with his guardian to hear the sophists (Prot. 315 A), he was one of Socrates' most devoted followers (Sym. 222 A). The philosopher urged him to enter public life (Mem. III. 7), and to overcome by a knowledge of himself the timidity which continued even into manhood. However, when actually in the political arena, he followed his aristocratic friends, was made one of the committee of Ten, who ruled the Piraeus under the Thirty, and was slain with Critias while defending the unrighteous cause (Hell. II. 4. 19).

Lysis is younger than his companions, and his conversation is full of boyish frankness and naïveté. The needless details added to his answers, his frequent oaths (ch. 4), and his mischievous desire to see his saucy cousin discomfited (63. 14), are evidences of his youth. Though he is too bashful to join the company without some excuse (59. 5), he can laugh merrily at Socrates' questions (60. 31), and becomes so interested that he answers out of turn (66. 4). Socrates, accordingly, adopts a simpler style, asks naïve questions (*e.g.* 60. 34), draws his examples from family life, and treats the subject more fully. We know nothing further of Lysis, nor yet of Hippothales, the sentimental lover, who wearies his friends by his poems and his eulogies, though he too can blush and change color (56. 7, 75. 4). Ctesippus is pert, impatient, at times even rude (63. 29), but he is good at heart (Phaedo 59 A). In the Euthydemus he has a more important rôle, and shows his cleverness and wit as well as his roughness.[1] Menexenus is probably the same as the Menexenus who gives his name to one of the dialogues. Both he and Ctesippus were with Socrates in his last hours.

In contrast to the two other dialogues, the Laches puts the young people quite in the background, in fact, they utter scarcely a word

[1] 284 D, 299 E, 284 E, 288 A, 298 B to 299 E.

(29. 31), but their devotion to Socrates serves to introduce him to their parents. Though they made considerable progress under his instruction, they did not persevere in their studies, but through evil association soon lost all that they had gained (Theat. 150 DE). The old men, Lysimachus and Melesias, are so closely united as to make practically one character, and are usually addressed and mentioned together (28. 30, 35. 30, etc.). Lysimachus is rather the more energetic of the two, but he suffers from the infirmities of age (29. 18–20, 39. 23–5), and his prefatory remarks are so diffuse and verbose that he himself realizes his weakness (27. 11). His life of narrow seclusion has kept him from acquaintance with the almost omnipresent Socrates, and he has no independent views of his own. Besides, the glory of his father, the great Aristides, makes his own insignificance more apparent. Melesias, too, though a great wrestler in his youth (Meno 94 C), did nothing to equal the fame of Thucydides, his father, the statesman and opponent of Pericles, and his share in the dialogue (34. 2–28) is confined to a few brief answers. Laches and Nicias, on whom the burden of the discussion rests, were leaders of the aristocratic party and had great influence in the state. Like all men of noble birth, they admired Spartan institutions (v. Note 31. 34) and favored peace. All that we know of Laches' life is that he led an expedition to Sicily (v. Note 33. 10), served as hoplite at Delium (v. Note 30. 3), was associated with Nicias in negotiating the peace of 421 (Thuc. V. 43), and fell at Mantinea in 418. The allusion to Delium in 30. 3 and the date of Laches' death enable us to fix the time when the conversation is supposed to take place. Laches is, first of all, a practical man: he has had no experience in abstract thinking (45. 27) and cannot form a general conception, he is confident (41. 10) and hasty in his conclusions, he appeals to facts (ἔργα; 32. 18, 38. 29), which, however, have no bearing on the question, and he is guided largely by his prejudices (*cf.* 31. 34). Furthermore, there is in his character a strong tendency to criticise. This appears in his first words (29. 5–9), again in the keen satire of Stesilaos (32. 24 ff.), but especially in his bitter and scornful attacks on Nicias (33. 9, 47. 1, 5, 11, 49. 25, 50. 6, 11, 19). Even Socrates does not escape (35. 23). His impatience and anger cause him twice (48. 33, 50. 24) to give up the

discussion, but he is finally reconciled (53. 30–34), and it is perhaps because he learns the most that the dialogue bears his name. Nicias, after the death of Pericles (429), was the most highly esteemed citizen of Athens, because of his integrity and piety and the generous use of his great wealth in public works and in private benefactions. As a general he took a kindly interest in the welfare of his soldiers, and by his prudence gained considerable success (Thuc. III. 51, 91, IV. 42, 53, 129), but he lacked energy, promptness, and decision, and was often hampered by superstitious fears (v. Note 48. 7). Sent to Sicily against his will in 415, after many disasters, for which he was himself largely responsible, he met his death at Syracuse in 413. Nicias presents throughout a strong contrast to Laches. Quiet, thoughtful, and mild (v. Notes 49. 34, 50. 19), he is ready to accept new ideas (30. 28), and is fond of argument. He is eminently a theorist, and restricts courage to knowledge. While Laches knows Socrates only on the battle-field, Nicias has attended his instruction as well as the lectures of the sophists (38. 7, 53. 17, 26), so that he is familiar with Socratic doctrines (46. 14) and makes better progress. Each general presents the aspect of courage that is consistent with his own experience, but it is Socrates alone that unites both qualities in his own character and presents a perfect example.

III. Philosophic Contents.

The Charmides.

A. Analysis and Abstract.

I. *Introduction* (πρόλογος), *ch.* 1–6.

(*a*) Socrates returns from Potidaea, and, meeting some friends in the palaestra, tells them of the battle. He then inquires about the young men, and is introduced to Charmides, whose soul is as beautiful as his body (ch. 1–3). (*b*) Socrates poses as a physician, and offers a remedy for Charmides' headache, which must be accompanied by a charm. This consists in fair words, which will cure the soul, the source of good and evil to the body, and impart temperance. Although Critias declares that Charmides already possesses this virtue, the latter consents to submit to an examination (ch. 4–6).

II. *The Definitions of Charmides* (ἐπίτασις), *ch.* 7–9.

(*a*) Being asked to define temperance, he replies that it is (1st) *quietness*, but he is shown that activity is often preferable to inaction, and since temperance is always desirable, this definition cannot stand (ch. 7). (*b*) Charmides is urged to regard his inner self rather than outward appearances, and he defines temperance as (2d) *modesty*. This goes deeper, but modesty is sometimes out of place, while temperance never is (ch. 8). (*c*) He then quotes the opinion that it is (3d) *doing one's own business;* but all artisans work for other people, so the definition is not clear. Critias, from whom Charmides had borrowed the statement, becomes impatient to define it, and takes his cousin's place (ch. 9).

III. *The Definitions of Critias* (πλοκή), *ch.* 10–14.

(*a*) Critias distinguishes "doing" and "making," for while work (making) is vulgar, (4th) *doing* applies only to *what is good.* From this it would follow that one can be temperate without knowing it, for good may be done unwittingly (ch. 10, 11). (*b*) This forces home to Critias the importance of knowledge, so he takes a fresh start, and declares temperance to be (5th) *self-knowledge.* Being asked what is the product of such knowledge, or to what object it is directed, he replies that it differs from all other sciences, for it has no external object or product, but is (6th) *the knowledge of itself and of other sciences* (ch. 12–14).

IV. *The Discussion of Socrates* (λύσις), *ch.* 15–22.

Taking more definite control of the conversation, Socrates considers (*a*) the possibility of such knowledge. If we know what we know, we must also know what we do not know. This is neither subjectively nor objectively true of other mental activities, which makes the question more perplexing (ch. 15, 16). We then pass to an examination of (*b*) the utility of this knowledge (18. 12), which further implies that we must know what others know and do not know. This cannot be, since temperance does not teach technical details, nor does it make learning easier. In short, we only know *that* we know and not know

(19. 26) (ch. 17, 18). (*c*) Even if we knew what we know, it would only increase material prosperity, and it is still uncertain *what kind* of knowledge brings real happiness (ch. 19–21). (*d*) Critias then suggests (7th) *the knowledge of good and evil* (23. 29). But if temperance is only a knowledge of knowledge, it can have no part in specific sciences, and since all happiness comes from the knowledge of good and evil, temperance is of no practical utility (ch. 22).

V. *Conclusion* (καταστροφή), *ch.* 23, 24.

Such a conclusion is absurd, and we have failed to discover the nature of temperance; the fault must lie in Socrates' stupidity. Charmides, however, has confidence in him, and resolves to follow his guidance in the future.

Summary of the definitions proposed.

I. Superficial. (1) Quietness. (2) Modesty.

II. Universal. A. Action (3) Doing one's business. (4) Doing good. B. Knowledge (5) of self, (6) of knowledge, (7) of good and evil.

B. RESULTS OBTAINED.

In the introduction Socrates himself defines temperance as the health of the soul and the control of the body. It is the harmony of all the virtues rather than itself a single virtue (cf. Prot. 330 AB). Starting with this assumption, Socrates leads the discussion by a gradual development to the desired end. He rejects the first three definitions as insufficient, and objects to the fourth as superficial, since it lacks the knowledge which is at the basis of right action. The identification of virtue with knowledge is a genuine Socratic doctrine,[1] and when *self-knowledge* is proposed, we feel that we are on the right track. The discussion of the knowledge of knowledge consumes so much time that it seems more important than it really is. Plato, however, by leaving the investigation unfinished, shows clearly that this course will not lead us to the truth, and Socrates declares (21. 30)

[1] 46. 14–15, Mem. III. 9. 5.

that all their labor was in vain. He here makes Critias responsible for the definition, and he himself explicitly rejects the ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης in the Theaetetus (200 BC). But when knowledge takes on a moral tone and is limited to the good and evil, Socrates shows by his delight (23. 29 ff., cf. Gorg. 499 B) that the goal has at last been reached, for nowhere else can true utility be found. Now we may weave the tangled threads together, joining good knowledge and the resultant good action to the health of the soul with which we began, and we gain the complete definition of temperance. The result then is only apparently negative, and as in the other earlier dialogues, the intelligent reader is left to draw the conclusion. Socrates has practically demonstrated that ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης is not temperance, and his negation of success really applies to this point alone. Charmides, by his determination to follow Socrates, and Critias, by his approval of this course, show that they understand the true meaning veiled by the Socratic irony, and are satisfied with the results. Moreover, Socrates himself consents to impart temperance (26. 11), so he must have reached an understanding of its nature.

The Laches.

A. ANALYSIS AND ABSTRACT.

I. *Introduction* (πρόλογος), *ch.* 1–8.

(*a*) *Lysimachus* and Melesias wish their sons to have a better education than they themselves received, and ask the advice of Nicias and Laches regarding the importance of fencing (ch. 1, 2). (*b*) At Laches' suggestion, *Socrates*, as a philosopher and also a brave soldier, is invited to join their deliberations (ch. 3, 4). (*c*) *Nicias* approves of fencing, as tending to strengthen the body, prepare young men for military service, and make them more courageous (ch. 5), but (*d*) *Laches* rejects the art because the Spartans do not practise it, and fencing-masters make no better soldiers than other men, though more is expected of them (ch. 6–8).

II. *Preparation and Specialization* (ἐπίτασις), *ch.* 9–16.

(*a*) Socrates is asked to cast the deciding vote, but such weighty matters can only be determined by a trained man. He himself is too poor to be taught by the sophists, but the two generals should be well informed on such matters. Since, however, they disagree, they must prove their knowledge by telling *who their teachers* were, or whom they have taught (ch. 9–11). (*b*) Nicias is well acquainted with *Socrates' dialectic skill*, by which he gives a personal application to every discussion, while Laches has full confidence in him, because he has seen *his valiant deeds* (ch. 12–14). (*c*) Socrates now proposes that, since they wish to make the boys virtuous, they first try to discover what virtue is, or, still better, *consider only the nature of courage*, the part of virtue that fencing claims to produce (ch. 15–16).

III. *The Definition of Laches* (πλοκή), *ch.* 17–21.

(*a*) Laches declares the brave man to be *one who stands in line to meet the enemy*, but Socrates shows that a man may be brave even in flight, and may exhibit courage in emotion or in poverty (ch. 17–18). (*b*) Laches now defines courage as *constancy of the soul*, but, as bravery is a good thing, he is forced to limit it to *reasonable* constancy. This appears, however, in business and in medical practice, where there is no question of courage, and, on the other hand, the soldier who ignorantly resists superior force is braver than his skilled opponent (ch. 19, 20). (*c*) Laches is disgusted at his failure (ch. 21).

IV. *The Definition of Nicias* (λύσις), *ch.* 22–29.

(*a*) Nicias now suggests that courage is *the knowledge of things dangerous and safe*, but Laches objects that this is also possessed by physicians and farmers. Nicias replies that, at any rate, physicians do not know whether death or recovery will be better for the sick. Only the soothsayer knows the future, says Laches, so he must be brave. Yet, says Nicias, even he does not know whether death is really an evil. Laches thinks this is all foolishness (ch. 22–24). (*b*) It is suggested that the *brute beasts* are usually considered brave, but Nicias

replies that they are ignorant of danger, and so, *merely fearless* (ch. 25, 26). (*c*) Socrates shows that since fear (δέος) is the expectation of coming evil, danger (τὰ δεινά) lies only in the future, and courage would be the knowledge of simply future good and evil; but since knowledge really admits of no limitation in time, the definition should read, *knowledge* (not of danger merely) but *of all good and evil.* This, however, is virtue itself, not one of its parts, and cannot stand as the definition of courage (ch. 27–29).

V. *Conclusion* (καταστροφή), *ch.* 30, 31.

Laches rejoices over Nicias' discomfiture, and commends the boys to the care of Socrates. To this Nicias agrees, though he believes that he has himself come near to the truth.

B. REMARKS.

The two definitions of Laches are practically one, for the second is only an extension of the first, a more general conception designed to meet the objections advanced by Socrates, but both are finally rejected (45. 9–10). In discussing the definition of Nicias, Socrates assumes that courage is a part of virtue, but he does not prove this, whereas the definition is introduced as Socratic, and is then amplified and improved. In fact, Socrates does not criticise the definition itself, but only its relation to the above supposition, and it is the latter which is really put to the test. If the two disagree, it does not follow that the definition is wrong, but either it or the supposition must be discarded, so that the rejection of the definition (53. 5) is manifestly illogical, and is not seriously intended. As in the Charmides and Lysis, the apparent failure is only a sort of philosophic irony, and it is expected that the reader will form the correct conclusion. Socrates says, it is true, ὁμοίως πάντες ἐν ἀπορίᾳ ἐγενόμεθα (54. 15), but only because he never raises himself above the other interlocutors, while they would not all express such confidence in him, if he had been unsuccessful. Though Laches admits his failure, Nicias, who is never ironical, claims to be right, and his definition agrees with Prot. 360 D. Moreover, he is a representative Socratic pupil (38. 7, 53. 17, 26), and can understand his master better than the rest. His definition, then, must be accepted,

and the supposition that virtue is made up of parts cannot stand. In fact, it seems to be the real purpose of the dialogue to show that virtue is single and indivisible, as the Republic and Protagoras teach, and is the knowledge of good and evil; courage is, then, only an example chosen to illustrate this truth.

The discussion, however, is felt to be incomplete (53. 25–27); it needs a better foundation (βεβαίωσις), for it is not proven that virtue is knowledge, and it needs correction (ἐπανόρθωσις), since it does not appear what is the real nature of good and evil. These points are given full treatment in the Protagoras, so that the Laches merely serves to prepare the way for the greater dialogue.

The Lysis.

A. ABSTRACT AND ANALYSIS.

I. *Introduction, ch.* 1–3.

Socrates meets some young friends and learns of Hippothales' extravagant love. They enter a palaestra, where Socrates offers to teach Hippothales dialectic as a better means of success than poetry.

II. *Socrates and Lysis, ch.* 4–6.

Socrates shows Lysis that his parents' loving restraint is intended to confine him to those occupations with which he is sufficiently acquainted to be of some use. This is also true in trade and politics. Friendship is based on utility.

III. *Socrates and Menexenus, ch.* 7–9.

When one man loves another without return, which is the *friend? Both* are not, since one does not love, nor can we say *neither* is, for there are friends of wine, of wisdom; not the lover, nor yet the loved one, for each might be the friend of his enemy, which is absurd.

IV. *Socrates, Lysis, and Menexenus, ch.* 10–18.

(*a*) Does like love like? The bad cannot, for they are never at unity with each other. The good cannot be the friend of the good,

since like cannot add anything to like, and without benefit there is no friendship (ch. 10, 11). (*b*) Nor can the unlike be friends, for the good cannot love the bad (ch. 12). (*c*) The indifferent (neither good nor bad) is friend to the good, but only when there is an addition of the bad. So the body needs a physician only when sick (ch. 13, 14). (*d*) But friendship must have a reason and a purpose. So the body needs medicine for the sake of health. Yet health is not an end in itself, and we must seek that end which alone is loved for its own sake, and of which all else is but the shadow (ch. 15, 16). (*e*) We love the good, because it is a remedy for the adherent bad. Yet if there were no such thing as bad, we should still love the good, for there are desires which are merely indifferent (hunger). Therefore friendship is really due to the presence of desire, not to the adherence of the bad. We desire what we have lost, what belongs to us (οἰκεῖον) (ch. 17). (*f*) This last is true only if our own (οἰκεῖον) is different from the like (ὅμοιον), and so we assume it to be. Since we love the good and also our own, is the good identical with our own, and does the good belong to every one, or only the good to the good and the bad to the bad? The boys accept the latter alternative, and since like does not love like, the discussion has been fruitless (ch. 18).

V. *Epilogue.* The boys have to go home (75. 31–76. 10).

B. REMARKS.

The Lysis treats of many emotions, not of friendship alone, and their common basis is desire. The foundation thought, from which the discussion starts, is that all desire is directed toward the useful (62. 25–26), and this is repeated at the close (75. 10). The example of parents' love to children (II.) is chosen because it is extreme, and so proves the universality of the rule. 65. 15–17 shows that the parents do not seek selfish utility. Plato then demonstrates (III.) the falsity of the usual conceptions of friendship, and finally (IV.) comes to the conclusion that the good is the highest object of desire. The apparent failure of the discussion lies merely in the thoughtless answer of the boys. They forget that, as they have just said, the like is different from our own, while if the good belongs to the good, like would belong to

like, and like be the same as our own. Therefore, the good can only belong to the unlike, *i.e.* to the indifferent. If we, however, do what the boys failed to do, and admit that the good belongs to every one, we obtain a positive and logical result. The good has an absolute value, and the desire for the good is the basis not only of friendship, but of every human aspiration.

Though the Lysis seems like a comparatively slight performance, it contains the germs of all Platonic philosophy, and is closely related to several important dialogues (v. p. xxv). The nature of the good is treated more fully in the Protagoras and Gorgias; in fact, the latter work makes the same division of good, bad, and indifferent (467 E, cf. Sym. 202 B), and repeats that desire which looks beyond the present object to the final good (468 B). The Phaedrus[1] continues in a poetic form the idea that the good is our original possession, and the Symposium[2] studies the desires more carefully, and elaborates the conception that love arises from seeking its own, which it has lost.

There is a tradition that Socrates read the Lysis and exclaimed, "By Heracles, how many lies this young man has told about me." Although the story may be a mere invention, the elementary nature of the dialogue, both in structure and contents, makes it probable that it is the earliest of the Platonic dialogues. Certain linguistic tests (v. p. x), the beauty of its style, and its advance on the pure Socratic teaching have induced some scholars to put it much later, but statistics in such matters can only be confirmatory, not determinative: the literary excellence is characteristic of youthful fancy rather than of matured art, and in his first essay Plato may have taken steps ahead of his master, which it did not suit his purpose to take in the succeeding dialogues of the earlier period.

IV. Chronology of the Dialogues.

The dialogues with which the Charmides has the closest affinity are the Lysis, Laches, and Protagoras. Both the dramatic form and philo-

[1] Ast compares 66. 34 and Phr. 255 B *inter al.*

[2] 62. 20–9 and Sym. 205 E, 66. 20–5 and Sym. 195 B, 68. 13–19 and Sym. 186 D, 70. 26–33 and Sym. 204 A.

sophic contents of the Lysis connect it very closely with the Charmides. In the Lysis only boys participate, and Socrates suggests their answers to them; in the Charmides a full-grown man appears, who uses his own experience and draws his own conclusions, so that the discussion is deeper and more independent. The Lysis teaches that human endeavor is not worthy in itself, but only when directed toward the highest good; the Charmides, that the sciences, which aid this endeavor, must seek the same end. In the one dialogue the good is praised, in the other the knowledge of the good. The Charmides extends the views propounded in the Lysis and must be later. The Laches also employs the same method of investigation as the Charmides. Both attack the virtues first from their external side, then pass, with a change of interlocutor (so also the Gorgias), to deeper aspects of the question; both uphold the knowledge of the good (v. 52. 32). The Laches, however, states the result more clearly, and hints at the existence of separate virtues, which the Charmides does not recognize. It thus marks the transition to the Protagoras, where the single virtues are distinguished, and by their common reference to the knowledge of good are made to prove the unity of virtue (Note 40. 31). The Lysis, Charmides, and Laches are so closely related that Christ believes they were published in one volume by Plato himself some time before 390. We cannot fix the date more precisely, for it must always remain uncertain whether Plato published anything before the death of Socrates.[1] Scholars are very evenly divided on this question, and after all it is more or less a matter of individual feeling. It is hardly likely that our dialogues were intended to serve any but a philosophic purpose, unless it be to honor the memory of Socrates. Steinhart, however, suggests that the Charmides was written in 404, in order to win back Critias and Charmides to a better life, while Teichmüller holds that Plato (about 393) is defending his relatives against the aspersions contained in Xenophon's Memorabilia. He conceives the Charmides to be a sort of criticism or recension of this work, wherein Plato also ridicules certain philosophic doctrines set forth by Xenophon (Note 12. 26). The genuineness of the Charmides, Laches,

[1] Grote (Plato, I. 328–334) gives a good summary of the arguments for the negative.

and Lysis is so generally accepted that it is hardly necessary to defend them against the attacks of Ast and Schaarschmidt, whose criticism is so severe that they accept the one only fourteen, the other only nine dialogues. Their literary excellence, their Platonic diction, and their agreement with the greater dialogues place them above suspicion. It is only fair to say, however, that the Lysis does not stand on quite so sure a footing as the Charmides and Laches.

ΧΑΡΜΙΔΗΣ

ἢ περὶ σωφροσύνης.

TIME: 432 B.C. PLACE: The palaestra of Taureas.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΧΑΙΡΕΦΩΝ, ΚΡΙΤΙΑΣ, ΧΑΡΜΙΔΗΣ.

1. Ἥκον μὲν τῇ προτεραίᾳ ἑσπέρας ἐκ Ποτειδαίας ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου, οἷον δὲ διὰ χρόνου ἀφιγμένος ἄσμενος ἦα ἐπὶ τὰς συνήθεις διατριβάς. καὶ δὴ καὶ εἰς τὴν Ταυρέου παλαίστραν τὴν καταντικρὺ τοῦ τῆς βασίλης ἱεροῦ εἰσῆλθον, καὶ αὐτόθι κατέλαβον πάνυ πολλούς, τοὺς μὲν καὶ ἀγνῶτας ἐμοί, τοὺς δὲ πλείστους γνωρίμους. καί με ὡς εἶδον εἰσιόντα ἐξ ἀπροσδοκήτου, εὐθὺς πόρρωθεν ἠσπάζοντο ἄλλος ἄλλοθεν· Χαιρεφῶν δέ, ἅτε καὶ μανικὸς ὤν, ἀναπηδήσας ἐκ μέσων ἔθει πρός με, καί μου λαβόμενος τῆς χειρός, Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἦ δ' ὅς, πῶς ἐσώθης ἐκ τῆς μάχης; ὀλίγου δὲ πρὶν ἡμᾶς ἀπιέναι μάχη ἐγεγόνειν ἐν τῇ Ποτειδαίᾳ, ἣν ἄρτι ἦσαν οἱ τῇδε πεπυσμένοι. καὶ ἐγὼ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀποκρινόμενος, Οὕτωσί, ἔφην, ὡς σὺ ὁρᾷς. Καὶ μὴν ἤγγελταί γε δεῦρο, ἔφη, ἥ τε μάχη πάνυ ἰσχυρὰ γεγονέναι καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ πολλοὺς τῶν γνωρίμων τεθνάναι. Καὶ ἐπιεικῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ ἀπήγγελται. Παρεγένου μέν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τῇ μάχῃ; Παρεγενόμην. Δεῦρο δή, ἔφη, καθεζόμενος ἡμῖν διήγησαι· οὐ γάρ τί πω πάντα σαφῶς πεπύσμεθα. καὶ ἅμα με καθίζει ἄγων παρὰ Κριτίαν τὸν Καλλαίσχρου. παρακαθεζόμενος οὖν ἠσπαζόμην τόν τε Κριτίαν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ διηγούμην αὐτοῖς τὰ ἀπὸ στρατοπέδου, ὅ τί μέ τις ἀνέροιτο· ἠρώτων δὲ ἄλλος ἄλλο.

2. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων ἄδην εἴχομεν, αὖθις ἐγὼ αὐτοὺς ἀνηρώτων τὰ τῇδε, περὶ φιλοσοφίας ὅπως ἔχοι τὰ νῦν, περί

τε τῶν νέων, εἴ τινες ἐν αὐτοῖς διαφέροντες ἢ σοφίᾳ ἢ κάλλει ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ἐγγεγονότες εἶεν. καὶ ὁ Κριτίας ἀποβλέψας πρὸς τὴν θύραν, ἰδών τινας νεανίσκους εἰσιόντας καὶ λοιδορουμένους ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἄλλον ὄχλον ὄπισθεν ἑπόμενον, Περὶ μὲν τῶν καλῶν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὐτίκα μοι δοκεῖς εἴσεσθαι· οὗτοι γὰρ τυγχάνουσιν οἱ εἰσιόντες πρόδρομοί τε καὶ ἐρασταὶ ὄντες τοῦ δοκοῦντος καλλίστου εἶναι τά γε δὴ νῦν· φαίνεται δέ μοι καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγγὺς ἤδη που εἶναι προσιών. Ἔστιν δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τίς τε καὶ τοῦ; Οἶσθά που σύ γε, ἔφη, ἀλλ' οὔπω ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ἦν πρίν σε ἀπιέναι, Χαρμίδην τὸν τοῦ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ ἡμετέρου θείου υἱόν, ἐμὸν δὲ ἀνεψιόν. Οἶδα μέντοι νὴ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐ γάρ τι φαῦλος οὐδὲ τότε ἦν ἔτι παῖς ὤν, νῦν δ' οἶμαί που εὖ μάλα ἂν ἤδη μειράκιον εἴη. Αὐτίκα, ἔφη, εἴσει καὶ ἡλίκος καὶ οἷος γέγονεν. καὶ ἅμα ταῦτ' αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ὁ Χαρμίδης εἰσέρχεται.

3. Ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐδὲν σταθμητόν· ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ λευκὴ στάθμη εἰμὶ πρὸς τοὺς καλούς· σχεδὸν γάρ τί μοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ καλοὶ φαίνονται· ἀτὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τότε ἐκεῖνος ἐμοὶ θαυμαστὸς ἐφάνη τό τε μέγεθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος, οἱ δὲ δὴ ἄλλοι πάντες ἐρᾶν ἔμοιγε ἐδόκουν αὐτοῦ· οὕτως ἐκπεπληγμένοι τε καὶ τεθορυβημένοι ἦσαν, ἡνίκ' εἰσῆει· πολλοὶ δὲ δὴ ἄλλοι ἐρασταὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὄπισθεν εἵποντο. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἡμέτερον τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἦττον θαυμαστὸν ἦν· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ καὶ τοῖς παισὶ προσέσχον τὸν νοῦν, ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος' ἔβλεπεν αὐτῶν, οὐδ' ὅστις σμικρότατος ἦν, ἀλλὰ πάντες ὥσπερ ἄγαλμα ἐθεῶντο αὐτόν.

Καὶ ὁ Χαιρεφῶν καλέσας με, Τί σοι φαίνεται ὁ νεανίσκος, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὐκ εὐπρόσωπος; Ὑπερφυῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Οὗτος μέντοι, ἔφη, εἰ ἐθέλοι ἀποδῦναι, δόξει σοι ἀπρόσωπος εἶναι· οὕτως τὸ εἶδος πάγκαλός ἐστιν. Συνέφασαν οὖν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα τῷ Χαιρεφῶντι· κἀγώ, Ἡράκλεις, ἔφην, ὡς ἄμαχον λέγετε τὸν ἄνδρα, εἰ ἔτι αὐτῷ ἓν δὴ μόνον τυγχάνει προσὸν σμικρόν τι. Τί; ἔφη ὁ Κριτίας. Εἰ τὴν ψυχήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τυγχάνει εὖ πεφυκώς. πρέπει δέ που, ὦ Κριτία,

τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν εἶναι τῆς γε ὑμετέρας ὄντα οἰκίας. Ἀλλ', ἔφη, πάνυ καλὸς κἀγαθός ἐστιν καὶ ταῦτα. Τί οὖν, ἔφην, οὐκ ἀπεδύσαμεν αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἐθεασάμεθα πρότερον τοῦ εἴδους; πάντως γάρ που τηλικοῦτος ὢν ἤδη ἐθέλει διαλέγεσθαι. Καὶ πάνυ γε, ἔφη ὁ Κριτίας, ἐπεί τοι καὶ ἔστιν φιλόσοφός τε καί, ὡς δοκεῖ ἄλλοις τε καὶ ἐμαυτῷ, πάνυ ποιητικός. Τοῦτο μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Κριτία, πόρρωθεν ὑμῖν τὸ καλὸν ὑπάρχει ἀπὸ τῆς Σόλωνος συγγενείας. ἀλλὰ τί οὐκ ἐπέδειξάς μοι τὸν νεανίαν καλέσας δεῦρο; οὐδὲ γὰρ δή που εἰ ἐτύγχανεν ἔτι νεώτερος ὤν, αἰσχρὸν ἂν ἦν αὐτῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἡμῖν ἐναντίον γε σοῦ, ἐπιτρόπου τε ἅμα καὶ ἀνεψιοῦ ὄντος. Ἀλλὰ καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις, καὶ καλῶμεν αὐτόν. καὶ ἅμα πρὸς τὸν ἀκόλουθον, Παῖ, ἔφη, κάλει Χαρμίδην, εἰπὼν ὅτι βούλομαι αὐτὸν ἰατρῷ συστῆσαι περὶ τῆς ἀσθενείας ἧς πρῴην πρός με ἔλεγεν ὅτι ἀσθενοῖ. πρὸς οὖν ἐμὲ ὁ Κριτίας, Ἐναγχός τοι ἔφη βαρύνεσθαί τι τὴν κεφαλὴν ἔωθεν ἀνιστάμενος· ἀλλὰ τί σε κωλύει προσποιήσασθαι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαί τι κεφαλῆς φάρμακον; Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· μόνον ἐλθέτω. Ἀλλ' ἥξει, ἔφη.

4. Ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἐγένετο. ἦκε γάρ, καὶ ἐποίησε γέλωτα πολύν· ἕκαστος γὰρ ἡμῶν τῶν καθημένων συγχωρῶν τὸν πλησίον ἐώθει σπουδῇ, ἵνα παρ' αὐτῷ καθέζοιτο, ἕως τῶν ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ καθημένων τὸν μὲν ἀνεστήσαμεν, τὸν δὲ πλάγιον κατεβάλομεν. ὁ δ' ἐλθὼν μεταξὺ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ Κριτίου ἐκαθέζετο. ἐνταῦθα μέντοι, ὦ φίλε, ἐγὼ ἤδη ἠπόρουν, καί μου ἡ πρόσθεν θρασύτης ἐξεκέκοπτο, ἣν εἶχον ἐγὼ ὡς πάνυ ῥᾳδίως αὐτῷ διαλεξόμενος· ἐπειδὴ δέ, φράσαντος τοῦ Κριτίου ὅτι ἐγὼ εἴην ὁ τὸ φάρμακον ἐπιστάμενος, ἐνέβλεψέν τέ μοι τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀμήχανόν τι οἷον καὶ ἀνήγετο ὡς ἐρωτήσων, καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ παλαίστρᾳ ἅπαντες περιέρρεον ἡμᾶς κύκλῳ κομιδῇ, τότε δή, ὦ γεννάδα, εἶδόν τε τὰ ἐντὸς τοῦ ἱματίου καὶ ἐφλεγόμην καὶ οὐκέτ' ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ ἦν καὶ ἐνόμισα σοφώτατον εἶναι τὸν Κυδίαν τὰ ἐρωτικά, ὃς εἶπεν ἐπὶ καλοῦ λέγων παιδός, ἄλλῳ ὑποτιθέμενος, εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ κατέναντα λέοντος νεβρὸν ἐλθόντα †† μοῖραν αἱρεῖσθαι κρεῶν· αὐτὸς γάρ μοι ἐδόκουν ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου

θρέμματος ἐαλωκέναι. ὅμως δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐρωτήσαντος, εἰ ἐπισταίμην τὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς φάρμακον, μόγις πως ἀπεκρινάμην ὅτι ἐπισταίμην. Τί οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐστίν; καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι αὐτὸ μὲν εἴη φύλλον τι, ἐπῳδὴ δέ τις ἐπὶ τῷ φαρμάκῳ εἴη, ἣν εἰ μέν τις ἐπᾴδοι ἅμα καὶ χρῷτο αὐτῷ, παντάπασιν ὑγιᾶ ποιοῖ τὸ φάρμακον· ἄνευ δὲ τῆς ἐπῳδῆς οὐδὲν ὄφελος εἴη τοῦ φύλλου. καὶ ὅς, Ἀπογράψομαι τοίνυν, ἔφη, παρὰ σοῦ τὴν ἐπῳδήν. Πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐάν με πείθῃς ἢ κἂν μή; γελάσας οὖν, Ἐάν σε πείθω, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· καὶ τοὔνομά μου σὺ ἀκριβοῖς; Εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε, ἔφη· οὐ γάρ τι σοῦ ὀλίγος λόγος ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἡλικιώταις, μέμνημαι δὲ ἔγωγε καὶ παῖς ὢν Κριτίᾳ τῷδε συνόντα σε. Καλῶς γε σύ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιῶν· μᾶλλον γάρ σοι παρρησιάσομαι περὶ τῆς ἐπῳδῆς, οἵα τυγχάνει οὖσα· ἄρτι δ' ἠπόρουν, τίνι τρόπῳ σοι ἐνδειξαίμην τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς. ἔστι γάρ, ὦ Χαρμίδη, τοιαύτη οἵα μὴ δύνασθαι τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον ὑγιᾶ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἴσως ἤδη καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἰατρῶν, ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοῖς προσέλθῃ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἀλγῶν, λέγουσί που, ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε αὐτοὺς μόνους ἐπιχειρεῖν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἰᾶσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον *ἂν* εἴη ἅμα καὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν, εἰ μέλλοι καὶ τὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων εὖ ἕξειν· καὶ αὖ τὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν οἴεσθαι ἄν ποτε θεραπεῦσαι αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἄνευ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος πολλὴν ἄνοιαν εἶναι. ἐκ δὴ τούτου τοῦ λόγου διαίταις ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα τρεπόμενοι μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος ἐπιχειροῦσιν θεραπεύειν τε καὶ ἰᾶσθαι· ἢ οὐκ ἤσθησαι ὅτι ταῦτα οὕτως λέγουσίν τε καὶ ἔχει; Πάνυ γε, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι καὶ ἀποδέχει τὸν λόγον; Πάντων μάλιστα, ἔφη.

5. Κἀγὼ ἀκούσας αὐτοῦ ἐπαινέσαντος ἀνεθάρρησά τε, καί μοι κατὰ σμικρὸν πάλιν ἡ θρασύτης συνηγείρετο, καὶ ἀνεζωπυρούμην· καὶ εἶπον Τοιοῦτον τοίνυν ἐστίν, ὦ Χαρμίδη, καὶ τὸ ταύτης τῆς ἐπῳδῆς. ἔμαθον δ' αὐτὴν ἐγὼ ἐκεῖ ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς παρά τινος τῶν Θρᾳκῶν τῶν Ζαλμόξιδος ἰατρῶν, οἳ λέγονται καὶ ἀπαθανατίζειν. ἔλεγεν δὲ ὁ Θρᾷξ οὗτος, ὅτι ταῦτα μὲν [ἰατροὶ] οἱ Ἕλληνες, ἃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, καλῶς λέγοιεν·

ἀλλὰ Ζάλμοξις, ἔφη, λέγει ὁ ἡμέτερος βασιλεύς, θεὸς ὤν, ὅτι ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμοὺς ἄνευ κεφαλῆς οὐ δεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν ἰᾶσθαι οὐδὲ κεφαλὴν ἄνευ σώματος, οὕτως οὐδὲ σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ αἴτιον εἴη τοῦ διαφεύγειν τοὺς παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἰατροὺς τὰ πολλὰ νοσήματα, ὅτι τὸ ὅλον ἀγνοοῖεν οὗ δέοι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι, οὗ μὴ καλῶς ἔχοντος ἀδύνατον εἴη τὸ μέρος εὖ ἔχειν. πάντα γὰρ ἔφη ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ὡρμῆσθαι καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ τῷ σώματι καὶ παντὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἐκεῖθεν ἐπιρρεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐπὶ τὰ ὄμματα· δεῖν οὖν ἐκεῖνο καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα θεραπεύειν, εἰ μέλλει καὶ τὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος καλῶς ἔχειν. θεραπεύεσθαι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔφη, ὦ μακάριε, ἐπῳδαῖς τισιν· τὰς δ' ἐπῳδὰς ταύτας τοὺς λόγους εἶναι τοὺς καλούς· ἐκ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς σωφροσύνην ἐγγίγνεσθαι, ἧς ἐγγενομένης καὶ παρούσης ῥᾴδιον ἤδη εἶναι τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι πορίζειν. διδάσκων οὖν με τό τε φάρμακον καὶ τὰς ἐπῳδάς, ὅπως, ἔφη, τῷ φαρμάκῳ τούτῳ μηδείς σε πείσει τὴν αὐτοῦ κεφαλὴν θεραπεύειν, ὃς ἂν μὴ τὴν ψυχὴν πρῶτον παράσχῃ τῇ ἐπῳδῇ ὑπὸ σοῦ θεραπευθῆναι. καὶ γὰρ νῦν, ἔφη, τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὸ ἁμάρτημα περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅτι χωρὶς ἑκατέρου ἰατροί τινες ἐπιχειροῦσιν εἶναι· καί μοι πάνυ σφόδρα ἐνετέλλετο μήτε πλούσιον οὕτω μηδένα εἶναι μήτε γενναῖον μήτε καλόν, ὃς ἐμὲ πείσει ἄλλως ποιεῖν. ἐγὼ οὖν — ὁμώμοκα γὰρ αὐτῷ, καί μοι ἀνάγκη πείθεσθαι — πείσομαι οὖν, καὶ σοί, ἐὰν μὲν βούλῃ κατὰ τὰς τοῦ ξένου ἐντολὰς τὴν ψυχὴν πρῶτον παρασχεῖν ἐπᾷσαι ταῖς τοῦ Θρᾳκὸς ἐπῳδαῖς, προσοίσω τὸ φάρμακον τῇ κεφαλῇ· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμεν ὅ τι ποιοῖμέν σοι, ὦ φίλε Χαρμίδη.

6. Ἀκούσας οὖν μου ὁ Κριτίας ταῦτ' εἰπόντος, Ἑρμαῖον, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη ἡ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἀσθένεια τῷ νεανίσκῳ, εἰ ἀναγκασθήσεται καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν διὰ τὴν κεφαλὴν βελτίων γενέσθαι. λέγω μέντοι σοι, ὅτι Χαρμίδης τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν οὐ μόνον τῇ ἰδέᾳ δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ, οὗ σὺ φῂς τὴν ἐπῳδὴν ἔχειν· φῂς δὲ σωφροσύνης· ἦ γάρ; Πάνυ

γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Εὖ τοίνυν ἴσθι, ἔφη, ὅτι πλείστοις δοκεῖ σωφρονέστατος εἶναι τῶν νυνί, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, εἰς ὅσον ἡλικίας ἥκει, οὐδενὸς χείρων ὤν. Καὶ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ δίκαιον, ὦ Χαρμίδη, διαφέρειν σε τῶν ἄλλων πᾶσιν τοῖς τοιούτοις· οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι ἄλλον οὐδένα τῶν ἐνθάδε ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἔχειν ἐπιδεῖξαι, ποῖαι δύο οἰκίαι συνελθοῦσαι εἰς ταὐτὸν τῶν Ἀθήνησιν ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων καλλίω ἂν καὶ ἀμείνω γεννήσειαν ἢ ἐξ ὧν σὺ γέγονας. ἥ τε γὰρ πατρῴα ὑμῖν οἰκία, ἡ Κριτίου τοῦ Δρωπίδου, καὶ ὑπὸ Ἀνακρέοντος καὶ ὑπὸ Σόλωνος καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλων πολλῶν ποιητῶν ἐγκεκωμιασμένη παραδέδοται ἡμῖν, ὡς διαφέρουσα κάλλει τε καὶ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ λεγομένῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ· καὶ αὖ ἡ πρὸς μητρὸς ὡσαύτως· Πυριλάμπους γὰρ τοῦ σοῦ θείου οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐν τῇπείρῳ λέγεται καλλίων καὶ μείζων ἀνὴρ δόξαι εἶναι, ὁσάκις ἐκεῖνος ἢ παρὰ μέγαν βασιλέα ἢ παρὰ ἄλλον τινὰ πρεσβεύων ἀφίκετο, σύμπασα δὲ αὕτη ἡ οἰκία οὐδὲν τῆς ἑτέρας ὑποδεεστέρα. ἐκ δὴ τοιούτων γεγονότα εἰκός σε εἰς πάντα πρῶτον εἶναι. τὰ μὲν οὖν ὁρώμενα τῆς ἰδέας, ὦ φίλε παῖ Γλαύκωνος, δοκεῖς μοι οὐδένα τῶν πρὸ σοῦ ἐν οὐδενὶ ὑποβεβηκέναι· εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην καὶ πρὸς τἆλλα κατὰ τὸν τοῦδε λόγον ἱκανῶς πέφυκας, μακαριόν σε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Χαρμίδη, ἡ μήτηρ ἔτικτεν. ἔχει δ' οὖν οὕτως. εἰ μέν σοι ἤδη πάρεστιν, ὡς λέγει Κριτίας ὅδε, σωφροσύνη καὶ εἶ σώφρων ἱκανῶς, οὐδὲν ἔτι σοι δεῖ οὔτε τῶν Ζαλμόξιδος οὔτε τῶν Ἀβάριδος τοῦ Ὑπερβορέου ἐπῳδῶν, ἀλλ' αὐτό σοι ἂν ἤδη δοτέον εἴη τὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς φάρμακον· εἰ δ' ἔτι τούτων ἐπιδεὴς εἶναι δοκεῖς, ἐπᾳστέον πρὸ τῆς τοῦ φαρμάκου δόσεως. αὐτὸς οὖν μοι εἰπέ, πότερον ὁμολογεῖς τῷδε καὶ φῂς ἱκανῶς ἤδη σωφροσύνης μετέχειν ἢ ἐνδεὴς εἶναι; Ἀνερυθριάσας οὖν ὁ Χαρμίδης πρῶτον μὲν ἔτι καλλίων ἐφάνη· καὶ γὰρ τὸ αἰσχυντηλὸν αὐτοῦ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ἔπρεψεν· ἔπειτα καὶ οὐκ ἀγεννῶς ἀπεκρίνατο· εἶπεν γὰρ ὅτι οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἴη ἐν τῷ παρόντι οὔθ' ὁμολογεῖν οὔτε ἐξάρνῳ εἶναι τὰ ἐρωτώμενα. ἐὰν μὲν γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς, μὴ φῶ εἶναι σώφρων, ἅμα μὲν ἄτοπον αὐτὸν καθ' ἑαυτοῦ τοιαῦτα λέγειν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ Κριτίαν τόνδε ψευδῆ ἐπιδείξω καὶ ἄλλους

πολλούς, οἷς δοκῶ εἶναι σώφρων, ὡς ὁ τούτου λόγος· ἐὰν δ' αὖ φῶ καὶ ἐμαυτὸν ἐπαινῶ, ἴσως ἐπαχθὲς φανεῖται· ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τί σοι ἀποκρίνωμαι. Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι μοι εἰκότα φαίνει λέγειν, ὦ Χαρμίδη. καί μοι δοκεῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κοινῇ ἂν εἶναι σκεπτέον, εἴτε κέκτησαι εἴτε μὴ ὃ πυνθάνομαι, ἵνα μήτε σὺ ἀναγκάζῃ λέγειν ἃ μὴ βούλει, μήτ' αὖ ἐγὼ ἀσκέπτως ἐπὶ τὴν ἰατρικὴν τρέπωμαι. εἰ οὖν σοι φίλον, ἐθέλω σκοπεῖν μετὰ σοῦ· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐᾶν. Ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα, ἔφη, φίλον· ὥστε τούτου γε ἕνεκα, ὅπῃ αὐτὸς οἴει βέλτιον ἂν σκέψασθαι, ταύτῃ σκόπει.

7. Τῇδε τοίνυν, ἔφην ἐγώ, δοκεῖ μοι βελτίστη εἶναι ἡ σκέψις περὶ αὐτοῦ. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, εἴ σοι πάρεστιν σωφροσύνη, ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοξάζειν. ἀνάγκη γάρ που ἐνοῦσαν αὐτήν, εἴπερ ἔνεστιν, αἴσθησίν τινα παρέχειν, ἐξ ἧς δόξα ἄν τίς σοι περὶ αὐτῆς εἴη, ὅ τί ἐστιν καὶ ὁποῖόν τι ἡ σωφροσύνη· ἢ οὐκ οἴει; Ἔγωγε, ἔφη, οἶμαι. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε, ἔφην, ὃ οἴει, ἐπειδήπερ ἑλληνίζειν ἐπίστασαι, κἂν εἴποις δήπου αὐτὸ ὅ τί σοι φαίνεται; Ἴσως, ἔφη. Ἵνα τοίνυν τοπάσωμεν εἴτε σοι ἔνεστιν εἴτε μή, εἰπέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τί φῂς εἶναι σωφροσύνην κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν. Καὶ ὃς τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὤκνει τε καὶ οὐ πάνυ ἤθελεν ἀποκρίνασθαι· ἔπειτα μέντοι εἶπεν ὅτι οἱ δοκοῖ σωφροσύνη εἶναι τὸ κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ, ἔν τε ταῖς ὁδοῖς βαδίζειν καὶ διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ὡσαύτως ποιεῖν· καί μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, συλλήβδην ἡσυχιότης τις εἶναι ὃ ἐρωτᾷς.

Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὖ λέγεις; φασί γέ τοι, ὦ Χαρμίδη, τοὺς ἡσυχίους σώφρονας εἶναι· ἴδωμεν δὴ εἴ τι λέγουσιν. εἰπὲ γάρ μοι, οὐ τῶν καλῶν μέντοι ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστίν; Πάνυ γε, ἔφη. Πότερον οὖν κάλλιόν ἐστιν ἐν γραμματιστοῦ τὰ ὅμοια γράμματα γράφειν ταχὺ ἢ ἡσυχῇ; Ταχύ. Τί δ' ἀναγιγνώσκειν; ταχέως ἢ βραδέως; Ταχέως. Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τὸ κιθαρίζειν ταχέως καὶ τὸ παλαίειν ὀξέως πολὺ κάλλιον τοῦ ἡσυχῇ τε καὶ βραδέως; Ναί. Τί δέ; πυκτεύειν τε καὶ παγκρατιάζειν οὐχ ὡσαύτως; Πάνυ γε. Θεῖν δὲ καὶ ἄλλεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἅπαντα ἔργα, οὐ τὰ μὲν ὀξέως καὶ ταχὺ γιγνόμενα τὰ τοῦ

καλοῦ ἐστιν, τὰ δὲ μόγις τε καὶ ἡσυχῇ τὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ; Φαίνεται. Φαίνεται ἄρα ἡμῖν, ἔφην ἐγώ, κατά γε τὸ σῶμα οὐ τὸ ἡσύχιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τάχιστον καὶ ὀξύτατον κάλλιστον ὄν. ἦ γάρ; Πάνυ γε. Ἡ δέ γε σωφροσύνη καλόν τι ἦν; Ναί. Οὐ τοίνυν κατά γε τὸ σῶμα ἡ ἡσυχιότης ἂν ἀλλ' ἡ ταχυτὴς σωφρονέστερον εἴη, ἐπειδὴ καλὸν ἡ σωφροσύνη. Ἔοικεν, ἔφη. Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὐμαθία κάλλιον ἢ δυσμαθία; Εὐμαθία. Ἔστιν δέ γ', ἔφην, ἡ μὲν εὐμαθία ταχέως μανθάνειν; ἡ δὲ δυσμαθία ἡσυχῇ καὶ βραδέως; Ναί. Διδάσκειν δὲ ἄλλον οὐ ταχέως κάλλιον καὶ σφόδρα μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσυχῇ τε καὶ βραδέως; Ναί. Τί δέ; ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι καὶ μεμνῆσθαι ἡσυχῇ τε καὶ βραδέως κάλλιον ἢ σφόδρα καὶ ταχέως; Σφόδρ', ἔφη, καὶ ταχέως. Ἡ δ' ἀγχίνοια οὐχὶ ὀξύτης τίς ἐστιν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἡσυχία; Ἀληθῆ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ συνιέναι τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ ἐν γραμματιστοῦ καὶ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ ἄλλοθι πανταχοῦ, οὐχ ὡς ἡσυχαίτατα ἀλλ' ὡς τάχιστά ἐστι κάλλιστον; Ναί. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔν γε ταῖς ζητήσεσιν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῷ βουλεύεσθαι οὐχ ὁ ἡσυχιώτατος, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, καὶ μόγις βουλευόμενός τε καὶ ἀνευρίσκων ἐπαίνου δοκεῖ ἄξιος εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὁ ῥᾷστά τε καὶ τάχιστα τοῦτο δρῶν. Ἔστιν ταῦτα, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν πάντα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Χαρμίδη, ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα, τὰ τοῦ τάχους τε καὶ τῆς ὀξύτητος καλλίω φαίνεται ἢ τὰ τῆς βραδυτῆτός τε καὶ ἡσυχιότητος; Κινδυνεύει, ἔφη. Οὐκ ἄρα ἡσυχιότης τις ἡ σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη, οὐδ' ἡσύχιος ὁ σώφρων βίος, ἔκ γε τούτου τοῦ λόγου, ἐπειδὴ καλὸν αὐτὸν δεῖ εἶναι σώφρονα ὄντα. δυοῖν γὰρ δὴ τὰ ἕτερα, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἡμῖν ἢ πάνυ που ὀλιγαχοῦ αἱ ἡσύχιοι πράξεις ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλλίους ἐφάνησαν ἢ αἱ ταχεῖαί τε καὶ ἰσχυραί. εἰ δ' οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅ τι μάλιστα μηδὲν ἐλάττους αἱ ἡσύχιοι τῶν σφοδρῶν τε καὶ ταχειῶν πράξεων τυγχάνουσιν καλλίους οὖσαι, οὐδὲ ταύτῃ σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη μᾶλλόν τι τὸ ἡσυχῇ πράττειν τοῦ σφόδρα τε καὶ ταχέως, οὔτε ἐν βαδισμῷ οὔτε ἐν λέξει οὔτε ἄλλοθι οὐδαμοῦ, οὐδὲ ὁ ἡσύχιος βίος τοῦ μὴ ἡσυχίου σωφρονέστερος ἂν εἴη, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῶν καλῶν τι ἡμῖν ἡ σωφροσύνη ὑπετέθη, καλὰ δὲ

οὐχ ἧττον *τὰ* ταχέα τῶν ἡσυχίων πέφανται. Ὀρθῶς μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰρηκέναι.

8. Πάλιν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Χαρμίδη, μᾶλλον προσέχων τὸν νοῦν καὶ εἰς σεαυτὸν ἀποβλέψας, ἐννοήσας ὁποῖόν τινά σε ποιεῖ ἡ σωφροσύνη παροῦσα καὶ ποία τις οὖσα τοιοῦτον ἀπεργάζοιτο ἄν, πάντα ταῦτα συλλογισάμενος εἰπὲ εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως, τί σοι φαίνεται εἶναι; καὶ ὃς ἐπισχὼν καὶ πάνυ ἀνδρικῶς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν διασκεψάμενος, Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ἔφη, αἰσχύνεσθαι ποιεῖν ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ αἰσχυντηλὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ εἶναι ὅπερ αἰδὼς ἡ σωφροσύνη. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ καλὸν ἄρτι ὡμολόγεις τὴν σωφροσύνην εἶναι; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες οἱ σώφρονες; Ναί. Ἆρ' οὖν ἂν εἴη ἀγαθόν, ὃ μὴ ἀγαθοὺς ἀπεργάζεται; Οὐ δῆτα. Οὐ μόνον οὖν ἄρα καλόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· Ὁμήρῳ οὐ πιστεύεις καλῶς λέγειν, λέγοντι ὅτι

αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρημένῳ ἀνδρὶ παρεῖναι;

Ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Ἔστιν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, αἰδὼς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν. Φαίνεται. Σωφροσύνη δέ γε ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ οἷς ἂν παρῇ, κακοὺς δὲ μή. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὕτω γε δοκεῖ μοι ἔχειν, ὡς σὺ λέγεις. Οὐκ ἄρα σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη αἰδώς, εἴπερ τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τυγχάνει ὄν, αἰδὼς δὲ δὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν.

9. Ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο μὲν ὀρθῶς λέγεσθαι· τόδε δὲ σκέψαι τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι περὶ σωφροσύνης. ἄρτι γὰρ ἀνεμνήσθην ὃ ἤδη του ἤκουσα λέγοντος, ὅτι σωφροσύνη ἄν εἴη τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν. σκόπει οὖν τοῦτο εἰ ὀρθῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγειν ὁ λέγων. καὶ ἐγώ, Ὦ μιαρέ, ἔφην, Κριτίου τοῦδε ἀκήκοας αὐτὸ ἢ ἄλλου του τῶν σοφῶν. Ἔοικεν, ἔφη ὁ Κριτίας, ἄλλου· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐμοῦ γε. Ἀλλὰ τί διαφέρει, ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Χαρμίδης, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτου ἤκουσα; Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· πάντως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, ὅστις αὐτὸ εἶπεν, ἀλλὰ πότερον ἀληθὲς λέγεται ἢ οὔ. Νῦν ὀρθῶς λέγεις, ἦ δ' ὅς. Νὴ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ εὑρήσομεν αὐτὸ ὅπῃ γε ἔχει, θαυμάζοιμ' ἄν· αἰνίγματι γάρ τινι ἔοικεν. Ὅτι δὴ τί γε; ἔφη.

Ὅτι οὐ δήπου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ᾗ τὰ ῥήματα ἐφθέγξατο, ταύτῃ καὶ ἐνόει *ὁ* λέγων σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν. ἢ σὺ οὐδέν ἡγεῖ πράττειν τὸν γραμματιστήν, ὅταν γράφῃ ἢ ἀναγιγνώσκῃ; Ἔγωγε, ἡγοῦμαι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι τὸ αὑτοῦ ὄνομα μόνον γράφειν ὁ γραμματιστὴς καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκειν, ἢ ὑμᾶς τοὺς παῖδας διδάσκειν, ἢ οὐδὲν ἧττον τὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἐγράφετε ἢ τὰ ὑμέτερα καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων ὀνόματα; Οὐδὲν ἧττον. Ἦ οὖν ἐπολυπραγμονεῖτε καὶ οὐκ ἐσωφρονεῖτε τοῦτο δρῶντες; Οὐδαμῶς. Καὶ μὴν οὐ τὰ ὑμέτερά γε αὐτῶν ἐπράττετε, εἴπερ τὸ γράφειν πράττειν τί ἐστιν καὶ τὸ ἀναγιγνώσκειν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔστιν. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἰᾶσθαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ τὸ οἰκοδομεῖν καὶ τὸ ὑφαίνειν καὶ τὸ ἠτινιοῦν τέχνῃ ὁτιοῦν τῶν τέχνης ἔργων ἀπεργάζεσθαι πράττειν δήπου τί ἐστιν. Πάνυ γε. Τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖ ἄν σοι πόλις εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ νόμου τοῦ κελεύοντος τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἱμάτιον ἕκαστον ὑφαίνειν καὶ πλύνειν, καὶ ὑποδήματα σκυτοτομεῖν, καὶ λήκυθον καὶ στλεγγίδα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τῶν μὲν ἀλλοτρίων μὴ ἅπτεσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον ἐργάζεσθαί τε καὶ πράττειν; Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, σωφρόνως γε οἰκοῦσα εὖ ἂν οἰκοῖτο. Πῶς δ' οὔκ; ἔφη. Οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτά τε καὶ οὕτω τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη. Οὐ φαίνεται. Ἠνίττετο ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὁ λέγων τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν σωφροσύνην εἶναι· οὐ γάρ που οὕτω γε ἦν εὐήθης· ἤ τινος ἠλιθίου ἤκουσας τουτὶ λέγοντος, ὦ Χαρμίδη; Ἥκιστά γε, ἔφη, ἐπεί τοι καὶ πάνυ ἐδόκει σοφὸς εἶναι. Παντὸς τοίνυν μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, αἴνιγμα αὐτὸ προὔβαλεν, ὡς ὂν χαλεπὸν τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν γνῶναι ὅ τί ποτε ἔστιν. Ἴσως, ἔφη. Τί οὖν ἂν εἴη ποτὲ τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν; ἔχεις εἰπεῖν· Οὐκ οἶδα μὰ Δία ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς· ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐδὲν κωλύει μηδὲ τὸν λέγοντα μηδὲν εἰδέναι ὅ τι ἐνόει. καὶ ἅμα ταῦτα λέγων ὑπεγέλα τε καὶ εἰς τὸν Κριτίαν ἀπέβλεπεν.

10. Καὶ ὁ Κριτίας δῆλος μὲν ἦν καὶ πάλαι ἀγωνιῶν καὶ φιλοτίμως πρός τε τὸν Χαρμίδην καὶ πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας ἔχων,

μόγις δ' ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν κατέχων τότε οὐχ οἷός τε ἐγένετο· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ὃ ἐγὼ ὑπέλαβον, τοῦ Κριτίου ἀκηκοέναι τὸν Χαρμίδην ταύτην τὴν ἀπόκρισιν περὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης. ὁ μὲν οὖν Χαρμίδης βουλόμενος μὴ αὐτὸς ὑπέχειν λόγον ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνον τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, ὑπεκίνει αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον, καὶ ἐνεδείκνυτο ὡς ἐξελεγμένος εἴη· ὁ δ' οὐκ ἠνέσχετο, ἀλλά μοι ἔδοξεν ὀργισθῆναι αὐτῷ ὥσπερ ποιητὴς ὑποκριτῇ κακῶς διατιθέντι τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ποιήματα· ὥστ' ἐμβλέψας αὐτῷ εἶπεν, Οὕτως οἴει, ὦ Χαρμίδη, εἰ σὺ μὴ οἶσθα ὅ τί ποτ' ἐνόει ὃς ἔφη σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, οὐδὲ δὴ ἐκεῖνον εἰδέναι; Ἀλλ', ὦ βέλτιστε, ἔφην ἐγώ, Κριτία, τοῦτον μὲν οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἀγνοεῖν τηλικοῦτον ὄντα· σὲ δέ που εἰκὸς εἰδέναι καὶ ἡλικίας ἕνεκα καὶ ἐπιμελείας. εἰ οὖν συγχωρεῖς τοῦτ' εἶναι σωφροσύνην ὅπερ οὑτοσὶ λέγει, καὶ παραδέχει τὸν λόγον, ἔγωγε πολὺ ἂν ἥδιον μετὰ σοῦ σκοποίμην, εἴτ' ἀληθὲς εἴτε μὴ τὸ λεχθέν. Ἀλλὰ πάνυ συγχωρῶ, ἔφη, καὶ παραδέχομαι. Καλῶς γε σὺ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιῶν. καὶ μοι λέγε, ἦ καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἠρώτων ἐγὼ συγχωρεῖς, τοὺς δημιουργοὺς πάντας ποιεῖν τι; Ἔγωγε. Ἡ οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι τὰ ἑαυτῶν μόνον ποιεῖν ἢ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων; Καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων. Σωφρονοῦσιν οὖν οὐ τὰ ἑαυτῶν μόνον ποιοῦντες; Τί γὰρ κωλύει; ἔφη. Οὐδὲν ἐμέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ' ὅρα μὴ ἐκεῖνον κωλύει, ὃς ὑποθέμενος σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν ἔπειτα οὐδέν φησι κωλύειν καὶ τοὺς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντας σωφρονεῖν. Ἐγὼ γὰρ ποῦ, ἦ δ' ὅς, τοῦθ' ὡμολόγηκα, ὡς οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες σωφρονοῦσιν, εἰ τοὺς ποιοῦντας ὡμολόγησα; Εἰπέ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ ταὐτὸν καλεῖς τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πράττειν; Οὐ μέντοι, ἔφη· οὐδέ γε τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν. ἔμαθον γὰρ παρ' Ἡσιόδου, ὃς ἔφη, ἔργον οὐδὲν εἶναι ὄνειδος. οἴει οὖν αὐτόν, εἰ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔργα ἐκάλει καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ πράττειν, οἷα νυνδὴ σὺ ἔλεγες, οὐδενὶ ἂν ὄνειδος φάναι εἶναι σκυτοτομοῦντι ἢ ταριχοπωλοῦντι ἢ ἐπ' οἰκήματος καθημένῳ; οὐκ οἴεσθαί γε χρή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνος οἶμαι ποίησιν πράξεως καὶ ἐργασίας

ἄλλο ἐνόμιζεν, καὶ ποίημα μὲν γίγνεσθαι ὄνειδος ἐνίοτε, ὅταν μὴ μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ γίγνηται, ἔργον δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν ὄνειδος· τὰ γὰρ καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως ποιούμενα ἔργα ἐκάλει, καὶ ἐργασίας τε καὶ πράξεις τὰς τοιαύτας ποιήσεις. φάναι δέ γε χρὴ καὶ οἰκεῖα μόνα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἡγεῖσθαι αὐτόν, τὰ δὲ βλαβερὰ πάντα ἀλλότρια· ὥστε καὶ Ἡσίοδον χρὴ οἴεσθαι καὶ ἄλλον, ὅστις φρόνιμος, τὸν τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττοντα τοῦτον σώφρονα καλεῖν.

11. Ὦ Κριτία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου σου σχεδὸν ἐμάνθανον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι τὰ οἰκειά τε καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀγαθὰ καλοίης, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήσεις πράξεις· καὶ γὰρ Προδίκου μυρία τινὰ ἀκήκοα περὶ ὀνομάτων διαιροῦντος. ἀλλ' ἐγώ σοι τίθεσθαι μὲν τῶν ὀνομάτων δίδωμι ὅπῃ ἂν βούλῃ ἕκαστον· δήλου δὲ μόνον ἐφ' ὅ τι ἂν φέρῃς τοὔνομα ὅ τι ἂν λέγῃς. νῦν οὖν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς σαφέστερον ὅρισαι· ἆρα τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρᾶξιν ἢ ποίησιν ἢ ὅπως σὺ βούλει ὀνομάζειν, ταύτην λέγεις σὺ σωφροσύνην εἶναι; Ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Οὐκ ἄρα σωφρονεῖ ὁ τὰ κακὰ πράττων, ἀλλ' ὁ τἀγαθά; Σοὶ δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ βέλτιστε, οὐχ οὕτω δοκεῖ; Ἔα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· μὴ γάρ πω τὸ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν σκοπῶμεν, ἀλλ' ὃ σὺ λέγεις νῦν. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἔγωγε, ἔφη, τὸν μὴ ἀγαθὰ ἀλλὰ κακὰ ποιοῦντα οὔ φημι σωφρονεῖν, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὰ ἀλλὰ μὴ κακὰ σωφρονεῖν· τὴν γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρᾶξιν σωφροσύνην εἶναι σαφῶς σοι διορίζομαι. Καὶ οὐδέν γέ σε ἴσως κωλύει ἀληθῆ λέγειν· τόδε γε μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, θαυμάζω, εἰ σωφρονοῦντας ἀνθρώπους ἡγεῖ σὺ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι σωφρονοῦσιν. Ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡγοῦμαι, ἔφη. Οὐκ ὀλίγον πρότερον, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ σοῦ, ὅτι τοὺς δημιουργοὺς οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ αὖ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ποιοῦντας σωφρονεῖν; Ἐλέγετο γάρ, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο; Οὐδέν· ἀλλὰ λέγε εἰ δοκεῖ τίς σοι ἰατρός, ὑγιᾶ τινὰ ποιῶν, ὠφέλιμα καὶ ἑαυτῷ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐκείνῳ ὃν ἰῷτο; Ἔμοιγε. Οὐκοῦν τὰ δέοντα πράττει ὅ γε ταῦτα πράττων; Ναί. Ὁ τὰ δέοντα πράττων οὐ σωφρονεῖ; Σωφρονεῖ μὲν οὖν. Ἦ οὖν καὶ γιγνώσκειν ἀνάγκη τῷ ἰατρῷ, ὅταν τε ὠφελίμως ἰᾶται καὶ ὅταν μή; καὶ ἑκάστῳ τινὶ

τῶν δημιουργῶν, ὅταν τε μέλλῃ ὀνήσεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔργου οὗ ἂν πράττῃ, καὶ ὅταν μή; Ἴσως οὔ. Ἐνίοτε ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὠφελίμως πράξας ἡ βλαβερῶς ὁ ἰατρὸς οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἔπραξεν· καίτοι ὠφελίμως πράξας, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, σωφρόνως ἔπραξεν· ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγες; Ἔγωγε. Οὐκοῦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐνίοτε ὠφελίμως πράξας πράττει μὲν σωφρόνως καὶ σωφρονεῖ, ἀγνοεῖ δ' ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ;

12. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μέν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, ἀλλ' εἴ τι σὺ οἴει ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ὡμολογημένων εἰς τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι συμβαίνειν, ἐκείνων ἄν τι ἔγωγε μᾶλλον ἀναθείμην, καὶ οὐκ ἂν αἰσχυνθείην τότε μὴ οὐχὶ ὀρθῶς φάναι εἰρηκέναι, μᾶλλον ἤ ποτε συγχωρήσαιμ' ἂν ἀγνοοῦντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἄνθρωπον σωφρονεῖν. σχεδὸν γάρ τι ἔγωγε αὐτὸ τοῦτό φημι εἶναι σωφροσύνην, τὸ γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν, καὶ συμφέρομαι τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἀναθέντι τὸ τοιοῦτον γράμμα. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο οὕτω μοι δοκεῖ τὸ γράμμα ἀνακεῖσθαι, ὡς δὴ πρόσρησις οὖσα τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν εἰσιόντων ἀντὶ τοῦ χαῖρε, ὡς τούτου μὲν οὐκ ὀρθοῦ ὄντος τοῦ προσρήματος, [τὸ χαίρειν], οὐδὲ δεῖν τοῦτο παρακελεύεσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἀλλὰ σωφρονεῖν. οὕτω μὲν δὴ ὁ θεὸς προσαγορεύει τοὺς εἰσιόντας εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν διαφέρον τι ἢ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ὡς διανοούμενος ἀνέθηκεν ὁ ἀναθείς, ὥς μοι δοκεῖ· καὶ λέγει πρὸς τὸν ἀεὶ εἰσιόντα οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ σωφρόνει, φησίν. αἰνιγματωδέστερον δὲ δή, ὡς μάντις, λέγει· τὸ γὰρ γνῶθι σαυτόν καὶ τὸ σωφρόνει ἔστιν μὲν ταὐτόν, ὡς τὰ γράμματά φησιν καὶ ἐγώ, τάχα δ' ἄν τις οἰηθείη ἄλλο εἶναι, ὃ δή μοι δοκοῦσιν παθεῖν καὶ οἱ τὰ ὕστερον γράμματα ἀναθέντες, τό τε μηδὲν ἄγαν καὶ τὸ ἐγγύη πάρα δ' ἄτη. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι συμβουλὴν ᾠήθησαν εἶναι τὸ γνῶθι σαυτόν, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν εἰσιόντων ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πρόσρησιν· εἶθ' ἵνα δὴ καὶ σφεῖς μηδὲν ἧττον συμβουλὰς χρησίμους ἀναθεῖεν, ταῦτα γράψαντες ἀνέθεσαν. οὗ δὴ οὖν ἕνεκα λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα πάντα, τόδ' ἐστίν· τὰ μὲν ἔμπροσθέν σοι πάντα ἀφίημι· ἴσως μὲν γάρ τι σὺ ἔλεγες περὶ αὐτῶν ὀρθότερον, ἴσως δ' ἐγώ, σαφὲς δ' οὐδὲν πάνυ ἦν ὧν ἐλέγομεν· νῦν δ' ἐθέλω τούτου σοι διδόναι λόγον,

εἰ μὴ ὁμολογεῖς σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ γιγνώσκειν αὐτὸν ἑαυτόν.

13. Ἀλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κριτία, σὺ μὲν ὡς φάσκοντος ἐμοῦ εἰδέναι, περὶ ὧν ἐρωτῶ, προσφέρει πρός με, καὶ ἐὰν δὴ βούλωμαι, ὁμολογήσοντός σοι· τὸ δ' οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλὰ ζητῶ γὰρ μετὰ σοῦ ἀεὶ τὸ προτιθέμενον διὰ τὸ μὴ αὐτὸς εἰδέναι· σκεψάμενος οὖν ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν εἴτε ὁμολογῶ εἴτε μή. ἀλλ' ἐπίσχες ἕως ἂν σκέψωμαι. Σκόπει δή, ἦ δ' ὅς. Καὶ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, σκοπῶ. εἰ γὰρ δὴ γιγνώσκειν γέ τί ἐστιν ἡ σωφροσύνη, δῆλον ὅτι ἐπιστήμη τις ἂν εἴη καὶ τινός· ἦ οὔ; Ἔστιν, ἔφη, ἑαυτοῦ γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰατρική, ἔφην, ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ; Πάνυ γε. Εἰ τοίνυν με, ἔφην, ἔροιο σύ, ἰατρικὴ ὑγιεινοῦ ἐπιστήμη οὖσα τί ἡμῖν χρησίμη ἐστὶν καὶ τί ἀπεργάζεται, εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι οὐ σμικρὰν ὠφελίαν· τὴν γὰρ ὑγίειαν καλὸν ἡμῖν ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται, εἰ ἀποδέχει τοῦτο. Ἀποδέχομαι. Καὶ εἰ τοίνυν με ἔροιο τὴν οἰκοδομικήν, ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν τοῦ οἰκοδομικοῦ, τί φημι ἔργον ἀπεργάζεσθαι, εἴποιμ' ἂν ὅτι οἰκήσεις· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. χρὴ οὖν καὶ σὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς σωφροσύνης, ἐπειδὴ φῂς αὐτὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἐρωτηθέντα, ὦ Κριτία, σωφροσύνη, ἐπιστήμη οὖσα ἑαυτοῦ, τί καλὸν ἡμῖν ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται καὶ ἄξιον τοῦ ὀνόματος; ἴθι οὖν, εἰπέ. Ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζητεῖς. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοία αὕτη πέφυκεν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις, οὐδέ γε αἱ ἄλλαι ἀλλήλαις· σὺ δ' ὡς ὁμοίων οὐσῶν ποιεῖ τὴν ζήτησιν. ἐπεὶ λέγε μοι, ἔφη, τῆς λογιστικῆς τέχνης ἢ τῆς γεωμετρικῆς τί ἐστιν τοιοῦτον ἔργον οἷον οἰκία οἰκοδομικῆς ἢ ἱμάτιον ὑφαντικῆς ἢ ἄλλα τοιαῦτ' ἔργα, ἃ πολλὰ ἄν τις ἔχοι πολλῶν τεχνῶν δεῖξαι; ἔχεις οὖν μοι καὶ σὺ τούτων τοιοῦτόν τι ἔργον δεῖξαι; ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕξεις. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι Ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ τόδε σοι ἔχω δεῖξαι, τίνος ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἑκάστη τούτων τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ὃ τυγχάνει ὂν ἄλλο αὐτῆς τῆς ἐπιστήμης. οἷον ἡ λογιστικὴ ἐστίν που τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ τοῦ περιττοῦ, πλήθους ὅπως ἔχει πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα· ἦ γάρ; Πάνυ γε, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἑτέρου ὄντος τοῦ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου αὐτῆς τῆς λογι-

στικῆς; Πῶς δ' οὔ; Καὶ μὴν αὖ ἡ στατικὴ τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κουφοτέρου σταθμοῦ ἐστιν· ἕτερον δέ ἐστιν τὸ βαρὺ καὶ τὸ κοῦφον τῆς στατικῆς αὐτῆς. συγχωρεῖς; Ἔγωγε. Λέγε δή, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη τίνος ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, ὃ τυγχάνει ἕτερον ὂν αὐτῆς τῆς σωφροσύνης;

14. Τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἥκεις ἐρευνῶν, ὅτῳ διαφέρει πασῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἡ σωφροσύνη· σὺ δὲ ὁμοιότητά τινα ζητεῖς αὐτῆς ταῖς ἄλλαις. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως, ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι πᾶσαι ἄλλου εἰσὶν ἐπιστῆμαι, ἑαυτῶν δ' οὔ, ἡ δὲ μόνη τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν καὶ αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς. καὶ ταῦτά σε πολλοῦ δεῖ λεληθέναι· ἀλλὰ γάρ, οἶμαι, ὃ ἄρτι οὐκ ἔφησθα ποιεῖν, τοῦτο ποιεῖς, ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν, ἐάσας περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστίν. Οἷον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιεῖς ἡγούμενος, εἴ ὅ τι μάλιστα σὲ ἐλέγχω, ἄλλου τινὸς ἕνεκα ἐλέγχειν ἢ οὗπερ ἕνεκα κἂν ἐμαυτὸν διερευνῴμην τί λέγω, φοβούμενος μή ποτε λάθω οἰόμενος μέν τι εἰδέναι, εἰδὼς δὲ μή. καὶ νῦν δὴ οὖν ἔγωγέ φημι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, τὸν λόγον σκοπεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἕνεκα, ἴσως δὲ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων· ἢ οὐ κοινὸν οἴει ἀγαθὸν εἶναι σχεδόν τι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, γίγνεσθαι καταφανὲς ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ὅπῃ ἔχει; Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες. Θαρρῶν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ μακάριε, ἀποκρινόμενος τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ὅπῃ σοι φαίνεται, ἔα χαίρειν, εἴτε Κριτίας ἐστὶν εἴτε Σωκράτης ὁ ἐλεγχόμενος· ἀλλ' αὐτῷ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν τῷ λόγῳ σκόπει, ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἐκβήσεται ἐλεγχόμενος. Ἀλλά, ἔφη, ποιήσω οὕτω· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι μέτρια λέγειν. Λέγε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, περὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης πῶς λέγεις;

15. Λέγω τοίνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅτι μόνη τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν αὐτή τε αὑτῆς ἐστιν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἐπιστήμη ἂν εἴη, εἴπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμης; Πάνυ γε, ἔφη. Ὁ ἄρα σώφρων μόνος αὐτός τε ἑαυτὸν γνώσεται καὶ οἷός τε ἔσται ἐξετάσαι τί τε τυγχάνει εἰδὼς καὶ τί μή, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὡσαύτως δυνατὸς ἔσται ἐπισκοπεῖν, τί τις οἶδεν καὶ οἴεται, εἴπερ οἶδεν, καὶ τί

αὖ οἴεται μὲν εἰδέναι, οἶδεν δ' οὔ, τῶν δ' ἄλλων οὐδείς· καὶ ἔστιν δὴ τοῦτο τὸ σωφρονεῖν τε καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ τὸ ἑαυτὸν αὐτὸν γιγνώσκειν, τὸ εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν. ἆρα ταῦτά ἐστιν ἃ λέγεις; Ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Πάλιν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπισκεψώμεθα, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν τοῦτ' εἶναι ἢ οὔ, τὸ ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν εἰδέναι ὅτι *οἶδε καὶ ὅτι* οὐκ οἶδεν· ἔπειτα εἰ ὅ τι μάλιστα δυνατόν, τίς ἂν εἴη ἡμῖν ὠφελία εἰδόσιν αὐτό. Ἀλλὰ χρή, ἔφη, σκοπεῖν. Ἴθι δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Κριτία, σκέψαι, ἐάν τι περὶ αὐτῶν εὐπορώτερος φανῇς ἐμοῦ· ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἀπορῶ· ἢ δὲ ἀπορῶ, φράσω σοι; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάντα ταῦτ' ἂν εἴη, εἰ ἔστιν ὅπερ σὺ νυνδὴ ἔλεγες, μία τις ἐπιστήμη, ἣ οὐκ ἄλλου τινός ἐστιν ἢ ἑαυτῆς τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἡ αὐτὴ αὕτη; Πάνυ γε. Ἰδὲ δὴ ὡς ἄτοπον ἐπιχειροῦμεν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, λέγειν· ἐν ἄλλοις γάρ που τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐὰν σκοπῇς, δόξει σοι, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἀδύνατον εἶναι. Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποῦ; Ἐν τοῖσδε. ἐννόει γὰρ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ὄψις τις εἶναι, ἣ ὧν μὲν αἱ ἄλλαι ὄψεις εἰσίν, οὐκ ἔστιν τούτων ὄψις, ἑαυτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων ὄψις ἐστίν, καὶ μὴ ὄψεων ὡσαύτως, καὶ χρῶμα μὲν ὁρᾷ οὐδὲν ὄψις οὖσα, αὐτὴν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὄψεις· δοκεῖ τίς σοι εἶναι τοιαύτη; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε. Τί δὲ ἀκοή, ἣ φωνῆς μὲν οὐδεμιᾶς ἀκούει, αὐτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀκοῶν ἀκούει καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀκοῶν; Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. Συλλήβδην δὴ σκόπει περὶ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων, εἴ τίς σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι αἰσθήσεων μὲν αἴσθησις καὶ αὐτῆς, ὧν δὲ δὴ αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις αἰσθάνονται, μηδενὸς αἰσθανομένη; Οὐκ ἔμοιγε. Ἀλλ' ἐπιθυμία δοκεῖ τίς σοι εἶναι, ἥτις ἡδονῆς μὲν οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία, αὐτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν; Οὐ δῆτα. Οὐδὲ μὴν βούλησις, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἣ ἀγαθὸν μὲν οὐδὲν βούλεται, αὐτὴν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας βουλήσεις βούλεται. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Ἔρωτα δὲ φαίης ἄν τινα εἶναι τοιοῦτον, ὃς τυγχάνει ὢν ἔρως καλοῦ μὲν οὐδενός, αὐτοῦ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων; Οὔκ, ἔφη, ἔγωγε. Φόβον δὲ ἤδη τινὰ κατανενόηκας, ὃς ἑαυτὸν μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους φόβους

φοβεῖται, τῶν δεινῶν δ' οὐδὲ ἓν φοβεῖται; Οὐ κατανενόηκα, ἔφη. Δόξαν δὲ δοξῶν δόξαν καὶ αὐτῆς, ὧν δὲ αἱ ἄλλαι δοξάζουσιν μηδὲν δοξάζουσαν; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμην, ὡς ἔοικεν, φαμέν τινα εἶναι τοιαύτην, ἥτις μαθήματος μὲν οὐδενός ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη, αὐτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη; Φαμὲν γάρ. Οὐκοῦν ἄτοπον, εἰ ἄρα καὶ ἔστιν; μηδὲν γάρ πω διισχυριζώμεθα ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἔστιν ἔτι σκοπῶμεν. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

16. Φέρε δή· ἔστι μὲν αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἔχει τινὰ τοιαύτην δύναμιν ὥστε τινὸς εἶναι· ἦ γάρ; Πάνυ γε. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ μεῖζόν φαμεν τοιαύτην τινὰ ἔχειν δύναμιν, ὥστε τινὸς εἶναι μεῖζον; Ἔχει γάρ. Οὐκοῦν ἐλάττονός τινος, εἴπερ ἔσται μεῖζον. Ἀνάγκη; Εἰ οὖν τι εὕροιμεν μεῖζον, ὃ τῶν μὲν μειζόνων ἐστὶν μεῖζον καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, ὧν δὲ τἆλλα μείζω ἐστὶν μηδενὸς μεῖζον, πάντως ἄν που ἐκεῖνό γ' αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοι, εἴπερ ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον εἴη, καὶ ἔλαττον ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι· ἦ οὔ; Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἴ τι διπλάσιόν ἐστιν τῶν τε ἄλλων διπλασίων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ, ἡμίσεος δήπου ὄντος ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων διπλάσιον ἂν εἴη· οὐ γάρ ἐστίν που ἄλλου διπλάσιον ἢ ἡμίσεος. Ἀληθῆ. Πλέον δὲ αὐτοῦ ὂν οὐ καὶ ἔλαττον ἔσται, καὶ βαρύτερον ὂν κουφότερον, καὶ πρεσβύτερον ὂν νεώτερον, καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὡσαύτως, ὅ τί περ ἂν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἔχῃ, οὐ καὶ ἐκείνην ἕξει τὴν οὐσίαν, πρὸς ἣν ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ ἦν; λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· οἷον ἡ ἀκοή, φαμέν, οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς ἦν ἀκοὴ ἢ φωνῆς· ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ αὐτὴ αὐτῆς ἀκούσεται, φωνὴν ἐχούσης ἑαυτῆς ἀκούσεται· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως ἀκούσειεν. Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. Καὶ ἡ ὄψις γέ που, ὦ ἄριστε, εἴπερ ὄψεται αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν, χρῶμά τι αὐτὴν ἀνάγκη ἔχειν· ἄχρων γὰρ ὄψις οὐδὲν μή ποτε ἴδῃ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ Κριτία, ὅτι ὅσα διεληλύθαμεν, τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀδύνατα παντάπασι φαίνεται ἡμῖν, τὰ δ' ἀπιστεῖται σφόδρα μή ποτ' ἂν τὴν ἑαυτῶν δύναμιν πρὸς ἑαυτὰ σχεῖν; μεγέθη μὲν γὰρ καὶ πλήθη καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα παντάπασιν ἀδύνατον· ἦ οὐχί; Πάνυ γε. Ἀκοὴ δ' αὖ καὶ ὄψις καὶ

ἔτι γε κίνησις αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν κινεῖν, καὶ θερμότης κάειν, καὶ πάντα δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μὲν ἀπιστίαν *ἂν* παράσχοι, ἴσως δέ τισιν οὔ. μεγάλου δή τινος, ὦ φίλε, ἀνδρὸς δεῖ, ὅστις τοῦτο κατὰ πάντων ἱκανῶς διαιρήσεται, πότερον οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ πέφυκεν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλλο, ἢ τὰ μέν, τὰ δ' οὔ· καὶ εἰ ἔστιν αὖ ἅτινα αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἔχει, ἆρ' ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, ἣν δὴ ἡμεῖς σωφροσύνην φαμὲν εἶναι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐ πιστεύω ἐμαυτῷ ἱκανὸς εἶναι ταῦτα διελέσθαι· διὸ καὶ οὔτ' εἰ δυνατόν ἐστι τοῦτο γενέσθαι ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, ἔχω διισχυρίσασθαι, οὔτ' εἰ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἔστι, σωφροσύνην ἀποδέχομαι αὐτὸ εἶναι, πρὶν ἂν ἐπισκέψωμαι, εἴτε τι ἂν ἡμᾶς ὠφελοῖ τοιοῦτον ὄν, εἴτε μή. τὴν γὰρ οὖν δὴ σωφροσύνην ὠφέλιμόν τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν μαντεύομαι εἶναι· σὺ οὖν, ὦ παῖ Καλλαίσχρου — τίθεσαι γὰρ σωφροσύνην τοῦτ' εἶναι, ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης — πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο ἔνδειξαι, ὅτι δυνατὸν ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ἔπειτα πρὸς τῷ δυνατῷ ὅτι καὶ ὠφέλιμον· κἀμὲ τάχ' ἂν ἀποπληρώσαις, ὡς ὀρθῶς λέγεις περὶ σωφροσύνης, ὃ ἔστιν.

17. Καὶ ὁ Κριτίας ἀκούσας ταῦτα καὶ ἰδών με ἀποροῦντα, ὥσπερ οἱ τοὺς χασμωμένους καταντικρὺ ὁρῶντες ταὐτὸν τοῦτο συμπάσχουσιν, κἀκεῖνος ἔδοξέ μοι ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἀποροῦντος καὶ αὐτὸς ἁλῶναι ὑπὸ ἀπορίας. ἅτε οὖν εὐδοκιμῶν ἑκάστοτε, ᾐσχύνετο τοὺς παρόντας, καὶ οὔτε συγχωρῆσαί μοι ἤθελεν ἀδύνατος εἶναι διελέσθαι ἃ προὐκαλούμην αὐτόν, ἔλεγέν τε οὐδὲν σαφές, ἐπικαλύπτων τὴν ἀπορίαν. κἀγὼ ἡμῖν ἵνα ὁ λόγος προΐοι, εἶπον Ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, ὦ Κριτία, νῦν μὲν τοῦτο συγχωρήσωμεν, δυνατὸν εἶναι γενέσθαι ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης· αὖθις δὲ ἐπισκεψόμεθα εἴτε οὕτως ἔχει εἴτε μή. ἴθι δὴ οὖν, εἰ ὅ τι μάλιστα δυνατὸν τοῦτο, τί μᾶλλον οἷόν τέ ἐστιν εἰδέναι ἅ τέ τις οἶδε καὶ ἃ μή; τοῦτο γὰρ δήπου ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὸ γιγνώσκειν αὐτὸν καὶ σωφρονεῖν· ἦ γάρ; Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ συμβαίνει γέ που, ὦ Σώκρατες. εἰ γάρ τις ἔχει ἐπιστήμην ἣ αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει, τοιοῦτος ἂν αὐτὸς εἴη οἷόνπερ ἐστὶν ὃ ἔχει. ὥσπερ ὅταν τάχος τις ἔχῃ, ταχύς, καὶ ὅταν κάλλος,

καλός, καὶ ὅταν γνῶσιν, γιγνώσκων· ὅταν δὲ δὴ γνῶσιν αὐτὴν αὑτῆς τις ἔχῃ, γιγνώσκων που αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν τότε ἔσται. Οὐ τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀμφισβητῶ, ὡς οὐχ ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ γιγνώσκόν τις ἔχῃ, αὐτὸς αὑτὸν γνώσεται, ἀλλ' ἔχοντι τοῦτο τίς ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; Ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταὐτόν ἐστιν τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ. Ἴσως, ἔφην, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ κινδυνεύω ἀεὶ ὅμοιος εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ αὖ μανθάνω ὡς ἔστιν τὸ αὐτὸ [ἃ οἶδεν εἰδέναι καὶ ἅ τις μὴ οἶδεν εἰδέναι]. Πῶς λέγεις, ἔφη; Ὧδε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἐπιστήμη που ἐπιστήμης οὖσα ἆρα πλέον τι οἵα τ' ἔσται διαιρεῖν, ἢ ὅτι τούτων τόδε μὲν ἐπιστήμη, τόδε δ' οὐκ ἐπιστήμη; Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον. Ταὐτὸν οὖν ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνη ὑγιεινοῦ, καὶ ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνη δικαίου; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν οἶμαι ἰατρική, τὸ δὲ πολιτική, τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμη. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν μὴ προσεπίστηταί τις τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ ἐπιστήμην μόνον γιγνώσκῃ ἅτε τούτου μόνον ἔχων ἐπιστήμην, ὅτι μέν τι ἐπίσταται καὶ ὅτι ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἔχει, εἰκότως ἂν γιγνώσκοι καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Ὅ τι δὲ γιγνώσκει, ταύτῃ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ πῶς εἴσεται; γιγνώσκει γὰρ δὴ τὸ μὲν ὑγιεινὸν τῇ ἰατρικῇ ἀλλ' οὐ σωφροσύνῃ, τὸ δὲ ἁρμονικὸν μουσικῇ ἀλλ' οὐ σωφροσύνῃ, τὸ δ' οἰκοδομικὸν οἰκοδομικῇ ἀλλ' οὐ σωφροσύνῃ, καὶ οὕτω πάντα· ἦ οὔ; Φαίνεται. Σωφροσύνη δέ, εἴπερ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη, πῶς εἴσεται ὅτι τὸ ὑγιεινὸν γιγνώσκει ἢ ὅτι τὸ οἰκοδομικόν; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐκ ἄρα εἴσεται ὃ οἶδεν ὁ τοῦτο ἀγνοῶν, ἀλλ' ὅτι οἶδεν μόνον. Ἔοικεν.

18. Οὐκ ἄρα σωφρονεῖν τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη οὐδὲ σωφροσύνη, εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν μόνον. Κινδυνεύει. Οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἄρα οἷός τε ἔσται οὗτος ἐξετάσαι φάσκοντά τι ἐπίστασθαι, πότερον ἐπίσταται ὃ φησιν ἐπίστασθαι ἢ οὐκ ἐπίσταται· ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ὡς ἔοικεν, γνώσεται, ὅτι ἔχει τινὰ ἐπιστήμην, ὅτου δέ γε, ἡ σωφροσύνη οὐ ποιήσει αὐτὸν γιγνώσκειν. Οὐ φαίνεται. Οὔτε ἄρα τὸν προσποιούμενον ἰατρὸν εἶναι, ὄντα δὲ μή, καὶ τὸν ὡς

ἀληθῶς ὄντα οἷός τε ἔσται διακρίνειν, οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδένα τῶν ἐπιστημόνων καὶ μή. σκεψώμεθα δὲ ἐκ τῶνδε· εἰ μέλλει ὁ σώφρων ἢ ὁστισοῦν ἄλλος τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἰατρὸν διαγνώσεσθαι καὶ τὸν μή, ἆρ' οὐχ ὧδε ποιήσει· περὶ μὲν ἰατρικῆς δήπου αὐτῷ οὐ διαλέξεται· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπαΐει, ὡς ἔφαμεν, ὁ ἰατρὸς ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ τὸ νοσῶδες· ἢ οὔ; Ναί, οὕτως. Περὶ δέ γε ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ μόνῃ ἀπέδομεν. Ναί. Οὐδὲ περὶ ἰατρικῆς ἄρα οἶδεν ὁ ἰατρικός, ἐπειδήπερ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη οὖσα τυγχάνει. Ἀληθῆ. Ὅτι μὲν δὴ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἔχει, γνώσεται ὁ σώφρων τὸν ἰατρόν· δεῖν δὲ πεῖραν λαβεῖν ἥτις ἐστίν, ἄλλο τι σκέψεται ὧντινων; ἢ οὐ τούτῳ ὥρισται ἑκάστη ἐπιστήμη μὴ μόνον ἐπιστήμη εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τίς, τῷ τινῶν εἶναι; Τούτῳ μὲν οὖν. Καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ δὴ ἑτέρα εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ὡρίσθη τῷ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ εἶναι καὶ νοσώδους ἐπιστήμη. Ναί. Οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτοις ἀναγκαῖον σκοπεῖν τὸν βουλόμενον ἰατρικὴν σκοπεῖν, ἐν οἷς ποτ' ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἔν γε τοῖς ἔξω, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστιν; Οὐ δῆτα. Ἐν τοῖς ὑγιεινοῖς ἄρα καὶ νοσώδεσιν ἐπισκέψεται τὸν ἰατρόν, ᾗ ἰατρικός ἐστιν, ὁ ὀρθῶς σκοπούμενος. Ἔοικεν. Οὐκοῦν ἐν τοῖς οὕτως ἢ λεγομένοις ἢ πραττομένοις τὰ μὲν λεγόμενα, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγεται, σκοπούμενος, τὰ δὲ πραττόμενα, εἰ ὀρθῶς πράττεται; Ἀνάγκη. Ἡ οὖν ἄνευ ἰατρικῆς δύναιτ' ἄν τις τούτων ποτέροις ἐπακολουθῆσαι; Οὐ δῆτα. Οὔτε γε ἄλλος οὐδείς, ὡς ἔοικεν, πλὴν ἰατρός, οὔτε δὴ ὁ σώφρων· ἰατρὸς γὰρ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τῇ σωφροσύνῃ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον, εἰ ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη μόνον ἐστὶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης, οὔτε ἰατρὸν διακρῖναι οἵα τε ἔσται ἐπιστάμενον τὰ τῆς τέχνης ἢ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον, προσποιούμενον δὲ ἢ οἰόμενον, οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδένα τῶν ἐπισταμένων καὶ ὁτιοῦν, πλήν γε τὸν αὐτοῦ ὁμότεχνον, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί. Φαίνεται, ἔφη.

19. Τίς οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κριτία, ὠφελία ἡμῖν ἔτι ἂν εἴη ἀπὸ τῆς σωφροσύνης τοιαύτης οὔσης; εἰ μὲν γάρ, ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπετιθέμεθα, ᾔδειν ὁ σώφρων ἅ τε ᾔδει καὶ ἃ μὴ ᾔδει, τὰ

μὲν ὅτι οἶδεν, τὰ δ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν, καὶ ἄλλον ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πεπονθότα ἐπισκέψασθαι οἷός τ' ἦν, μεγαλωστὶ ἂν ἡμῖν, φαμέν, ὠφέλιμον ἦν σώφροσιν εἶναι· ἀναμάρτητοι γὰρ ἂν τὸν βίον ἐζῶμεν αὐτοί τε οἱ τὴν σωφροσύνην ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὅσοι ὑφ' ἡμῶν ἤρχοντο. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἐπεχειροῦμεν πράττειν ἃ μὴ ἠπιστάμεθα, ἀλλ' ἐξευρίσκοντες τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ἐκείνοις ἂν παρεδίδομεν, οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπετρέπομεν, ὧν ἤρχομεν, ἄλλο τι πράττειν ἢ ὅ τι πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἔμελλον πράξειν· τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἄν, οὗ ἐπιστήμην εἶχον· καὶ οὕτω δὴ ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης οἰκία τε οἰκουμένη ἔμελλεν καλῶς οἰκεῖσθαι, πόλις τε πολιτευομένη, καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν οὗ σωφροσύνη ἄρχοι· ἁμαρτίας γὰρ ἐξῃρημένης, ὀρθότητος δὲ ἡγουμένης, ἐν πάσῃ πράξει ἀναγκαῖον καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν τοὺς οὕτω διακειμένους, τοὺς δὲ εὖ πράττοντας εὐδαίμονας εἶναι. ἆρ' οὐχ οὕτως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Κριτία, ἐλέγομεν περὶ σωφροσύνης, λέγοντες ὅσον ἀγαθὸν εἴη τὸ εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδέν τις καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὕτω. Νῦν δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁρᾷς ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ ἐπιστήμη οὐδεμία τοιαύτη οὖσα πέφανται. Ὁρῶ, ἔφη. Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτ' ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἣν νῦν εὑρίσκομεν σωφροσύνην οὖσαν, τὸ ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην, ὅτι ὁ ταύτην ἔχων, ὅ τι ἂν ἄλλο μανθάνῃ, ῥᾷόν τε μαθήσεται καὶ ἐναργέστερα πάντα αὐτῷ φανεῖται, ἅτε πρὸς ἑκάστῳ ᾧ ἂν μανθάνῃ προσκαθορῶντι τὴν ἐπιστήμην· καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δὴ κάλλιον ἐξετάσει περὶ ὧν ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς μάθῃ, οἱ δὲ ἄνευ τούτου ἐξετάζοντες ἀσθενέστερον καὶ φαυλότερον τοῦτο δράσουσιν; ἆρ', ὦ φίλε, τοιαῦτα ἄττα ἐστὶν ἃ ἀπολαυσόμεθα τῆς σωφροσύνης, ἡμεῖς δὲ μεῖζόν τι βλέπομεν καὶ ζητοῦμεν αὐτὸ μεῖζόν τι εἶναι ἢ ὅσον ἐστίν; Τάχα δ' ἄν, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχοι.

20. Ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἴσως δέ γε ἡμεῖς οὐδὲν χρηστὸν ἐζητήσαμεν. τεκμαίρομαι δέ, ὅτι μοι ἄτοπ' ἄττα καταφαίνεται περὶ σωφροσύνης, εἰ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. ἴδωμεν γάρ, εἰ βούλει, συγχωρήσαντες καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμην δυνατὸν εἶναι καὶ ὅ γε ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐτιθέμεθα σωφροσύνην εἶναι, τὸ εἰδέναι ἅ τε

οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, μὴ ἀποστερήσωμεν, ἀλλὰ δῶμεν· καὶ πάντα ταῦτα δόντες ἔτι βέλτιον σκεψώμεθα, εἰ ἄρα τι καὶ ἡμᾶς ὀνήσει τοιοῦτον ὄν. ἃ γὰρ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ὡς μέγα ἂν εἴη ἀγαθὸν ἡ σωφροσύνη, εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴη, ἡγουμένη διοικήσεως καὶ οἰκίας καὶ πόλεως, οὔ μοι δοκοῦμεν, ὦ Κριτία, καλῶς ὡμολογηκέναι. Πῶς δή; ἦ δ' ὅς. Ὅτι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ῥᾳδίως ὡμολογήσαμεν μέγα τι ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, εἰ ἕκαστοι ἡμῶν, ἃ μὲν ἴσασιν, πράττοιεν ταῦτα, ἃ δὲ μὴ ἐπίσταιντο, ἄλλοις παραδιδοῖεν τοῖς ἐπισταμένοις. Οὐκ οὖν, ἔφη, καλῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν; Οὔ μοι δοκοῦμεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Ἄτοπα λέγεις ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Νὴ τὸν κύνα, ἔφην, καὶ ἐμοί τοι δοκεῖ οὕτω, κἀνταῦθα καὶ ἄρτι ἀποβλέψας ἄτοπ' ἄττ' ἔφην μοι προφαίνεσθαι, καὶ ὅτι φοβοίμην μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς σκοποῖμεν. ὡς ἀληθῶς γάρ, εἴ ὅ τι μάλιστα τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐδέν μοι δῆλον εἶναι δοκεῖ ὅ τι ἀγαθὸν ἡμᾶς ἀπεργάζεται. Πῶς δή; ἦ δ' ὅς. λέγε, ἵνα καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰδῶμεν ὅ τι λέγεις. Οἶμαι μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ληρεῖν με· ὅμως τό γε προφαινόμενον ἀναγκαῖον σκοπεῖν καὶ μὴ εἰκῇ παριέναι, εἴ τίς γε αὐτοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν κήδεται. Καλῶς γάρ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

21. Ἄκουε δή, ἔφην, τὸ ἐμὸν ὄναρ, εἴτε διὰ κεράτων εἴτε δι' ἐλέφαντος ἐλήλυθεν. εἰ γὰρ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἡμῶν ἄρχοι ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὖσα οἵαν νῦν ὁριζόμεθα, ἄλλο τι κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἂν πράττοιτο, καὶ οὔτε τις κυβερνήτης φάσκων εἶναι, ὢν δὲ οὔ, ἐξαπατῴη ἂν ἡμᾶς, οὔτε ἰατρὸς οὔτε στρατηγὸς οὔτ' ἄλλος οὐδείς, προσποιούμενός τι εἰδέναι ὃ μὴ οἶδεν, λανθάνοι ἄν· ἐκ δὴ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων ἄλλο ἂν ἡμῖν τι συμβαίνοι *ἢ* ὑγιέσιν τε τὰ σώματα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν, καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ κινδυνεύοντας καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ σῴζεσθαι, καὶ τὰ σκεύη καὶ τὴν ἀμπεχόνην καὶ ὑπόδεσιν πᾶσαν καὶ τὰ χρήματα πάντα τεχνικῶς ἡμῖν εἰργασμένα εἶναι καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ διὰ τὸ ἀληθινοῖς δημιουργοῖς χρῆσθαι; εἰ δὲ βούλοιό γε, καὶ τὴν μαντικὴν εἶναι συγχωρήσωμεν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι, καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην, αὐτῆς ἐπιστατοῦσαν, τοὺς μὲν ἀλαζόνας ἀποτρέπειν, τοὺς δὲ ὡς ἀληθῶς μάντεις καθιστάναι

ἡμῖν προφήτας τῶν μελλόντων. κατεσκευασμένον δὴ οὕτω τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος ὅτι μὲν ἐπιστημόνως ἂν πράττοι καὶ ζῴη, ἕπομαι· ἡ γὰρ σωφροσύνη φυλάττουσα οὐκ ἂν ἐᾷη παρεμπίπτουσαν τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην συνεργὸν ἡμῖν εἶναι· ὅτι δ' ἐπιστημόνως ἂν πράττοντες εὖ ἂν πράττοιμεν καὶ εὐδαιμονοῖμεν, τοῦτο δὲ οὔπω δυνάμεθα μαθεῖν, ὦ φίλε Κριτία.

22. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ ῥᾳδίως εὑρήσεις ἄλλο τι τέλος τοῦ εὖ πράττειν, ἐὰν τὸ ἐπιστημόνως ἀτιμάσῃς. Σμικρὸν τοίνυν με, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι προσδίδαξον. τίνος ἐπιστημόνως λέγεις; ἢ σκυτῶν τομῆς; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε. Ἀλλὰ χαλκοῦ ἐργασίας; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἀλλὰ ἐρίων ἢ ξύλων ἢ ἄλλου του τῶν τοιούτων; Οὐ δῆτα. Οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτι ἐμμένομεν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντα. οὗτοι γὰρ ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντες οὐχ ὁμολογοῦνται παρὰ σοῦ εὐδαίμονες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περί τινων ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντα σὺ δοκεῖς μοι ἀφορίζεσθαι τὸν εὐδαίμονα. καὶ ἴσως λέγεις ὃν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸν εἰδότα τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι πάντα, τὸν μάντιν. τοῦτον ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ λέγεις; Καὶ τοῦτον ἔγωγε, ἔφη, καὶ ἄλλον. Τίνα; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἆρα μὴ τὸν τοιόνδε, εἴ τις πρὸς τοῖς μέλλουσιν καὶ τὰ γεγονότα πάντα εἰδείη καὶ τὰ νῦν ὄντα, καὶ μηδὲν ἀγνοοῖ; φῶμεν γάρ τινα εἶναι αὐτόν. οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι τούτου γε ἔτι ἂν εἴποις οὐδένα ἐπιστημονέστερον ζῶντα εἶναι. Οὐ δῆτα. Τόδε δὴ ἔτι προσποθῶ, τίς αὐτὸν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονα; ἢ ἅπασαι ὁμοίως; Οὐδαμῶς ὁμοίως, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ ποία μάλιστα; ἦ τί οἶδεν καὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι; ἆρά γε ἦ τὸ πεττευτικόν; Ποῖον, ἦ δ' ὅς, πεττευτικόν; Ἀλλ' ἦ τὸ λογιστικόν; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἀλλ' ἦ τὸ ὑγιεινόν; Μᾶλλον, ἔφη. Ἐκείνη δ' ἦν λέγω μάλιστα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἦ τί; Ἥι τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἔφη, καὶ τὸ κακόν. Ὦ μιαρέ, ἔφην ἐγώ, πάλαι με περιέλκεις κύκλῳ, ἀποκρυπτόμενος ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἐπιστημόνως ἦν ζῆν τὸ εὖ πράττειν τε καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦν, οὐδὲ συμπασῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ἀλλὰ μιᾶς οὔσης ταύτης μόνον τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακόν. ἐπεί, ὦ Κριτία, εἰ θελεις ἐξελεῖν ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων

ἐπιστημῶν, ἧττόν τι ἡ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ὑγιαίνειν ποιήσει, ἡ δὲ σκυτικὴ ὑποδεδέσθαι, ἡ δὲ ὑφαντικὴ ἡμφιέσθαι, ἡ δὲ κυβερνητικὴ κωλύσει ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ἀποθνῄσκειν καὶ ἡ στρατηγικὴ ἐν πολέμῳ; Οὐδὲν ἧττον, ἔφη. Ἀλλ', ὦ φίλε Κριτία, τὸ εὖ γε τούτων ἕκαστα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὠφελίμως ἀπολελοιπὸς ἡμᾶς ἔσται ταύτης ἀπούσης. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Οὐχ αὕτη δέ γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶν ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἧς ἔργον ἐστὶν τὸ ὠφελεῖν ἡμᾶς. οὐ γὰρ ἐπιστημῶν τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ· ὥστε εἰ αὕτη ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος, ἡ σωφροσύνη ἄλλο τι ἂν εἴη ἡμῖν. Τί δ', ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἂν αὕτη ὠφελοῖ; εἰ γὰρ ὅ τι μάλιστα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἐπιστατεῖ δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις, καὶ ταύτης δήπου ἂν ἄρχουσα τῆς περὶ τἀγαθὸν ἐπιστήμης ὠφελοῖ ἂν ἡμᾶς. Ἢ κἂν ὑγιαίνειν ποιοῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὕτη, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ ἰατρική; καὶ τἄλλα τὰ τῶν τεχνῶν αὕτη ἂν ποιοῖ, καὶ οὐχ αἱ ἄλλαι τὸ αὐτῆς ἔργον ἑκάστη; ἢ οὐ πάλαι διεμαρτυρόμεθα, ὅτι ἐπιστήμης μόνον ἐστὶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἐπιστήμη, ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός· οὐχ οὕτω; Φαίνεταί γε. Οὐκ ἄρα ὑγιείας ἔσται δημιουργός. Οὐ δῆτα. Ἄλλης γὰρ ἦν τέχνης ὑγίεια· ἢ οὔ; Ἄλλης. Οὐδ' ἄρα ὠφελίας, ὦ ἑταῖρε· ἄλλῃ γὰρ αὖ ἀπέδομεν τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον τέχνῃ νυνδή· ἢ γάρ; Πάνυ γε. Πῶς οὖν ὠφέλιμος ἔσται ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας οὖσα δημιουργός; Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔοικέν γε.

23. Ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ Κριτία, ὡς ἐγὼ πάλαι εἰκότως ἐδεδοίκη καὶ δικαίως ἐμαυτὸν ἠτιώμην ὅτι οὐδὲν χρηστὸν περὶ σωφροσύνης σκοπῶ; οὐ γὰρ ἄν που ὅ γε κάλλιστον πάντων ὁμολογεῖται εἶναι, τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἀνωφελὲς ἐφάνη, εἴ τι ἐμοῦ ὄφελος ἦν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς ζητεῖν. νῦν δέ — πανταχῇ γὰρ ἡττώμεθα, καὶ οὐ δυνάμεθα εὑρεῖν ἐφ' ὅτῳ ποτὲ τῶν ὄντων ὁ ὀνοματοθέτης τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔθετο, τὴν σωφροσύνην. καίτοι πολλά γε συγκεχωρήκαμεν οὐ συμβαίνονθ' ἡμῖν τῷ λόγῳ. καὶ γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης εἶναι συνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐκ ἐῶντος τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲ φάσκοντος εἶναι· καὶ ταύτῃ αὖ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἔργα γιγνώσκειν συνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἐῶντος τοῦ λόγου,

ἵνα δὴ ἡμῖν γένοιτο ὁ σώφρων ἐπιστήμων ὢν τε οἶδεν, ὅτι οἶδεν, καὶ ὢν μὴ οἶδεν, ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν. τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ παντάπασι μεγαλοπρεπῶς συνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδ' ἐπισκεψάμενοι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἄ τις μὴ οἶδεν μηδαμῶς, ταῦτα εἰδέναι ἁμῶς γέ πως· ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν, φησὶν αὐτὰ εἰδέναι ἡ ἡμετέρα ὁμολογία. καίτοι, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐχὶ ἀλογώτερον τοῦτ' ἂν φανείη. ἀλλ' ὅμως οὕτως ἡμῶν εὐηθικῶν τυχοῦσα ἡ ζήτησις καὶ οὐ σκληρῶν, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον εὑρεῖν δύναται τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον κατεγέλασεν αὐτῆς, ὥστε ὃ ἡμεῖς πάλαι συνομολογοῦντες καὶ συμπλάττοντες ἐτιθέμεθα σωφροσύνην εἶναι, τοῦτο ἡμῖν πάνυ ὑβριστικῶς ἀνωφελὲς ὂν ἀπέφαινε. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐμὸν καὶ ἧττον ἀγανακτῶ· ὑπὲρ δὲ σοῦ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Χαρμίδη, πάνυ ἀγανακτῶ, εἰ σὺ τοιοῦτος ὢν τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ τὴν ψυχὴν σωφρονέστατος, μηδὲν ὀνήσει ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς σωφροσύνης μηδέ τί σε ὠφελήσει ἐν τῷ βίῳ παροῦσα. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἀγανακτῶ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐπῳδῆς, ἣν παρὰ τοῦ Θρᾳκὸς ἔμαθον, εἰ μηδενὸς ἀξίου πράγματος οὖσαν αὐτὴν μετὰ πολλῆς σπουδῆς ἐμάνθανον. ταῦτ' οὖν πάνυ μὲν οὐκ οἶομαι οὕτως ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ἐμὲ φαῦλον εἶναι ζητητήν· ἐπεὶ τήν γε σωφροσύνην μέγα τι ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, καὶ εἴπερ γε ἔχεις αὐτό, μακάριον εἶναί σε. ἀλλ' ὅρα εἰ ἔχεις τε καὶ μηδὲν δέει τῆς ἐπῳδῆς· εἰ γὰρ ἔχεις, μᾶλλον ἂν ἔγωγέ σοι συμβουλεύσαιμι ἐμὲ μὲν λῆρον ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι καὶ ἀδύνατον λόγῳ ὁτιοῦν ζητεῖν, σεαυτὸν δέ, ὅσῳπερ σωφρονέστερος εἶ, τοσούτῳ εἶναι καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερον.

24. Καὶ ὁ Χαρμίδης, Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω. πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἰδείην ὅ γε μηδ' ὑμεῖς οἷοί τέ ἐστε ἐξευρεῖν ὅ τί ποτ' ἔστιν, ὡς φῂς σύ; ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐ πάνυ σοι πείθομαι, καὶ ἐμαυτόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάνυ οἶμαι δεῖσθαι τῆς ἐπῳδῆς, καὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐπᾴδεσθαι ὑπὸ σοῦ ὅσαι ἡμέραι, ἕως ἂν φῇς σὺ ἱκανῶς ἔχειν. Εἶεν· ἀλλ', ἔφη ὁ Κριτίας, ὦ Χαρμίδη, δρᾶ τοῦτο· ἔμοιγ' ἔσται τοῦτο τεκμήριον ὅτι σωφρονεῖς, ἢν ἐπᾴδειν παρέχῃς Σωκράτει καὶ μὴ ἀπολείπῃ τούτου μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρόν. Ὡς ἀκολουθήσοντος, ἔφη, καὶ μὴ ἀπολειψομένου·

δεινὰ γὰρ ἂν ποιοίην, εἰ μὴ πειθοίμην σοὶ τῷ ἐπιτρόπῳ καὶ μὴ ποιοίην ἃ κελεύεις. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, κελεύω ἔγωγε. Ποιήσω τοίνυν, ἔφη, ἀπὸ ταυτησὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἀρξάμενος. Οὗτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τί βουλεύεσθον ποιεῖν; Οὐδέν, ἔφη ὁ Χαρμίδης, ἀλλὰ βεβουλεύμεθα. Βιάσει ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ οὐδ' ἀνάκρισίν μοι δώσεις; Ὡς βιασομένου, ἔφη, ἐπειδήπερ ὅδε γε ἐπιτάττει· πρὸς ταῦτα σὺ αὖ βουλεύου ὅ τι ποιήσεις. Ἀλλ' οὐδεμία, ἔφην ἐγώ, λείπεται βουλή· σοὶ γὰρ ἐπιχειροῦντι πράττειν ὁτιοῦν καὶ βιαζομένῳ οὐδεὶς οἷός τ' ἔσται ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἀνθρώπων. Μὴ τοίνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, μηδὲ σὺ ἐναντιοῦ. Οὐ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐναντιώσομαι.

ΛΑΧΗΣ

ἢ περὶ ἀνδρείας.

TIME: About 420 B.C. (v. Introd., p. xviii). PLACE: A palaestra.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΛΥΣΙΜΑΧΟΣ, ΜΕΛΗΣΙΑΣ, ΝΙΚΙΑΣ, ΛΑΧΗΣ, ΠΑΙΔΕΣ ΛΥΣΙΜΑΧΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΜΕΛΗΣΙΟΥ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ.

1. Τεθέασθε μὲν τὸν ἄνδρα μαχόμενον ἐν ὅπλοις, ὦ Νικία τε καὶ Λάχης· οὗ δ' ἕνεκα ὑμᾶς ἐκελεύσαμεν συνθεάσασθαι ἐγώ τε καὶ Μελησίας ὅδε, τότε μὲν οὐκ εἴπομεν, νῦν δ' ἐροῦμεν. ἡγούμεθα γὰρ χρῆναι πρός γε ὑμᾶς παρρησιάζεσθαι. εἰσὶ γάρ τινες οἳ τῶν τοιούτων καταγελῶσι, καὶ ἐάν τις αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύσηται, οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν ἃ νοοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ συμβουλευομένου ἄλλα λέγουσι παρὰ τὴν αὑτῶν δόξαν· ὑμᾶς δὲ ἡμεῖς ἡγησάμενοι καὶ ἱκανοὺς γνῶναι καὶ γνόντας ἁπλῶς ἂν εἰπεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ ὑμῖν, οὕτω παρελάβομεν ἐπὶ τὴν συμβουλὴν περὶ ὧν μέλλομεν ἀνακοινοῦσθαι. ἔστιν οὖν τοῦτο, περὶ οὗ πάλαι τοσαῦτα προοιμιάζομαι, τόδε. ἡμῖν εἰσὶν υἱεῖς οὑτοί, ὅδε μὲν τοῦδε, πάππου ἔχων ὄνομα Θουκυδίδης, ἐμὸς δὲ αὖ ὅδε· παππῷον δὲ καὶ οὗτος ὄνομ' ἔχει τοὐμοῦ πατρός· Ἀριστείδην γὰρ αὐτὸν καλοῦμεν. ἡμῖν οὖν τούτων δέδοκται ἐπιμεληθῆναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, καὶ μὴ ποιῆσαι ὅπερ οἱ πολλοί, ἐπειδὴ μειράκια γέγονεν, ἀνεῖναι αὐτοὺς ὅ τι βούλονται ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ νῦν δὴ καὶ ἄρχεσθαι αὐτῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καθ' ὅσον οἷοί τ' ἐσμέν. εἰδότες οὖν καὶ ὑμῖν υἱεῖς ὄντας *εἰς συμβουλὴν ὑμᾶς παρεκαλέσαμεν ὅτι* ἡγησάμεθα μεμεληκέναι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἴπερ τισὶν ἄλλοις, πῶς ἂν θεραπευθέντες γένοιντο ἄριστοι· εἰ δ' ἄρα πολλάκις μὴ προσεσχήκατε τὸν νοῦν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὑπομνήσοντες

δεινὰ γὰρ ἂν ποιοίην, εἰ μὴ πειθοίμην σοὶ τῷ ἐπιτρόπῳ καὶ μὴ ποιοίην ἃ κελεύεις. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, κελεύω ἔγωγε. Ποιήσω τοίνυν, ἔφη, ἀπὸ ταυτησὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἀρξάμενος. Οὗτοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τί βουλεύεσθον ποιεῖν; Οὐδέν, ἔφη ὁ Χαρμίδης, ἀλλὰ βεβουλεύμεθα. Βιάσει ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ οὐδ' ἀνάκρισίν μοι δώσεις; Ὡς βιασομένου, ἔφη, ἐπειδήπερ ὅδε γε ἐπιτάττει· πρὸς ταῦτα σὺ αὖ βουλεύου ὅ τι ποιήσεις. Ἀλλ' οὐδεμία, ἔφην ἐγώ, λείπεται βουλή· σοὶ γὰρ ἐπιχειροῦντι πράττειν ὁτιοῦν καὶ βιαζομένῳ οὐδεὶς οἷός τ' ἔσται ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἀνθρώπων. Μὴ τοίνυν, ἦ δ' ὅς, μηδὲ σὺ ἐναντιοῦ. Οὐ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐναντιώσομαι.

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ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΛΥΣΙΜΑΧΟΣ, ΜΕΛΗΣΙΑΣ, ΝΙΚΙΑΣ, ΛΑΧΗΣ, ΠΑΙΔΕΣ ΛΥΣΙΜΑΧΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΜΕΛΗΣΙΟΥ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ.

1. Τεθέασθε μὲν τὸν ἄνδρα μαχόμενον ἐν ὅπλοις, ὦ Νικία τε καὶ Λάχης· οὗ δ' ἕνεκα ὑμᾶς ἐκελεύσαμεν συνθεάσασθαι ἐγώ τε καὶ Μελησίας ὅδε, τότε μὲν οὐκ εἴπομεν, νῦν δ' ἐροῦμεν. ἡγούμεθα γὰρ χρῆναι πρός γε ὑμᾶς παρρησιάζεσθαι. εἰσὶ γάρ τινες οἳ τῶν τοιούτων καταγελῶσι, καὶ ἐάν τις αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύσηται, οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν ἃ νοοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ συμβουλευομένου ἄλλα λέγουσι παρὰ τὴν αὑτῶν δόξαν· ὑμᾶς δὲ ἡμεῖς ἡγησάμενοι καὶ ἱκανοὺς γνῶναι καὶ γνόντας ἁπλῶς ἂν εἰπεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ ὑμῖν, οὕτω παρελάβομεν ἐπὶ τὴν συμβουλὴν περὶ ὧν μέλλομεν ἀνακοινοῦσθαι. ἔστιν οὖν τοῦτο, περὶ οὗ πάλαι τοσαῦτα προοιμιάζομαι, τόδε. ἡμῖν εἰσὶν υἱεῖς οὑτοί, ὅδε μὲν τοῦδε, πάππου ἔχων ὄνομα Θουκυδίδης, ἐμὸς δὲ αὖ ὅδε· παππῷον δὲ καὶ οὗτος ὄνομ' ἔχει τοὐμοῦ πατρός· Ἀριστείδην γὰρ αὐτὸν καλοῦμεν. ἡμῖν οὖν τούτων δέδοκται ἐπιμεληθῆναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, καὶ μὴ ποιῆσαι ὅπερ οἱ πολλοί, ἐπειδὴ μειράκια γέγονεν, ἀνεῖναι αὐτοὺς ὅ τι βούλονται ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ νῦν δὴ καὶ ἄρχεσθαι αὐτῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καθ' ὅσον οἷοί τ' ἐσμέν. εἰδότες οὖν καὶ ὑμῖν υἱεῖς ὄντας *εἰς συμβουλὴν ὑμᾶς παρεκαλέσαμεν ὅτι* ἡγησάμεθα μεμεληκέναι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἴπερ τισὶν ἄλλοις, πῶς ἂν θεραπευθέντες γένοιντο ἄριστοι· εἰ δ' ἄρα πολλάκις μὴ προσεσχήκατε τὸν νοῦν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὑπομνήσοντες

ὅτι οὐ χρὴ αὐτοῦ ἀμελεῖν, καὶ παρακαλοῦντες ὑμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπιμέλειάν τινα ποιήσασθαι τῶν υἱέων κοινῇ μεθ' ἡμῶν.

2. Ὅθεν δὲ ἡμῖν ταῦτ' ἔδοξεν, ὦ Νικία τε καὶ Λάχης, χρὴ ἀκοῦσαι, κἂν ᾖ ὀλίγῳ μακρότερα. συσσιτοῦμεν γὰρ δὴ ἐγώ τε καὶ Μελησίας ὅδε, καὶ ἡμῖν τὰ μειράκια παρασιτεῖ. ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἀρχόμενος εἶπον τοῦ λόγου, παρρησιασόμεθα πρὸς ὑμᾶς. ἡμῶν γὰρ ἑκάτερος περὶ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ πατρὸς πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα ἔχει λέγειν πρὸς τοὺς νεανίσκους, καὶ ὅσα ἐν πολέμῳ εἰργάσαντο καὶ ὅσα ἐν εἰρήνῃ, διοικοῦντες τά τε τῶν συμμάχων καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως· ἡμέτερα δ' αὐτῶν ἔργα οὐδέτερος ἔχει λέγειν. ταῦτα δὴ ὑπαισχυνόμεθά τε τούσδε καὶ αἰτιώμεθα τοὺς πατέρας ἡμῶν, ὅτι ἡμᾶς μὲν εἴων τρυφᾶν, ἐπειδὴ μειράκια ἐγενόμεθα, τὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων πράγματα ἔπραττον· καὶ τοῖσδε τοῖς νεανίσκοις αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐνδεικνύμεθα, λέγοντες ὅτι, εἰ μὲν ἀμελήσουσιν ἑαυτῶν καὶ μὴ πείσονται ἡμῖν, ἀκλεεῖς γενήσονται, εἰ δ' ἐπιμελήσονται, τάχ' ἂν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἄξιοι γένοιντο ἃ ἔχουσιν. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν φασὶν πείσεσθαι· ἡμεῖς δὲ δὴ τοῦτο σκοποῦμεν, τί ἂν οὗτοι μαθόντες ἢ ἐπιτηδεύσαντες ὅ τι ἄριστοι γένοιντο. εἰσηγήσατο οὖν τις ἡμῖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα, ὅτι καλὸν εἴη τῷ νέῳ μαθεῖν ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι· καὶ ἐπῄνει τοῦτον ὃν νῦν ὑμεῖς ἐθεάσασθε ἐπιδεικνύμενον, κἄτ' ἐκέλευε θεάσασθαι. ἔδοξε δὴ χρῆναι αὐτούς τε ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ θέαν τἀνδρὸς καὶ ὑμᾶς συμπαραλαβεῖν ἅμα μὲν συνθεατάς, ἅμα δὲ συμβούλους τε καὶ κοινωνούς, ἐὰν βούλησθε, περὶ τῆς τῶν υἱέων ἐπιμελείας. ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἃ ἐβουλόμεθα ὑμῖν ἀνακοινώσασθαι. ἤδη οὖν ὑμέτερον μέρος συμβουλεύειν καὶ περὶ τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος, εἴτε δοκεῖ χρῆναι μανθάνειν εἴτε μή, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, εἴ τι ἔχετε ἐπαινέσαι μάθημα νέῳ ἀνδρὶ ἢ ἐπιτήδευμα, καὶ περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας λέγειν ὁποῖόν τι ποιήσετε.

3. ΝΙ. Ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ Λυσίμαχε καὶ Μελησία, ἐπαινῶ τε ὑμῶν τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ κοινωνεῖν ἑτοῖμος, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Λάχητα τόνδε.

ΛΑ. Ἀληθῆ γὰρ οἴει, ὦ Νικία. ὡς ὅ γε ἔλεγεν ὁ Λυσίμαχος ἄρτι περὶ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ Μελησίου,

πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ εὖ εἰρῆσθαι καὶ εἰς ἐκείνους καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς καὶ εἰς ἅπαντας ὅσοι τὰ τῶν πόλεων πράττουσιν, ὅτι αὐτοῖς σχεδόν τι ταῦτα συμβαίνει, ἃ οὗτος λέγει, καὶ περὶ παῖδας καὶ περὶ τἆλλα ἴδια, ὀλιγώρως τε καὶ ἀμελῶς διατίθεσθαι. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Λυσίμαχε· ὅτι δ' ἡμᾶς μὲν συμβούλους παρακαλεῖς ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν νεανίσκων παιδείαν, Σωκράτη δὲ τόνδε οὐ παρακαλεῖς, θαυμάζω, πρῶτον μὲν ὄντα δημότην, ἔπειτα ἐνταῦθα ἀεὶ τὰς διατριβὰς ποιούμενον, ὅπου τί ἐστι τῶν τοιούτων ὧν σὺ ζητεῖς περὶ τοὺς νέους ἢ μάθημα ἢ ἐπιτήδευμα καλόν.

ΛΤ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Λάχης; Σωκράτης γὰρ ὅδε τινὸς τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιμέλειαν πεποίηται;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Λυσίμαχε.

ΝΙ. Τοῦτο μέν σοι κἂν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν οὐ χεῖρον Λάχητος· καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ μοι ἔναγχος ἄνδρα προὐξένησε τῷ υἱεῖ διδάσκαλον μουσικῆς, Ἀγαθοκλέους μαθητὴν Δάμωνα, ἀνδρῶν χαριέστατον οὐ μόνον τὴν μουσικήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τἆλλα ὁπόσα βούλει ἄξιον συνδιατρίβειν τηλικούτοις νεανίσκοις.

4. ΛΤ. Οὗτοι, ὦ Σώκρατές τε καὶ Νικία καὶ Λάχης, οἱ ἡλίκοι ἐγὼ ἔτι γιγνώσκομεν τοὺς νεωτέρους, ἅτε κατ' οἰκίαν τὰ πολλὰ διατρίβοντες ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας· ἀλλ' εἴ τι καὶ σύ, ὦ παῖ Σωφρονίσκου, ἔχεις τῷδε τῷ σαυτοῦ δημότῃ ἀγαθὸν συμβουλεῦσαι, χρὴ συμβουλεύειν. δίκαιος δ' εἶ· καὶ γὰρ πατρικὸς ἡμῖν φίλος τυγχάνεις ὤν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ σὸς πατὴρ ἑταίρω τε καὶ φίλω ἦμεν, καὶ πρότερον ἐκεῖνος ἐτελεύτησε, πρίν τι ἐμοὶ διενεχθῆναι. περιφέρει δέ τίς με καὶ μνήμη ἄρτι τῶνδε λεγόντων· τὰ γὰρ μειράκια τάδε πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἷκοι διαλεγόμενοι θαμὰ ἐπιμέμνηνται Σωκράτους καὶ σφόδρα ἐπαινοῦσιν· οὐ μέντοι πώποτε αὐτοὺς ἀνηρώτησα, εἰ τὸν Σωφρονίσκου λέγοιεν. ἀλλ', ὦ παῖδες, λέγετέ μοι, ὅδ' ἐστὶ Σωκράτης, περὶ οὗ ἑκάστοτε μέμνησθε;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ πάτερ, οὗτος.

ΛΤ. Εὖ γε νὴ τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὀρθοῖς τὸν πατέρα, ἄριστον ἀνδρῶν ὄντα, καὶ ἄλλως καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅτι οἰκεῖα τά τε σὰ ἡμῖν ὑπάρξει καὶ σοὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα.

ΛΑ. Καὶ μήν, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, μὴ ἀφίεσό γε τἀνδρός· ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλοθί γε αὐτὸν ἐθεασάμην οὐ μόνον τὸν πατέρα ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πατρίδα ὀρθοῦντα· ἐν γὰρ τῇ ἀπὸ Δηλίου φυγῇ μετ' ἐμοῦ συνανεχώρει, κἀγώ σοι λέγω ὅτι εἰ *οἱ* ἄλλοι ἤθελον τοιοῦτοι εἶναι, ὀρθὴ ἂν ἡμῶν ἡ πόλις ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔπεσε τότε τοιοῦτον πτῶμα.

ΛΥ. Ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτος μέντοι ὁ ἔπαινός ἐστιν καλός, ὃν σὺ νῦν ἐπαινεῖ ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν ἀξίων πιστεύεσθαι καὶ εἰς ταῦτα εἰς ἃ οὗτοι ἐπαινοῦσιν. εὖ οὖν ἴσθι ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα ἀκούων χαίρω ὅτι εὐδοκιμεῖς, καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡγοῦ με ἐν τοῖς γ' εὐνουστάτοις σοι εἶναι. χρῆν μὲν οὖν καὶ πρότερόν σε φοιτᾶν αὐτὸν παρ' ἡμᾶς καὶ οἰκείους ἡγεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ τὸ δίκαιον· νῦν δ' οὖν ἀπὸ τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας, ἐπειδὴ ἀνεγνωρίσαμεν ἀλλήλους, μὴ ἄλλως ποίει, ἀλλὰ σύνισθί τε καὶ γνώριζε καὶ ἡμᾶς καὶ τούσδε τοὺς νεωτέρους, ὅπως ἂν διασῴζητε καὶ ὑμεῖς τὴν ἡμετέραν φιλίαν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ σὺ ποιήσεις καὶ ἡμεῖς σε καὶ αὖθις ὑπομνήσομεν· περὶ δὲ ὧν ἠρξάμεθα τί φατε; τί δοκεῖ; τὸ μάθημα τοῖς μειρακίοις ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι ἢ οὔ, τὸ μαθεῖν ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι;

5. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων πέρι, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, ἔγωγε πειράσομαι συμβουλεύειν ἄν τι δύνωμαι, καὶ αὖ ἃ προκαλεῖ πάντα ποιεῖν. δικαιότατον μέντοι μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἐμὲ νεώτερον ὄντα τῶνδε καὶ ἀπειρότερον τούτων ἀκούειν πρότερον τί λέγουσιν καὶ μανθάνειν παρ' αὐτῶν· ἐὰν δ' ἔχω τι ἄλλο παρὰ τὰ ὑπὸ τούτων λεγόμενα, τότ' ἤδη διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν καὶ σὲ καὶ τούτους. ἀλλ', ὦ Νικία, τί οὐ λέγει πότερος ὑμῶν;

ΝΙ. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα τοῖς νέοις ὠφέλιμον εἶναι ἐπίστασθαι πολλαχῇ. καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἄλλοθι διατρίβειν, ἐν οἷς δὴ φιλοῦσιν οἱ νέοι τὰς διατριβὰς ποιεῖσθαι, ὅταν σχολὴν ἄγωσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τούτῳ, εὖ ἔχει, ὅθεν καὶ τὸ σῶμα βέλτιον ἴσχειν ἀνάγκη — οὐδενὸς γὰρ τῶν γυμνασίων φαυλότερον οὐδ' ἐλάττω πόνον ἔχει — καὶ ἅμα προσήκει μάλιστ' ἐλευθέρῳ τοῦτό τε τὸ γυμνάσιον καὶ ἡ ἱππική· οὐ γὰρ ἀγῶνος ἀθληταί ἐσμεν καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγὼν

πρόκειται, μόνοι οὗτοι γυμνάζονται οἱ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ὀργάνοις γυμναζόμενοι. ἔπειτα ὀνήσει μέν τι τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα καὶ ἐν τῇ μάχῃ αὐτῇ, ὅταν ἐν τάξει δέῃ μάχεσθαι μετὰ πολλῶν ἄλλων· μέγιστον μέντοι αὐτοῦ ὄφελος, ὅταν λυθῶσιν αἱ τάξεις καὶ ἤδη τινὰ δέῃ μόνον πρὸς μόνον ἢ διώκοντα ἀμυνομένῳ τινὶ ἐπιθέσθαι ἢ καὶ ἐν φυγῇ ἐπιτιθεμένου ἄλλου ἀμύνασθαι αὐτόν· οὐ τἂν ὑπό γε ἑνὸς εἷς ὁ τοῦτ' ἐπιστάμενος οὐδὲν ἂν πάθοι, ἴσως δ' οὐδὲ ὑπὸ πλειόνων, ἀλλὰ πανταχῇ ἂν ταύτῃ πλεονεκτοῖ. ἔτι δὲ καὶ εἰς ἄλλου καλοῦ μαθήματος ἐπιθυμίαν παρακαλεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον· πᾶς γὰρ ἂν μαθὼν ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι ἐπιθυμήσειε καὶ τοῦ ἐξῆς· μαθήματος τοῦ περὶ τὰς τάξεις, καὶ ταῦτα λαβὼν καὶ φιλοτιμηθεὶς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ πᾶν ἂν τὸ περὶ τὰς στρατηγίας ὁρμήσειε· καὶ ἤδη δῆλον ὅτι τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα καὶ μαθήματα πάντα καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ καλὰ καὶ πολλοῦ ἄξια ἀνδρὶ μαθεῖν τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεῦσαι, ὧν καθηγήσαιτ' ἂν τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα. προσθήσομεν δ' αὐτῷ οὐ σμικρὰν προσθήκην, ὅτι πάντα ἄνδρα ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ θαρραλεώτερον καὶ ἀνδρειότερον ἂν ποιήσειεν αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ οὐκ ὀλίγῳ αὖτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη. μὴ ἀτιμάσωμεν δὲ εἰπεῖν, εἰ καί τῳ σμικρότερον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅτι καὶ εὐσχημονέστερον ἐνταῦθα οὖ χρὴ τὸν ἄνδρα εὐσχημονέστερον φαίνεσθαι, οὗ ἅμα καὶ δεινότερος τοῖς ἐχθροῖς φανεῖται διὰ τὴν εὐσχημοσύνην. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, ὥσπερ λέγω, δοκεῖ τε χρῆναι διδάσκειν τοὺς νεανίσκους ταῦτα καὶ δι' ἃ δοκεῖ εἴρηκα· Λάχητος δ', εἴ τι παρὰ ταῦτα λέγει, κἂν αὐτὸς ἡδέως ἀκούσαιμι.

6. ΛΑ. Ἀλλ' ἔστι μέν, ὦ Νικία, χαλεπὸν λέγειν περὶ ὁτουοῦν μαθήματος, ὡς οὐ χρὴ μανθάνειν· πάντα γὰρ ἐπίστασθαι ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ ὁπλιτικὸν τοῦτο, εἰ μέν ἐστιν μάθημα, ὅπερ φασὶν οἱ διδάσκοντες, καὶ οἷον Νικίας λέγει, χρὴ αὐτὸ μανθάνειν· εἰ δ' ἔστιν μὲν μὴ μάθημα, ἀλλ' ἐξαπατῶσιν οἱ ὑπισχνούμενοι, ἢ μάθημα μὲν τυγχάνει ὄν, μὴ μέντοι πάνυ σπουδαῖον, τί καὶ δέοι ἂν αὐτὸ μανθάνειν; λέγω δὲ ταῦτα περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰς τάδε ἀποβλέψας, ὅτι οἶμαι ἐγὼ τοῦτο, εἰ τὶ ἦν, οὐκ ἂν λεληθέναι Λακεδαιμονίους, οἷς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μέλει

ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἢ τοῦτο ζητεῖν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν, ὅ τι ἂν μαθόντες καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσαντες πλεονεκτοῖεν τῶν ἄλλων περὶ τὸν πόλεμον. εἰ δ' ἐκείνους ἐλελήθειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τούτους γε τοὺς διδασκάλους αὐτοῦ 'λελήθειν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι μάλιστα τῶν Ἑλλήνων σπουδάζουσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ ὅτι παρ' ἐκείνοις ἄν τις τιμηθεὶς εἰς ταῦτα καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων πλεῖστ' ἂν ἐργάζοιτο χρήματα, ὥσπερ γε καὶ τραγῳδίας ποιητὴς παρ' ἡμῖν τιμηθείς. τοιγάρτοι ὃς ἂν οἴηται τραγῳδίαν καλῶς ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἔξωθεν κύκλῳ περὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπιδεικνύμενος περιέρχεται, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς δεῦρο φέρεται καὶ τοῖσδ' ἐπιδείκνυσιν εἰκότως· τοὺς δὲ ἐν ὅπλοις μαχομένους ἐγὼ τούτους ὁρῶ τὴν μὲν Λακεδαίμονα ἡγουμένους εἶναι ἄβατον ἱερὸν καὶ οὐδὲ ἄκρῳ ποδὶ ἐπιβαίνοντας, κύκλῳ δὲ περιόντας αὐτὴν καὶ πᾶσι μᾶλλον ἐπιδεικνυμένους, καὶ μάλιστα τούτοις οἳ κἂν αὐτοὶ ὁμολογήσειαν πολλοὺς σφῶν προτέρους εἶναι πρὸς τὰ τοῦ πολέμου.

7. Ἔπειτα, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, οὐ πάνυ ὀλίγοις ἐγὼ τούτων παραγέγονα ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔργῳ, καὶ ὁρῶ οἷοί εἰσιν. ἔξεστι δὲ καὶ αὐτόθεν ἡμῖν σκέψασθαι. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπίτηδες οὐδεὶς πώποτ' εὐδόκιμος γέγονεν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἀνὴρ τῶν τὰ ὁπλιτικὰ ἐπιτηδευσάντων. καίτοι εἴς γε τἄλλα πάντα ἐκ τούτων οἱ ὀνομαστοὶ γίγνονται, ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευσάντων ἕκαστα· οὗτοι δ', ὡς ἔοικε, παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους οὕτω σφόδρα εἰς τοῦτο δεδυστυχήκασιν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτον τὸν Στησίλεων, ὃν ὑμεῖς μετ' ἐμοῦ ἐν τοσούτῳ ὄχλῳ ἐθεάσασθε ἐπιδεικνύμενον καὶ τὰ μεγάλα περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγοντα ἃ ἔλεγεν, ἐτέρωθι ἐγὼ κάλλιον ἐθεασάμην ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιδεικνύμενον οὐχ ἑκόντα. προσβαλούσης γὰρ τῆς νεὼς ἐφ' ᾗ ἐπεβάτευεν πρὸς ὁλκάδα τινά, ἐμάχετο ἔχων δορυδρέπανον, διαφέρον δὴ ὅπλον ἅτε καὶ αὐτὸς τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρων. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα οὐκ ἄξια λέγειν περὶ τἀνδρός, τὸ δὲ σόφισμα τὸ τοῦ δρεπάνου τοῦ πρὸς τῇ λόγχῃ οἷον ἀπέβη. μαχομένου γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐνέσχετό που ἐν τοῖς τῆς νεὼς σκεύεσιν καὶ ἀντελάβετο· εἷλκεν οὖν ὁ Στησίλεως βουλόμενος ἀπολῦσαι, καὶ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦν· ἡ δὲ ναῦς τὴν ναῦν παρήει. τέως μὲν οὖν

παρέθει ἐν τῇ νηΐ ἀντεχόμενος τοῦ δόρατος· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ παρημείβετο ἡ ναῦς τὴν ναῦν καὶ ἐπέσπα αὐτὸν τοῦ δόρατος ἐχόμενον, ἐφίει τὸ δόρυ διὰ τῆς χειρός, ἕως ἄκρου τοῦ στύρακος ἀντελάβετο. ἦν δὲ γέλως καὶ κρότος ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ὁλκάδος ἐπί τε τῷ σχήματι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐπειδὴ βαλόντος τινὸς λίθῳ παρὰ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ κατάστρωμα ἀφίεται τοῦ δόρατος, τότ' ἤδη καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς τριήρους οὐκέτι οἷοί τ' ἦσαν τὸν γέλωτα κατέχειν, ὁρῶντες αἰωρούμενον ἐκ τῆς ὁλκάδος τὸ δορυδρέπανον ἐκεῖνο. ἴσως μὲν οὖν εἴη ἂν τὶ ταῦτα, ὥσπερ Νικίας λέγει· οἷς δ' οὖν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα, τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ἐστίν.

8. Ὃ οὖν καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἶπον, ὅτι εἴτε οὕτως μικρὰς ὠφελίας ἔχει μάθημα ὄν, εἴτε μὴ ὄν, φασὶ καὶ προσποιοῦνται αὐτὸ εἶναι μάθημα, οὐκ ἄξιον ἐπιχειρεῖν μανθάνειν. καὶ γὰρ οὖν μοι δοκεῖ, εἰ μὲν δειλός τις ὢν οἴοιτο αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι, θρασύτερος ἂν δι' αὐτὸ γενόμενος ἐπιφανέστερος γένοιτο οἷος ἦν· εἰ δὲ ἀνδρεῖος, φυλαττόμενος ἂν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰ καὶ σμικρὸν ἐξαμάρτοι, μεγάλας ἂν διαβολὰς ἴσχειν· ἐπίφθονος γὰρ ἡ προσποίησις τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιστήμης, ὥστ' εἰ μή τι θαυμαστὸν ὅσον διαφέρει τῇ ἀρετῇ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἄν τις φύγοι τὸ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι, φάσκων ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην. τοιαύτη τις ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, ἡ περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα εἶναι σπουδή· χρὴ δ' ὅπερ σοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, καὶ Σωκράτη τόνδε μὴ ἀφιέναι, ἀλλὰ δεῖσθαι συμβουλεύειν ὅπῃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου.

ΛΥ. Ἀλλὰ δέομαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἔτι τοῦ διακρινοῦντος δοκεῖ μοι δεῖν ἡμῖν ἡ βουλή. εἰ μὲν γὰρ συνεφερέσθην τώδε, ἧττον ἂν τοῦ τοιούτου ἔδει· νῦν δέ — τὴν ἐναντίαν γάρ, ὡς ὁρᾷς, Λάχης Νικίᾳ ἔθετο — εὖ δὴ ἔχει ἀκοῦσαι καὶ σοῦ, ποτέρῳ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν σύμψηφος εἶ.

9. ΣΩ. Τί δέ, ὦ Λυσίμαχε; ὁπότερ' ἂν οἱ πλείους ἐπαινῶσιν ἡμῶν, τούτοις μέλλεις χρῆσθαι;

ΛΥ. Τί γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ ποιοῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ σύ, ὦ Μελησία, οὕτως ἂν ποιοῖς; κἂν εἴ τις περὶ ἀγωνίας τοῦ υἱέος σοι βουλὴ εἴη τί χρὴ ἀσκεῖν, ἆρα τοῖς

ἡμᾶς διδάξαντες φαίνονται· ἢ εἴ τις ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἑαυτῷ διδάσκαλον μὲν οὔ φησι γεγονέναι, ἀλλ' οὖν ἔργα αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ ἔχει εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἐπιδεῖξαι, τίνες Ἀθηναίων ἢ τῶν ξένων, ἢ δοῦλοι ἢ ἐλεύθεροι, δι' ἐκεῖνον ὁμολογουμένως ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν· εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἡμῖν τούτων ὑπάρχει, ἄλλους κελεύειν ζητεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐν ἑταίρων ἀνδρῶν υἱέσιν κινδυνεύειν διαφθείροντας τὴν μεγίστην αἰτίαν ἔχειν ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκειοτάτων. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Λυσίμαχέ τε καὶ Μελησία, πρῶτος περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ λέγω ὅτι διδάσκαλός μοι οὐ γέγονε τούτου πέρι. καίτοι ἐπιθυμῶ γε τοῦ πράγματος ἐκ νέου ἀρξάμενος. ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἔχω τελεῖν μισθούς, οἵπερ μόνοι ἐπηγγέλλοντό με οἷοί τ' εἶναι ποιῆσαι καλόν τε κἀγαθόν· αὐτὸς δ' αὖ εὑρεῖν τὴν τέχνην ἀδύνατῶ ἔτι νυνί. εἰ δὲ Νικίας ἢ Λάχης ηὗρηκεν ἢ μεμάθηκεν, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι· καὶ γὰρ χρήμασιν ἐμοῦ δυνατώτεροι, ὥστε μαθεῖν παρ' ἄλλων, καὶ ἅμα πρεσβύτεροι, ὥστε ἤδη ηὑρηκέναι. δοκοῦσι δή μοι δυνατοὶ εἶναι παιδεῦσαι ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε ἀδεῶς ἀπεφαίνοντο περὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων νέῳ χρηστῶν τε καὶ πονηρῶν, εἰ μὴ αὐτοῖς ἐπίστευον ἱκανῶς εἰδέναι. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ἔγωγε τούτοις πιστεύω· ὅτι δὲ διαφέρεσθον ἀλλήλοιν, ἐθαύμασα. τοῦτο οὖν σου ἐγὼ ἀντιδέομαι, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, καθάπερ ἄρτι Λάχης μὴ ἀφίεσθαί σε ἐμοῦ διεκελεύετο ἀλλὰ ἐρωτᾶν, καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν παρακελεύομαί σοι μὴ ἀφίεσθαι Λάχητος μηδὲ Νικίου, ἀλλ' ἐρωτᾶν λέγοντα, ὅτι ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης οὔ φησιν ἐπαΐειν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, οὐδ' ἱκανὸς εἶναι διακρῖναι ὁπότερος ὑμῶν ἀληθῆ λέγει· οὔτε γὰρ εὑρετὴς οὔτε μαθητὴς οὐδενὸς περὶ τῶν τοιούτων γεγονέναι· σὺ δ', ὦ Λάχης καὶ Νικία, εἴπετον ἡμῖν ἑκάτερος, τίνι δὴ δεινοτάτῳ συγγεγόνατον περὶ τῆς τῶν νέων τροφῆς, καὶ πότερα μαθόντε παρά του ἐπίστασθον ἢ αὐτὼ ἐξευρόντε, καὶ εἰ μὲν μαθόντε, τίς ὁ διδάσκαλος ἑκατέρῳ καὶ τίνες ἄλλοι ὁμότεχνοι αὐτοῖς, ἵν', ἂν μὴ ὑμῖν σχολὴ ᾖ ὑπὸ τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων, ἐπ' ἐκείνους ἴωμεν καὶ πείθωμεν ἢ δώροις ἢ χάρισιν ἢ ἀμφότερα ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων καὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων παίδων, ὅπως μὴ καταισχύνωσι τοὺς αὑτῶν προγόνους φαῦλοι γενόμενοι· εἰ δ' αὐτοὶ εὑρεταὶ γεγονότε τοῦ

τοιούτου, δότε παράδειγμα, τίνων ἤδη ἄλλων ἐπιμεληθέντες ἐκ φαύλων καλούς τε κἀγαθοὺς ἐποιήσατε. εἰ γὰρ νῦν ἄρξεσθε πρῶτον παιδεύειν, σκοπεῖν χρὴ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ Καρὶ ὑμῖν ὁ κίνδυνος κινδυνεύηται, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ὑμετέροις τε καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῶν φίλων παισί, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὸ λεγόμενον κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ὑμῖν συμβαίνῃ ἐν πίθῳ ἡ κεραμεία γιγνομένη. λέγετε οὖν, τί τούτων ἢ φατὲ ὑμῖν ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ προσήκειν, ἢ οὔ φατε. ταῦτ', ὦ Λυσίμαχε, παρ' αὐτῶν πυνθάνου τε καὶ μὴ μεθίει τοὺς ἄνδρας.

12. ΛΥ. Καλῶς μὲν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες, Σωκράτης λέγειν· εἰ δὲ βουλομένοις ὑμῖν ἐστι περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἐρωτᾶσθαί τε καὶ διδόναι λόγον, αὐτοὺς δὴ χρὴ γιγνώσκειν, ὦ Νικία τε καὶ Λάχης. ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ Μελησίᾳ τῷδε δῆλον ὅτι ἡδομένοις ἂν εἴη, εἰ πάντα, ἃ Σωκράτης ἐρωτᾷ, ἐθέλοιτε λόγῳ διεξιέναι· καὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐντεῦθεν ἠρχόμην λέγων, ὅτι εἰς συμβουλὴν διὰ ταῦτα ὑμᾶς παρακαλέσαιμεν, ὅτι μεμεληκέναι ὑμῖν ἡγούμεθα, ὡς εἰκός, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ἄλλως καὶ ἐπειδὴ οἱ παῖδες ὑμῖν ὀλίγου ὥσπερ οἱ ἡμέτεροι ἡλικίαν ἔχουσι παιδεύεσθαι. εἰ οὖν ὑμῖν μή τι διαφέρει, εἴπατε καὶ κοινῇ μετὰ Σωκράτους σκέψασθε, διδόντες τε καὶ δεχόμενοι λόγον παρ' ἀλλήλων· εὖ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο λέγει ὅδε, ὅτι περὶ τοῦ μεγίστου νῦν βουλευόμεθα τῶν ἡμετέρων. ἀλλ' ὁρᾶτε εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι οὕτω ποιεῖν.

ΝΙ. Ὦ Λυσίμαχε, δοκεῖς μοι ὡς ἀληθῶς Σωκράτη πατρόθεν γιγνώσκειν μόνον, αὐτῷ δ' οὐ συγγεγονέναι ἀλλ' ἢ παιδὶ ὄντι, εἴ που ἐν τοῖς δημόταις μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκολουθῶν ἐπλησίασέν σοι ἢ ἐν ἱερῷ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ τῳ συλλόγῳ τῶν δημοτῶν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ πρεσβύτερος γέγονεν, οὐκ ἐντετυχηκὼς τῷ ἀνδρὶ δῆλος εἶ.

ΛΥ. Τί μάλιστα, ὦ Νικία;

13. ΝΙ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖς εἰδέναι ὅτι, ὃς ἂν ἐγγύτατα Σωκράτους ᾖ λόγῳ, καὶ πλησιάζῃ διαλεγόμενος, ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ περὶ ἄλλου του πρότερον ἄρξηται διαλέγεσθαι, μὴ παύεσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου περιαγόμενον τῷ λόγῳ, πρὶν *ἂν*

ἐμπέσῃ εἰς τὸ διδόναι περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγον, ὅντινα τρόπον νῦν τε ζῇ καὶ ὅντινα τὸν παρεληλυθότα βίον βεβίωκεν· ἐπειδὰν δ' ἐμπέσῃ, ὅτι οὐ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀφήσει Σωκράτης, πρὶν ἂν βασανίσῃ ταῦτα εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς ἅπαντα· ἐγὼ δὲ συνήθης τέ εἰμι τῷδε καὶ οἶδ' ὅτι ἀνάγκη ὑπὸ τούτου πάσχειν ταῦτα, καὶ ἔτι γε αὐτὸς ὅτι πείσομαι ταῦτα εὖ οἶδα· χαίρω γάρ, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, τῷ ἀνδρὶ πλησιάζων, καὶ οὐδὲν οἶμαι κακὸν εἶναι τὸ ὑπομιμνήσκεσθαι ὅ τι μὴ καλῶς ἢ πεποιήκαμεν ἢ ποιοῦμεν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα βίον προμηθέστερον ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸν ταῦτα μὴ φεύγοντα, ἀλλ' ἐθέλοντα κατὰ τὸ τοῦ Σόλωνος καὶ ἀξιοῦντα μανθάνειν ἕωσπερ ἂν ζῇ, καὶ μὴ οἰόμενον αὐτὸ τὸ γῆρας νοῦν ἔχον προσιέναι. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν ἄηθες οὐδ' αὖ ἀηδὲς ὑπὸ Σωκράτους βασανίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλαι σχεδόν τι ἠπιστάμην, ὅτι οὐ περὶ τῶν μειρακίων ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἔσοιτο Σωκράτους παρόντος, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν. ὅπερ οὖν λέγω, τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει Σωκράτει συνδιατρίβειν ὅπως οὗτος βούλεται· Λάχητα δὲ τόνδε ὅρα ὅπως ἔχει περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου.

14. ΛΑ. Ἁπλοῦν τό γ' ἐμόν, ὦ Νικία, περὶ λόγων ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ βούλει, οὐχ ἁπλοῦν, ἀλλὰ διπλοῦν. καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξαιμί τῳ φιλόλογος εἶναι καὶ αὖ μισόλογος. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἀκούω ἀνδρὸς περὶ ἀρετῆς διαλεγομένου ἢ περί τινος σοφίας ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντος ἀνδρὸς καὶ ἀξίου τῶν λόγων ὧν λέγει, χαίρω ὑπερφυῶς, θεώμενος ἅμα τόν τε λέγοντα καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ὅτι πρέποντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ ἁρμόττοντά ἐστι· καὶ κομιδῇ μοι δοκεῖ μουσικὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι, ἁρμονίαν καλλίστην ἡρμοσμένος οὐ λύραν οὐδὲ παιδιᾶς ὄργανα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ζῆν ἡρμοσμένος εὖ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τὸν βίον σύμφωνον τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα, ἀτεχνῶς δωριστὶ ἀλλ' οὐκ ἰαστὶ οἶμαι οὐδὲ φρυγιστὶ οὐδὲ λυδιστί, ἀλλ' ἥπερ μόνη Ἑλληνική ἐστιν ἁρμονία. ὁ μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος χαίρειν με ποιεῖ φθεγγόμενος καὶ δοκεῖν ὁτῳοῦν φιλόλογον εἶναι· οὕτω σφόδρα ἀποδέχομαι παρ' αὐτοῦ τὰ λεγόμενα· ὁ δὲ τἀναντία τούτου πράττων λυπεῖ με, ὅσῳ ἂν δοκῇ ἄμεινον λέγειν, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον, καὶ ποιεῖ

αὖ δοκεῖν εἶναι μισόλογον. Σωκράτους δ' ἐγὼ τῶν μὲν λόγων οὐκ ἔμπειρός εἰμι, ἀλλὰ πρότερον, ὡς ἔοικε, τῶν ἔργων ἐπειράθην, καὶ ἐκεῖ αὐτὸν ηὗρον ἄξιον ὄντα λόγων καλῶν καὶ πάσης παρρησίας. εἰ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἔχει, συμβούλομαι τἀνδρί, καὶ ἥδιστ' ἂν ἐξεταζοίμην ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀχθοίμην μανθάνων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐγὼ τῷ Σόλωνι, ἓν μόνον προσλαβών, συγχωρῶ· γηράσκων γὰρ πολλὰ διδάσκεσθαι ἐθέλω ὑπὸ χρηστῶν μόνον. τοῦτο γάρ μοι συγχωρείτω, ἀγαθὸν καὶ αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν διδάσκαλον, ἵνα μὴ δυσμαθὴς φαίνωμαι ἀηδῶς μανθάνων· εἰ δὲ νεώτερος ὁ διδάσκων ἔσται ἢ μήπω ἐν δόξῃ ὢν ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων ἔχων, οὐδέν μοι μέλει. σοὶ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ ἐπαγγέλλομαι καὶ διδάσκειν καὶ ἐλέγχειν ἐμὲ ὅ τι ἂν βούλῃ, καὶ μανθάνειν γε ὅ τι αὖ ἐγὼ οἶδα· οὕτω σὺ παρ' ἐμοὶ διάκεισαι ἀπ' ἐκείνης τῆς ἡμέρας, ᾗ μετ' ἐμοῦ συνδιεκινδύνευσας καὶ ἔδωκας σαυτοῦ πεῖραν ἀρετῆς, ἣν χρὴ διδόναι τὸν μέλλοντα δικαίως δώσειν. λέγ' οὖν ὅ τί σοι φίλον, μηδὲν τὴν ἡμετέραν ἡλικίαν ὑπόλογον ποιούμενος.

15. ΣΩ. Οὐ τὰ ὑμέτερα, ὡς ἔοικεν, αἰτιασόμεθα μὴ οὐχ ἑτοῖμα εἶναι καὶ συμβουλεύειν καὶ συσκοπεῖν.

ΛΥ. Ἀλλ' ἡμέτερον δὴ ἔργον, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἕνα γάρ σε ἔγωγε ἡμῶν τίθημι· σκόπει οὖν ἀντ' ἐμοῦ ὑπὲρ τῶν νεανίσκων, ὅ τι δεόμεθα παρὰ τῶνδε πυνθάνεσθαι, καὶ συμβούλευε διαλεγόμενος τούτοις. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνομαι ἤδη τὰ πολλὰ διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ὧν ἂν διανοηθῶ ἐρέσθαι, καὶ αὖ ἃ ἂν ἀκούσω, ἐάν γε μεταξὺ ἄλλοι λόγοι γένωνται, οὐ πάνυ μέμνημαι. ὑμεῖς οὖν λέγετε καὶ διέξιτε πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ ὧν προὐθέμεθα· ἐγὼ δ' ἀκούσομαι καὶ ἀκούσας αὖ μετὰ Μελησίου τοῦδε ποιήσω τοῦτο ὅ τι ἂν καὶ ὑμῖν δοκῇ.

ΣΩ. Πειστέον, ὦ Νικία τε καὶ Λάχης, Λυσιμάχῳ καὶ Μελησίᾳ. ἃ μὲν οὖν νυνδὴ ἐπεχειρήσαμεν σκοπεῖν, τίνες οἱ διδάσκαλοι ἡμῖν τῆς τοιαύτης παιδείας γεγόνασιν ἢ τίνας ἄλλους βελτίους πεποιήκαμεν, ἴσως μὲν οὐ κακῶς ἔχει ἐξετάζειν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἡμᾶς αὐτούς· ἀλλ' οἶμαι καὶ ἡ τοιάδε σκέψις εἰς ταὐτὸν φέρει, σχεδὸν δέ τι καὶ μᾶλλον ἐξ ἀρχῆς

εἴη ἄν. εἰ γὰρ τυγχάνομεν ἐπιστάμενοι ὁτουοῦν πέρι, ὅτι παραγενόμενόν τῳ βέλτιον ποιεῖ ἐκεῖνο ᾧ παρεγένετο, καὶ προσέτι οἱοί τέ ἐσμεν αὐτὸ ποιεῖν παραγίγνεσθαι ἐκείνῳ, δῆλον ὅτι αὐτό γε ἴσμεν τοῦτο, οὗ πέρι σύμβουλοι ἂν γενοίμεθα ὡς ἄν τις αὐτὸ ῥᾷστα καὶ ἄριστ' ἂν κτήσαιτο. ἴσως οὖν οὐ μανθάνετέ μου ὅ τι λέγω, ἀλλ' ὧδε ῥᾷον μαθήσεσθε. εἰ τυγχάνομεν ἐπιστάμενοι, ὅτι ὄψις παραγενομένη ὀφθαλμοῖς βελτίους ποιεῖ ἐκείνους οἷς παρεγένετο, καὶ προσέτι οἱοί τ' ἐσμεν ποιεῖν αὐτὴν παραγίγνεσθαι ὄμμασι, δῆλον ὅτι ὄψιν γε ἴσμεν αὐτὴν ὅτι ποτ' ἔστιν, ἧς πέρι σύμβουλοι ἂν γενοίμεθα ὡς ἄν τις αὐτὴν ῥᾷστα καὶ ἄριστα κτήσαιτο. εἰ γὰρ μηδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰδεῖμεν, ὅ τί ποτ' ἔστιν ὄψις ἢ ὅ τι ἔστιν ἀκοή, σχολῇ ἂν σύμβουλοί γε ἄξιοι λόγου γενοίμεθα καὶ ἰατροὶ ἢ περὶ ὀφθαλμῶν ἢ περὶ ὤτων, ὄντινα τρόπον ἀκοὴν ἢ ὄψιν κάλλιστ' ἂν κτήσαιτό τις.

ΛΑ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

16. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Λάχης, καὶ νῦν ἡμᾶς τώδε παρακαλεῖτον εἰς συμβουλήν, τίν' ἂν τρόπον τοῖς υἱέσιν αὐτῶν ἀρετὴ παραγενομένη ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀμείνους ποιήσειε;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν τοῦτό γ' ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, τὸ εἰδέναι ὅ τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἀρετή; εἰ γάρ που μηδ' ἀρετὴν εἰδεῖμεν τὸ παράπαν ὅ τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν, τίν' ἂν τρόπον τούτου σύμβουλοι γενοίμεθα ὁτῳοῦν, ὅπως ἂν αὐτὸ κάλλιστα κτήσαιτο;

ΛΑ. Οὐδένα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Φαμὲν ἄρα, ὦ Λάχης, εἰδέναι αὐτὸ ὅ τι ἔστιν.

ΛΑ. Φαμὲν μέντοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅ γε ἴσμεν, κἂν εἴποιμεν δήπου τί ἐστιν.

ΛΑ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, περὶ ὅλης ἀρετῆς εὐθέως σκοπῶμεθα· πλέον γὰρ ἴσως ἔργον· ἀλλὰ μέρους τινὸς πέρι πρῶτον ἴδωμεν, εἰ ἱκανῶς ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι· καὶ ἡμῖν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, ῥᾴων ἡ σκέψις ἔσται.

ΛΑ. Ἀλλ' οὕτω ποιῶμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς σὺ βούλει.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ἂν προελοίμεθα τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μερῶν; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τοῦτο εἰς ὃ τείνειν δοκεῖ ἡ ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις μάθησις; δοκεῖ δέ που τοῖς πολλοῖς εἰς ἀνδρείαν. ἦ γάρ;

ΛΑ. Καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν πρῶτον ἐπιχειρήσωμεν, ὦ Λάχης, εἰπεῖν, ἀνδρεία τί ποτ' ἐστίν· ἔπειτα μετὰ τοῦτο σκεψόμεθα καὶ ὅτῳ ἂν τρόπῳ τοῖς νεανίσκοις παραγένοιτο, καθ' ὅσον οἷόν τε ἐξ ἐπιτηδευμάτων τε καὶ μαθημάτων παραγενέσθαι. ἀλλὰ πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ὃ λέγω, τί ἐστιν ἀνδρεία.

17. ΛΑ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν· εἰ γάρ τις ἐθέλοι ἐν τῇ τάξει μένων ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ μὴ φεύγοι, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἀνδρεῖος ἂν εἴη.

ΣΩ. Εὖ μὲν λέγεις, ὦ Λάχης· ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐγὼ αἴτιος, οὐ σαφῶς εἰπών, τὸ σὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὴ τοῦτο ὃ διανοούμενος ἠρόμην, ἀλλ' ἕτερον.

ΛΑ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ φράσω, ἐὰν οἷός τε γένωμαι. ἀνδρεῖός που οὗτος, ὃν καὶ σὺ λέγεις, ὃς ἂν ἐν τῇ τάξει μένων μάχηται τοῖς πολεμίοις.

ΛΑ. Ἐγὼ γοῦν φημί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ τί αὖ ὅδε, ὃς ἂν φεύγων μάχηται τοῖς πολεμίοις, ἀλλὰ μὴ μένων;

ΛΑ. Πῶς φεύγων;

ΣΩ. Ὥσπερ που καὶ Σκύθαι λέγονται οὐχ ἧττον φεύγοντες ἢ διώκοντες μάχεσθαι, καὶ Ὁμηρός που ἐπαινῶν τοὺς τοῦ Αἰνείου ἵππους κραιπνὰ μάλ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα ἔφη αὐτοὺς ἐπίστασθαι διώκειν ἠδὲ φέβεσθαι· καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Αἰνείαν κατὰ τοῦτ' ἐνεκωμίασε, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ φόβου ἐπιστήμην, καὶ εἶπεν αὐτὸν εἶναι μήστωρα φόβοιο.

ΛΑ. Καὶ καλῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες· περὶ ἁρμάτων γὰρ ἔλεγε· καὶ σὺ τὸ τῶν Σκυθῶν ἱππέων πέρι λέγεις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἱππικὸν τὸ ἐκείνων οὕτω μάχεται, τὸ δὲ ὁπλιτικὸν τό γε τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω.

ΣΩ. Πλήν γ' ἴσως, ὦ Λάχης, τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων. Λακεδαιμονίους γάρ φασιν ἐν Πλαταιαῖς, ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τοῖς γερροφόροις ἐγένοντο, οὐκ ἐθέλειν μένοντας πρὸς αὐτοὺς μάχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ φεύγειν, ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐλύθησαν αἱ τάξεις τῶν Περσῶν, ἀναστρεφομένους ὥσπερ ἱππέας μάχεσθαι καὶ οὕτω νικῆσαι τὴν ἐκεῖ μάχην.

ΛΑ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

18. ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ὅτι ἐγὼ αἴτιος μὴ καλῶς σε ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς ἠρόμην. βουλόμενος γάρ σου πυθέσθαι μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ ὁπλιτικῷ ἀνδρείους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἱππικῷ καὶ ἐν σύμπαντι τῷ πολεμικῷ εἴδει, καὶ μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κινδύνοις ἀνδρείους ὄντας, καὶ ὅσοι γε πρὸς νόσους καὶ ὅσοι πρὸς πενίας ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν, καὶ ἔτι αὖ μὴ μόνον ὅσοι πρὸς λύπας ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν ἢ φόβους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ ἡδονὰς δεινοὶ μάχεσθαι, μένοντες ἢ ἀναστρέφοντες — εἰσὶ γάρ πού τινες, ὦ Λάχης, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνδρεῖοι.

ΛΑ. Καὶ σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνδρεῖοι μὲν πάντες οὗτοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἐν ἡδοναῖς, οἱ δ' ἐν λύπαις, οἱ δ' ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις, οἱ δ' ἐν φόβοις τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἔκτηνται· οἱ δέ γ' οἶμαι δειλίαν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις.

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί ποτε ὂν ἑκάτερον τούτων, τοῦτο ἐπυνθανόμην. πάλιν οὖν πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ἀνδρείαν πρῶτον, τί ὂν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ταὐτόν ἐστιν· ἢ οὔπω καταμανθάνεις ὃ λέγω;

ΛΑ. Οὐ πάνυ τι.

19. ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ὧδε λέγω, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τάχος ἠρώτων τί ποτ' ἐστίν, ὃ καὶ ἐν τῷ τρέχειν τυγχάνει ὂν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ κιθαρίζειν καὶ ἐν τῷ λέγειν καὶ ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, καὶ σχεδόν τι αὐτὸ κεκτήμεθα, οὗ καὶ πέρι ἄξιον λέγειν, ἢ ἐν ταῖς τῶν χειρῶν πράξεσιν ἢ σκελῶν ἢ στόματός τε καὶ φωνῆς ἢ διανοίας· ἢ οὐχ οὕτω καὶ σὺ λέγεις;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Εἰ τοίνυν τίς με ἔροιτο· ὦ Σώκρατες, τί λέγεις τοῦτο, ὃ ἐν πᾶσιν ὀνομάζεις ταχυτῆτα εἶναι; εἴποιμ' ἂν αὐτῷ, ὅτι τὴν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πολλὰ διαπραττομένην δύναμιν ταχυτῆτα ἔγωγε καλῶ καὶ περὶ φωνὴν καὶ περὶ δρόμον καὶ περὶ τἆλλα πάντα.

ΛΑ. Ὀρθῶς γε σὺ λέγων.

ΣΩ. Πειρῶ δὴ καὶ σύ, ὦ Λάχης, τὴν ἀνδρείαν οὕτως εἰπεῖν, τίς οὖσα δύναμις ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν ἡδονῇ καὶ ἐν λύπῃ καὶ ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν αὐτὴν εἶναι, ἔπειτα ἀνδρεία κέκληται.

ΛΑ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καρτερία τις εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, εἰ τό γε διὰ πάντων [περὶ ἀνδρείας] πεφυκὸς δεῖ εἰπεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ, εἴ γε τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρινούμεθα ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοιγε φαίνεται, *ὅτι* οὔ τι πᾶσά γε, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, καρτερία ἀνδρεία σοι φαίνεται· τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐνθένδε· σχεδὸν γάρ τι οἶδα, ὦ Λάχης, ὅτι τῶν πάνυ καλῶν πραγμάτων ἡγεῖ σὺ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.

ΛΑ. Εὖ μὲν οὖν ἴσθι ὅτι τῶν καλλίστων.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡ μὲν μετὰ φρονήσεως καρτερία καλὴ κἀγαθή;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ἡ μετ' ἀφροσύνης; οὐ τοὐναντίον ταύτῃ βλαβερὰ καὶ κακοῦργος;

ΛΑ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καλὸν οὖν τι φήσεις σὺ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃν κακοῦργόν τε καὶ βλαβερόν;

ΛΑ. Οὔκουν δίκαιόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τήν γε τοιαύτην καρτερίαν ἀνδρείαν ὁμολογήσεις εἶναι, ἐπειδήπερ οὐ καλή ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία καλόν ἐστιν.

ΛΑ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἡ φρόνιμος ἄρα καρτερία κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον ἀνδρεία ἂν εἴη.

ΛΑ. Ἔοικεν.

20. ΣΩ. Ἴδωμεν δή, ἡ εἰς τί φρόνιμος; ἢ ἡ εἰς ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ σμικρά; οἷον εἴ τις καρτερεῖ ἀναλί-

σκων ἀργύριον φρονίμως, εἰδὼς ὅτι ἀναλώσας πλέον ἐκτήσεται, τοῦτον ἀνδρεῖον καλοῖς ἄν;

ΛΑ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οἷον εἴ τις ἰατρὸς ὤν, περιπλευμονίᾳ τοῦ υἱέος ἐχομένου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς καὶ δεομένου πιεῖν ἢ φαγεῖν δοῦναι, μὴ κάμπτοιτο ἀλλὰ καρτεροῖ;

ΛΑ. Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν οὐδ' αὖτη.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐν πολέμῳ καρτεροῦντα ἄνδρα καὶ ἐθέλοντα μάχεσθαι, φρονίμως λογιζόμενον, εἰδότα μὲν ὅτι βοηθήσουσιν ἄλλοι αὐτῷ, πρὸς ἐλάττους δὲ καὶ φαυλοτέρους μαχεῖται ἢ μεθ' ὧν αὐτός ἐστιν, ἔτι δὲ χωρία ἔχει κρείττω, τοῦτον τὸν μετὰ τῆς τοιαύτης φρονήσεως καὶ παρασκευῆς καρτεροῦντα ἀνδρειότερον ἂν φαίης ἢ τὸν ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ στρατοπέδῳ ἐθέλοντα ὑπομένειν τε καὶ καρτερεῖν;

ΛΑ. Τὸν ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀφρονεστέρα γε ἡ τούτου ἢ ἡ τοῦ ἑτέρου καρτερία.

ΛΑ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸν μετ' ἐπιστήμης ἄρα ἱππικῆς καρτεροῦντα ἐν ἱππομαχίᾳ ἧττον φήσεις ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι ἢ τὸν ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης.

ΛΑ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸν μετὰ σφενδονητικῆς ἢ τοξικῆς ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς τέχνης καρτεροῦντα.

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅσοι δὴ ἐθέλουσιν εἰς φρέαρ καταβαίνοντες καὶ κολυμβῶντες καρτερεῖν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ἔργῳ, μὴ ὄντες δεινοί, ἢ ἔν τινι ἄλλῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνδρειοτέρους φήσεις τῶν ταῦτα δεινῶν.

ΛΑ. Τί γὰρ ἄν τις ἄλλο φαίη, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν, εἴπερ οἴοιτό γε οὕτως.

ΛΑ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οἶμαί γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μήν που ἀφρονεστέρως γε, ὦ Λάχης, οἱ τοιοῦτοι κινδυνεύουσίν τε καὶ καρτεροῦσιν ἢ οἱ μετὰ τέχνης αὐτὸ πράττοντες.

ΛΑ. Φαίνονται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αἰσχρὰ ἡ ἄφρων τόλμα τε καὶ καρτέρησις ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἐφάνη ἡμῖν οὖσα καὶ βλαβερά;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δέ γε ἀνδρεία ὡμολογεῖτο καλόν τι εἶναι.

ΛΑ. Ὡμολογεῖτο γάρ.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δ' αὖ πάλιν φαμὲν ἐκεῖνο τὸ αἰσχρόν, τὴν ἄφρονα καρτέρησιν, ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.

ΛΑ. Ἐοίκαμεν.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς οὖν σοι δοκοῦμεν λέγειν;

ΛΑ. Μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμοὶ μὲν οὔ.

21. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα που κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον δωριστὶ ἡρμόσμεθα ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, ὦ Λάχης· τὰ γὰρ ἔργα οὐ συμφωνεῖ ἡμῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἔργῳ μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, φαίη ἄν τις ἡμᾶς ἀνδρείας μετέχειν, λόγῳ δ', ὡς ἐγῷμαι, οὐκ ἄν, εἰ νῦν ἡμῶν ἀκούσειε διαλεγομένων.

ΛΑ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι οὕτως ἡμᾶς διακεῖσθαι;

ΛΑ. Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν.

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν ᾧ λέγομεν πειθώμεθα τό γε τοσοῦτον;

ΛΑ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ τοῦτο, καὶ τίνι τούτῳ;

ΣΩ. Τῷ λόγῳ ὃς καρτερεῖν κελεύει. εἰ οὖν βούλει, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τῇ ζητήσει ἐπιμείνωμέν τε καὶ καρτερήσωμεν, ἵνα καὶ μὴ ἡμῶν αὐτὴ ἡ ἀνδρεία καταγελάσῃ, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνδρείως αὐτὴν ζητοῦμεν, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις αὐτὴ ἡ καρτέρησίς ἐστιν ἀνδρεία.

ΛΑ. Ἐγὼ μὲν ἑτοῖμος, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ προαφίστασθαι· καί τοι ἀήθης γ' εἰμὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων· ἀλλά τίς με καὶ φιλονικία εἴληφεν πρὸς τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγανακτῶ, εἰ οὑτωσὶ ἃ νοῶ μὴ οἷός τ' εἰμὶ εἰπεῖν. νοεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἔμοιγε δοκῶ περὶ ἀνδρείας ὅ τι ἔστιν, οὐκ οἶδα δ' ὅπῃ με ἄρτι διέφυγεν, ὥστε μὴ συλλαβεῖν τῷ λόγῳ αὐτὴν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅ τι ἔστιν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ φίλε, τὸν ἀγαθὸν κυνηγέτην μεταθεῖν χρὴ καὶ μὴ ἀνιέναι.

ΛΑ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν καὶ Νικίαν τόνδε παρακαλῶμεν ἐπὶ τὸ κυνηγέσιον, εἴ τι ἡμῶν εὐπορώτερός ἐστιν;

ΛΑ. Βούλομαι· πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

22. ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή, ὦ Νικία, ἀνδράσι φίλοις χειμαζομένοις ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἀποροῦσιν βοήθησον, εἴ τινα ἔχεις δύναμιν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἡμέτερα ὁρᾷς ὡς ἄπορα· σὺ δ' εἰπὼν ὅ τι ἡγεῖ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι, ἡμᾶς τε τῆς ἀπορίας ἔκλυσαι καὶ αὐτὸς ἃ νοεῖς τῷ λόγῳ βεβαίωσαι.

ΝΙ. Δοκεῖτε τοίνυν μοι πάλαι οὐ καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρίζεσθαι τὴν ἀνδρείαν· ὃ γὰρ ἐγὼ σοῦ ἤδη καλῶς λέγοντος ἀκήκοα, τούτῳ οὐ χρῆσθε.

ΣΩ. Ποίῳ δή, ὦ Νικία;

ΝΙ. Πολλάκις ἀκήκοά σου λέγοντος, ὅτι ταῦτα ἀγαθὸς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, ἅπερ σοφός, ἃ δὲ ἀμαθής, ταῦτα δὲ κακός.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ μέντοι νὴ Δία λέγεις, ὦ Νικία.

ΝΙ. Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ἀγαθός, δῆλον ὅτι σοφός ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἤκουσας, ὦ Λάχης;

ΛΑ. Ἔγωγε, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα γε μανθάνω ὃ λέγει.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ δοκῶ μανθάνειν, καί μοι δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ σοφίαν τινὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν λέγειν.

ΛΑ. Ποίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοφίαν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τόνδε τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς;

ΛΑ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δή, αὐτῷ εἰπέ, ὦ Νικία, ποία σοφία ἀνδρεία ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. οὐ γάρ που ἥ γε αὐλητική.

ΝΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ μὴν ἡ κιθαριστική.

ΝΙ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τίς δὴ αὕτη ἢ τίνος ἐπιστήμη;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ εἰπέτω γε τίνα φησὶν αὐτὴν εἶναι.

ΝΙ. Ταύτην ἔγωγε, ὦ Λάχης, τὴν τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν.

ΛΑ. Ὡς ἄτοπα λέγει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Πρὸς τί τοῦτ' εἶπες βλέψας, ὦ Λάχης;

ΛΑ. Πρὸς ὅ τι; χωρὶς δήπου σοφία ἐστὶν ἀνδρείας.

ΣΩ. Οὔκουν φησί γε Νικίας.

ΛΑ. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία· ταῦτά τοι καὶ ληρεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διδάσκωμεν αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ λοιδορῶμεν.

ΝΙ. Οὔκ, ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, Λάχης ἐπιθυμεῖν κἀμὲ φανῆναι μηδὲν λέγοντα, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρτι τοιοῦτος ἐφάνη.

23. ΛΑ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Νικία, καὶ πειράσομαί γε ἀποφῆναι. οὐδὲν γὰρ λέγεις· ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἐν ταῖς νόσοις οὐχ οἱ ἰατροὶ τὰ δεινὰ ἐπίστανται; ἢ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαι; ἢ τοὺς ἰατροὺς σὺ ἀνδρείους καλεῖς;

ΝΙ. Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν.

ΛΑ. Οὐδέ γε τοὺς γεωργούς οἶμαι. καίτοι τά γε ἐν τῇ γεωργίᾳ δεινὰ οὗτοι δήπου ἐπίστανται, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ ἅπαντες τὰ ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν τέχναις δεινά τε καὶ θαρραλέα ἴσασιν· ἀλλ' οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον οὗτοι ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν.

ΣΩ. Τί δοκεῖ Λάχης λέγειν, ὦ Νικία; ἔοικεν μέντοι λέγειν τι.

ΝΙ. Καὶ γὰρ λέγει γέ τι, οὐ μέντοι ἀληθές γε.

ΣΩ. Πῶς δή;

ΝΙ. Ὅτι οἴεται τοὺς ἰατροὺς πλέον τι εἰδέναι περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας ἢ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν [εἰπεῖν οἷόν] τε καὶ νοσῶδες. οἱ δὲ δήπου τοσοῦτον μόνον ἴσασιν· εἰ δὲ δεινόν τῳ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ὑγιαίνειν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ κάμνειν, ἡγεῖ σὺ τουτί, ὦ Λάχης, τοὺς ἰατροὺς ἐπίστασθαι; ἢ οὐ πολλοῖς οἴει ἐκ τῆς νόσου ἄμεινον εἶναι μὴ ἀναστῆναι ἢ ἀναστῆναι; τοῦτο γὰρ εἰπέ· σὺ πᾶσι φῂς ἄμεινον εἶναι ζῆν καὶ οὐ πολλοῖς κρεῖττον τεθνάναι;

ΛΑ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε τοῦτό γε.

ΝΙ. Οἷς οὖν τεθνάναι λυσιτελεῖ, ταὐτὰ οἴει δεινὰ εἶναι καὶ οἷς ζῆν;

ΛΑ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΝΙ. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ σὺ δίδως τοῖς ἰατροῖς γιγνώσκειν ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ δημιουργῷ πλὴν τῷ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἐπιστήμονι, ὃν ἐγὼ ἀνδρεῖον καλῶ;

ΣΩ. Κατανοεῖς, ὦ Λάχης, ὅ τι λέγει;

ΛΑ. Ἔγωγε, ὅτι γε τοὺς μάντεις καλεῖ τοὺς ἀνδρείους· τίς γὰρ δὴ ἄλλος εἴσεται ὅτῳ ἄμεινον ζῆν ἢν τεθνάναι; καίτοι σύ, ὦ Νικία, πότερον ὁμολογεῖς μάντις εἶναι ἢ οὔτε μάντις οὔτε ἀνδρεῖος;

ΝΙ. Τί δέ; μάντει αὖ οἶει προσήκει τὰ δεινὰ γιγνώσκειν καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα;

ΛΑ. Ἔγωγε· τίνι γὰρ ἄλλῳ;

24. ΝΙ. Ὧι ἐγὼ λέγω πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὦ βέλτιστε· ἐπεὶ μάντιν γε τὰ σημεῖα μόνον δεῖ γιγνώσκειν τῶν ἐσομένων, εἴτε τῳ θάνατος εἴτε νόσος εἴτε ἀποβολὴ χρημάτων ἔσται, εἴτε νίκη εἴτε ἥττα ἢ πολέμου ἢ καὶ ἄλλης τινὸς ἀγωνίας· ὅ τι δέ τῳ ἄμεινον τούτων ἢ παθεῖν ἢ μὴ παθεῖν, τί μᾶλλον μάντει προσήκει κρῖναι ἢ ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν;

ΛΑ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τούτου οὐ μανθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅ τι βούλεται λέγειν· οὔτε γὰρ μάντιν οὔτε ἰατρὸν οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδένα δηλοῖ ὄντινα λέγει τὸν ἀνδρεῖον, εἰ μὴ εἰ θεόν τινα λέγει αὐτὸν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν φαίνεται Νικίας οὐκ ἐθέλειν γενναίως ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι οὐδὲν λέγει, ἀλλὰ στρέφεται ἄνω καὶ κάτω ἐπικρυπτόμενος τὴν αὑτοῦ ἀπορίαν· καίτοι κἂν ἡμεῖς οἷοί τε ἦμεν ἄρτι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ τοιαῦτα στρέφεσθαι, εἰ ἐβουλόμεθα μὴ δοκεῖν ἐναντία ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς λέγειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι ἦσαν, εἶχεν ἄν τινα λόγον ταῦτα ποιεῖν· νῦν δὲ τί ἄν τις ἐν συνουσίᾳ τοιᾷδε μάτην κενοῖς λόγοις αὐτὸς αὑτὸν κοσμοῖ;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὦ Λάχης· ἀλλ' ὁρῶμεν μὴ Νικίας οἴεταί τι λέγειν καὶ οὐ λόγου ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγει. αὐτοῦ οὖν σαφέστερον πυθώμεθα τί ποτε νοεῖ· καὶ ἐάν τι φαίνηται λέγων, συγχωρησόμεθα, εἰ δὲ μή, διδάξομεν.

ΛΑ. Σὺ τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ βούλει πυνθάνεσθαι, πυνθάνου· ἐγὼ δ' ἴσως ἱκανῶς πέπυσμαι.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐδέν με κωλύει· κοινὴ γὰρ ἔσται ἡ πύστις ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ.

ΛΑ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

25. ΣΩ. Λέγε δή μοι, ὦ Νικία, μᾶλλον δ' ἡμῖν· κοινούμεθα γὰρ ἐγώ τε καὶ Λάχης τὸν λόγον· τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἐπιστήμην φῂς δεινῶν τε καὶ θαρραλέων εἶναι;

ΝΙ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὲ οὐ παντὸς δὴ εἶναι ἀνδρὸς γνῶναι, ὁπότε γε μήτε ἰατρὸς μήτε μάντις αὐτὸ γνώσεται μηδὲ ἀνδρεῖος ἔσται, ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὴν ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην προσλάβῃ· οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγες;

ΝΙ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἄρα τῷ ὄντι οὐκ ἂν πᾶσα ὗς γνοίη οὐδ' ἂν ἀνδρεία γένοιτο.

ΝΙ. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Δῆλον δή, ὦ Νικία, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὴν Κρομμυωνίαν ὗν πιστεύεις σύ γε ἀνδρείαν γεγονέναι. τοῦτο δὲ λέγω οὐ παίζων, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον οἶμαι τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι μηδενὸς θηρίου ἀποδέχεσθαι ἀνδρείαν, ἢ συγχωρεῖν θηρίον τι οὕτω σοφὸν εἶναι, ὥστε ἃ ὀλίγοι ἀνθρώπων ἴσασι διὰ τὸ χαλεπὰ εἶναι γνῶναι, ταῦτα λέοντα ἢ πάρδαλιν ἤ τινα κάπρον φάναι εἰδέναι· ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως λέοντα καὶ ἔλαφον καὶ ταῦρον καὶ πίθηκον πρὸς ἀνδρείαν φάναι πεφυκέναι τὸν τιθέμενον ἀνδρείαν τοῦθ' ὅπερ σὺ τίθεσαι.

ΛΑ. Νὴ τοὺς θεούς, καὶ εὖ γε λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ ἡμῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς τοῦτο ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Νικία, πότερον σοφώτερα φῂς ἡμῶν ταῦτα εἶναι τὰ θηρία, ἃ πάντες ὁμολογοῦμεν ἀνδρεῖα εἶναι, ἢ πᾶσιν ἐναντιούμενος τολμᾷς μηδὲ ἀνδρεῖα αὐτὰ καλεῖν;

ΝΙ. Οὐ γάρ τι, ὦ Λάχης, ἔγωγε ἀνδρεῖα καλῶ οὔτε θηρία οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν τὸ τὰ δεινὰ ὑπὸ ἀγνοίας μὴ φοβούμενον, ἀλλ' ἄφοβον καὶ μῶρον· ἢ καὶ τὰ παιδία πάντα οἴει με ἀνδρεῖα καλεῖν, ἃ δι' ἄγνοιαν οὐδὲν δέδοικεν; ἀλλ' οἶμαι τὸ ἄφοβον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν. ἐγὼ δὲ ἀνδρείας μὲν καὶ προμηθίας πάνυ τισὶν ὀλίγοις οἶμαι μετεῖναι, θρασύτητος δὲ

καὶ τόλμης καὶ τοῦ ἀφόβου μετὰ ἀπρομηθίας πάνυ πολλοῖς καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ παίδων καὶ θηρίων. ταῦτ' οὖν ἃ σὺ καλεῖς ἀνδρεῖα καὶ οἱ πολλοί, ἐγὼ θρασέα καλῶ, ἀνδρεῖα δὲ τὰ φρόνιμα περὶ ὧν λέγω.

26. ΛΑ. Θέασαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς εὖ ὅδε ἑαυτὸν δή, ὡς οἴεται, κοσμεῖ τῷ λόγῳ· οὓς δὲ πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν ἀνδρείους εἶναι, τούτους ἀποστερεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ ταύτης τῆς τιμῆς.

ΝΙ. Οὔκουν ἔγωγε, ὦ Λάχης, ἀλλὰ θάρρει· φημὶ γάρ σε εἶναι σοφόν, καὶ Λάμαχόν γε, εἴπερ ἐστὲ ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ ἄλλους γε συχνοὺς Ἀθηναίων.

ΛΑ. Οὐδὲν ἐρῶ πρὸς ταῦτα, ἔχων εἰπεῖν, ἵνα μή με φῇς ὡς ἀληθῶς Αἰξωνέα εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Μηδέ γε εἴπῃς, ὦ Λάχης· καὶ γάρ μοι δοκεῖς τοῦδε μὴ ᾐσθῆσθαι ὅτι ταύτην τὴν σοφίαν παρὰ Δάμωνος τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἑταίρου παρείληφεν, ὁ δὲ Δάμων τῷ Προδίκῳ πολλὰ πλησιάζει, ὃς δὴ δοκεῖ τῶν σοφιστῶν κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνόματα διαιρεῖν.

ΛΑ. Καὶ γὰρ πρέπει, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοφιστῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον κομψεύεσθαι ἢ ἀνδρὶ ὃν ἡ πόλις ἀξιοῖ αὐτῆς προεστάναι.

ΣΩ. Πρέπει μέντοι, ὦ μακάριε, τῶν μεγίστων προστατοῦντι μεγίστης φρονήσεως μετέχειν· δοκεῖ δέ μοι Νικίας ἄξιος εἶναι ἐπισκέψεως, ὅποι ποτὲ βλέπων τοὔνομα τοῦτο τίθησι τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

ΑΛ. Αὐτὸς τοίνυν σκόπει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μέλλω ποιεῖν, ὦ ἄριστε· μὴ μέντοι οἷόν με ἀφήσειν σε τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν καὶ συσκόπει τὰ λεγόμενα.

ΑΛ. Ταῦτα δὴ ἔστω, εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι.

27. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ. σὺ δέ, Νικία, λέγε ἡμῖν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς· οἶσθ' ὅτι τὴν ἀνδρείαν κατ' ἀρχὰς τοῦ λόγου ἐσκοποῦμεν ὡς μέρος ἀρετῆς σκοποῦντες;

ΝΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω ὡς μόριον, ὄντων δὴ καὶ ἄλλων μερῶν, ἃ σύμπαντα ἀρετὴ κέκληται;

ΝΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Ἆρ' οὖν ἅπερ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἐγὼ δὲ καλῶ πρὸς ἀνδρείᾳ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἄλλ' ἄττα τοιαῦτα. οὐ καὶ σύ;

ΝΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἔχε δή· ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ ὁμολογοῦμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων σκεψώμεθα, ὅπως μὴ σὺ μὲν ἄλλ' ἄττα ἡγῇ, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἄλλα. ἃ μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς ἡγούμεθα, φράσομέν σοι· σὺ δὲ ἂν μὴ ὁμολογῇς, διδάξεις. ἡγούμεθα δ' ἡμεῖς δεινὰ μὲν εἶναι ἃ καὶ δέος παρέχει, θαρραλέα δὲ ἃ μὴ δέος παρέχει· δέος δὲ παρέχειν οὐ τὰ γεγονότα οὐδὲ τὰ παρόντα τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ προσδοκώμενα· δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ· ἢ οὐχ οὕτω καὶ σύ, ὦ Λάχης;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν ἡμέτερα τοίνυν, ὦ Νικία, ἀκούεις, ὅτι δεινὰ μὲν τὰ μέλλοντα κακά φαμεν εἶναι, θαρραλέα δὲ τὰ μὴ κακὰ ἢ ἀγαθὰ μέλλοντα· σὺ δὲ ταύτῃ ἢ ἄλλῃ περὶ τούτων λέγεις;

ΝΙ. Ταύτῃ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τούτων δέ γε τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀνδρείαν προσαγορεύεις;

ΝΙ. Κομιδῇ γε.

28. ΣΩ. Ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον σκεψώμεθα εἰ συνδοκεῖ σοί τε καὶ ἡμῖν.

ΝΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ τοῦτο;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δὴ φράσω. δοκεῖ γὰρ δή ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷδε, περὶ ὅσων ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, οὐκ ἄλλη μὲν εἶναι περὶ γεγονότος, εἰδέναι ὅπῃ γέγονεν, ἄλλη δὲ περὶ γιγνομένων, ὅπῃ γίγνεται, ἄλλη δὲ ὅπῃ ἂν κάλλιστα γένοιτο [καὶ γενήσεται] τὸ μήπω γεγονός, ἀλλ' ἡ αὐτή. οἷον περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν εἰς ἅπαντας τοὺς χρόνους οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ *ἡ* ἰατρική, μία οὖσα, ἐφορᾷ καὶ γιγνόμενα καὶ γεγονότα καὶ γενησόμενα [ὅπῃ γενήσεται]· καὶ περὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς αὖ φυόμενα ἡ γεωργία ὡσαύτως ἔχει· καὶ δήπου τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοὶ ἂν μαρτυρήσαιτε ὅτι ἡ στρατηγία κάλλιστα προμηθεῖται τά τε ἄλλα καὶ περὶ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι, οὐδὲ τῇ μαντικῇ οἴεται δεῖν ὑπηρετεῖν ἀλλὰ ἄρχειν, ὡς εἰδυῖα κάλλιον

τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ γιγνόμενα καὶ γενησόμενα· καὶ ὁ νόμος οὕτω τάττει, μὴ τὸν μάντιν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἄρχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν στρατηγὸν τοῦ μάντεως. φήσομεν ταῦτα, ὦ Λάχης;

ΛΑ. Φήσομεν.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; σὺ ἡμῖν, ὦ Νικία, σύμφῃς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἐσομένων καὶ γιγνομένων καὶ γεγονότων ἐπαΐειν;

ΝΙ. Ἔγωγε· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ ἄριστε, καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία τῶν δεινῶν ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν καὶ θαρραλέων, ὡς φῄς· ἦ γάρ;

ΝΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ δεινὰ ὡμολόγηται καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα τὰ μὲν μέλλοντα ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ μέλλοντα κακὰ εἶναι.

ΝΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δέ γ' αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μελλόντων καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων εἶναι.

ΝΙ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μόνον ἄρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἡ ἀνδρεία ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ μελλόντων μόνον πέρι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν ἐπαΐει, ἀλλὰ καὶ γιγνομένων καὶ γεγονότων [καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων], ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι ἐπιστῆμαι.

ΝΙ. Ἔοικέν γε.

29. ΣΩ. Μέρος ἄρα ἀνδρείας ἡμῖν, ὦ Νικία, ἀπεκρίνω σχεδόν τι τρίτον· καίτοι ἡμεῖς ἠρωτῶμεν ὅλην ἀνδρείαν ὅ τι εἴη. καὶ νῦν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον οὐ μόνον δεινῶν τε καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ἡ περὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων, ὡς νῦν αὖ ὁ σὸς λόγος, ἀνδρεί' ἂν εἴη. οὕτως αὖ μετατίθεσθαι ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Νικία;

ΝΙ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ἀπολείπειν ἄν τι ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀρετῆς, εἴπερ εἰδείη τά τε ἀγαθὰ πάντα καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς γίγνεται καὶ γενήσεται καὶ γέγονε, καὶ τὰ κακὰ ὡσαύτως; καὶ τοῦτον οἴει ἂν σὺ ἐνδεᾶ εἶναι σωφροσύνης ἢ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ

ὁσιότητος, ᾧ γε μόνῳ προσήκει καὶ περὶ θεοὺς καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπους ἐξευλαβεῖσθαί τε τὰ δεινὰ [καὶ τὰ μή] καὶ τἀγαθὰ ποριζεσθαι, ἐπισταμένῳ ὀρθῶς προσομιλεῖν;

ΝΙ. Λέγειν τὶ ὦ Σώκρατές μοι δοκεῖς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ Νικία, μόριον ἀρετῆς ἂν εἴη τὸ νῦν σοι λεγόμενον, ἀλλὰ σύμπασα ἀρετή.

ΝΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἔφαμέν γε τὴν ἀνδρείαν μόριον εἶναι ἓν τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς.

ΝΙ. Ἔφαμεν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε νῦν λεγόμενον οὐ φαίνεται.

ΝΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα ηὑρήκαμεν, ὦ Νικία, ἀνδρεία ὅ τι ἐστίν.

ΝΙ. Οὐ φαινόμεθα.

ΛΑ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε, ὦ φίλε Νικία, ᾤμην σε εὑρήσειν, ἐπειδὴ ἐμοῦ κατεφρόνησας Σωκράτει ἀποκριναμένου· πάνυ δὴ μεγάλην ἐλπίδα εἶχον, ὡς τῇ παρὰ τοῦ Δάμωνος σοφίᾳ αὐτὴν ἀνευρήσεις.

30. ΝΙ. Εὖ γε, ὦ Λάχης, ὅτι οὐδὲν οἴει σὺ ἔτι πρᾶγμα εἶναι, ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄρτι ἐφάνης ἀνδρείας πέρι οὐδὲν εἰδώς, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ἐγὼ ἕτερος τοιοῦτος ἀναφανήσομαι, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέπεις, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι διοίσει, ὡς ἔοικε, σοὶ μετ' ἐμοῦ μηδὲν εἰδέναι ὧν προσήκει ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν ἀνδρὶ οἰομένῳ τὶ εἶναι. σὺ μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀνθρώπειον πρᾶγμα ἐργάζεσθαι, οὐδὲν πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπειν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους· ἐγὼ δ' οἶμαι ἐμοὶ περὶ ὧν ἐλέγομεν νῦν τε ἐπιεικῶς εἰρῆσθαι, καὶ εἴ τι αὐτῶν μὴ ἱκανῶς εἴρηται, ὕστερον ἐπανορθώσεσθαι καὶ μετὰ Δάμωνος, οὗ σύ που οἴει καταγελᾶν, καὶ ταῦτα οὐδ' ἰδὼν πώποτε τὸν Δάμωνα, καὶ μετ' ἄλλων· καὶ ἐπειδὰν βεβαιώσωμαι αὐτά, διδάξω καὶ σέ, καὶ οὐ φθονήσω· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι καὶ μάλα σφόδρα δεῖσθαι μαθεῖν.

ΛΑ. Σοφὸς γάρ τοι σὺ εἶ, ὦ Νικία. ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐγὼ Λυσιμάχῳ τῷδε καὶ Μελησίᾳ συμβουλεύω, σὲ μὲν καὶ ἐμὲ περὶ τῆς παιδείας τῶν νεανίσκων χαίρειν ἐᾶν, Σωκράτη δὲ τουτονί, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, μὴ ἀφιέναι· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ἦσαν οἱ παῖδες, ταὐτὰ ἂν ταῦτ' ἐποίουν.

ΝΙ. Ταῦτα μὲν κἀγὼ συγχωρῶ, ἐάνπερ ἐθέλῃ Σωκράτης τῶν μειρακίων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, μηδένα ἄλλον ζητεῖν· ἐπεὶ κἂν ἐγὼ τὸν Νικήρατον τούτῳ ἥδιστα ἐπιτρέποιμι, εἰ ἐθέλοι οὗτος. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἄλλους μοι ἑκάστοτε συνίστησιν, ὅταν τι αὐτῷ περὶ τούτου μνησθῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλει. ἀλλ' ὅρα, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, εἴ τι σοῦ ἂν μᾶλλον ὑπακούοι Σωκράτης.

ΛΥ. Δίκαιόν γέ τοι, ὦ Νικία, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐγὼ τούτῳ πολλὰ ἂν ἐθελήσαιμι ποιεῖν, ἃ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλοις πάνυ πολλοῖς ἐθέλοιμι. πῶς οὖν φῄς, ὦ Σώκρατες; ὑπακούσει τι καὶ συμπροθυμήσει ὡς βελτίστοις γενέσθαι τοῖς μειρακίοις;

31. ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν δεινὸν εἴη, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, τοῦτό γε, μὴ ἐθέλειν τῳ συμπροθυμεῖσθαι ὡς βελτίστῳ γενέσθαι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις τοῖς ἄρτι ἐγὼ μὲν ἐφάνην εἰδώς, τώδε δὲ μὴ εἰδότε, δίκαιον ἂν ἦν ἐμὲ μάλιστα ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον παρακαλεῖν· νῦν δ' — ὁμοίως γὰρ πάντες ἐν ἀπορίᾳ ἐγενόμεθα· τί οὖν ἄν τις ἡμῶν τίνα προαιροῖτο; ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δὴ αὐτῷ δοκεῖ οὐδένα· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, σκέψασθε ἄν τι δόξω συμβουλεύειν ὑμῖν. ἐγὼ γάρ φημι χρῆναι, ὦ ἄνδρες — οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἔκφορος λόγου — κοινῇ πάντας ἡμᾶς ζητεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς διδάσκαλον ὡς ἄριστον, δεόμεθα γάρ, ἔπειτα καὶ τοῖς μειρακίοις, μήτε χρημάτων φειδομένους μήτε ἄλλου μηδενός· ἐὰν δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἔχειν, ὡς νῦν ἔχομεν, οὐ συμβουλεύω. εἰ δέ τις ἡμῶν καταγελάσεται, ὅτι τηλικοίδε ὄντες εἰς διδασκάλων ἀξιοῦμεν φοιτᾶν, τὸν Ὅμηρον δοκεῖ μοι χρῆναι προβάλλεσθαι, ὃς ἔφη οὐκ ἀγαθὴν εἶναι αἰδῶ κεχρημένῳ ἀνδρὶ παρεῖναι. καὶ ἡμεῖς οὖν ἐάσαντες χαίρειν εἴ τίς τι ἐρεῖ, κοινῇ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν μειρακίων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιησώμεθα.

ΛΥ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀρέσκει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ λέγεις· καὶ ἐθέλω, ὅσῳπερ γεραίτατός εἰμι, τοσούτῳ προθυμότατα μανθάνειν μετὰ τῶν νεανίσκων. ἀλλά μοι οὑτωσὶ ποίησον· αὔριον ἕωθεν ἀφίκου οἴκαδε, καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποιήσῃς, ἵνα βουλευσώμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων· τὸ δὲ νῦν εἶναι τὴν συνουσίαν διαλύσωμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, ταῦτα, καὶ ἥξω παρὰ σὲ αὔριον, ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ.

ΛΥΣΙΣ

ἢ περὶ φιλίας

TIME: 409–400 B.C. (v. p. 76. 8). PLACE: A palaestra near Panops' spring

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΙΠΠΟΘΑΛΗΣ, ΚΤΗΣΙΠΠΟΣ, ΜΕΝΕΞΕΝΟΣ, ΛΥΣΙΣ

1. Ἐπορευόμην μὲν ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας εὐθὺ Λυκείου τὴν ἔξω τείχους ὑπ' αὐτὸ τὸ τεῖχος· ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐγενόμην κατὰ τὴν πυλίδα ἣ ἡ Πάνοπος κρήνη, ἐνταῦθα συνέτυχον Ἱπποθάλει τε τῷ Ἱερωνύμου καὶ Κτησίππῳ τῷ Παιανιεῖ καὶ ἄλλοις μετὰ τούτων νεανίσκοις ἁθρόοις συνεστῶσι. καί με προσιόντα ὁ Ἱπποθάλης ἰδὼν Ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ποῖ δὴ πορεύει καὶ πόθεν; Ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πορεύομαι εὐθὺ Λυκείου. Δεῦρο δή, ἦ δ' ὅς, εὐθὺ ἡμῶν. οὐ παραβαλεῖς; ἄξιον μέντοι. Ποῖ, ἔφην ἐγώ, λέγεις, καὶ παρὰ τίνας τοὺς ὑμᾶς; Δεῦρο, ἔφη, δείξας μοι ἐν τῷ καντικρὺ τοῦ τείχους περίβολόν τέ τινα καὶ θύραν ἀνεῳγμένην. διατρίβομεν δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, αὐτόθι ἡμεῖς τε αὐτοὶ καὶ ἄλλοι πάνυ πολλοὶ καὶ καλοί. Ἔστιν δὲ δὴ τί τοῦτο, καὶ τίς ἡ διατριβή; Παλαίστρα, ἔφη, νεωστὶ ᾠκοδομημένη· ἡ δὲ διατριβὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἐν λόγοις, ὧν ἡδέως ἄν σοι μεταδιδοῖμεν. Καλῶς γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποιοῦντες· διδάσκει δὲ τίς αὐτόθι; Σὸς ἑταῖρός γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, καὶ ἐπαινέτης, Μίκκος. Μὰ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ φαῦλός γε ἀνήρ, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸς σοφιστής. Βούλει οὖν ἕπεσθαι, ἔφη, ἵνα καὶ ἴδῃς τοὺς ὄντας αὐτοῦ; πρῶτον ἡδέως ἀκούσαιμ' ἄν, ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ εἴσειμι καὶ τίς ὁ καλός. Ἄλλος, ἔφη, ἄλλῳ ἡμῶν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες. Σοὶ

δὲ δὴ τίς, ὦ Ἱππόθαλες; τοῦτό μοι εἰπέ. καὶ ὃς ἐρωτηθεὶς ἠρυθρίασεν. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον Ὦ παῖ Ἱερωνύμου Ἱππόθαλες, τοῦτο μὲν μηκέτι εἴπῃς, εἴτε ἐρᾷς του εἴτε μή· οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐρᾷς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πόρρω ἤδη εἶ πορευόμενος τοῦ ἔρωτος. εἰμὶ δ' ἐγὼ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα φαῦλος καὶ ἄχρηστος, τοῦτο δέ μοί πως ἐκ θεοῦ δέδοται, ταχὺ οἵῳ τ' εἶναι γνῶναι ἐρῶντά τε καὶ ἐρώμενον. καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας πολὺ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἠρυθρίασεν. ὁ οὖν Κτήσιππος, Ἀστεῖόν γε, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅτι ἐρυθριᾷς, ὦ Ἱππόθαλες, καὶ ὀκνεῖς εἰπεῖν Σωκράτει τοὔνομα· ἐὰν δ' οὗτος καὶ σμικρὸν χρόνον συνδιατρίψῃ σοι, παραταθήσεται ὑπὸ σοῦ ἀκούων θαμὰ λέγοντος. ἡμῶν γοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐκκεκώφωκε τὰ ὦτα καὶ ἐμπέπληκε Λύσιδος· ἂν μὲν δὴ καὶ ὑποπίῃ, εὐμαρία ἡμῖν ἐστιν καὶ ἐξ ὕπνου ἐγρομένοις Λύσιδος οἴεσθαι τοὔνομα ἀκούειν. καὶ ἃ μὲν καταλογάδην διηγεῖται, δεινὰ ὄντα, οὐ πάνυ τι δεινά ἐστιν· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὰν τὰ ποιήματα ἡμῶν ἐπιχειρήσῃ καταντλεῖν καὶ συγγράμματα. καὶ ὅ ἐστιν τούτων δεινότερον, ὅτι καὶ ᾄδει εἰς τὰ παιδικὰ φωνῇ θαυμασίᾳ, ἣν ἡμᾶς δεῖ ἀκούοντας ἀνέχεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἐρωτώμενος ὑπὸ σοῦ ἐρυθριᾷ. Ἔστιν δέ, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ Λύσις νέος τις, ὡς ἔοικε· τεκμαίρομαι δέ, ὅτι ἀκούσας τοὔνομα οὐκ ἔγνων. Οὐ γὰρ πάνυ, ἔφη, τὶ αὐτοῦ τοὔνομα λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' ἔτι πατρόθεν ἐπονομάζεται διὰ τὸ σφόδρα τὸν πατέρα γιγνώσκεσθαι αὐτοῦ. ἐπεὶ εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι πολλοῦ δεῖς τὸ εἶδος ἀγνοεῖν τοῦ παιδός· ἱκανὸς γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ μόνου τούτου γιγνώσκεσθαι. Λεγέσθω, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτινος ἔστιν. Δημοκράτους, ἔφη, τοῦ Αἰξωνέως ὁ πρεσβύτατος υἱός. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Ἱππόθαλες, ὡς γενναῖον καὶ νεανικὸν τοῦτον τὸν ἔρωτα πανταχῇ ἀνηῦρες· καί μοι ἴθι ἐπίδειξαι ἃ καὶ τοῖσδε ἐπιδείκνυσαι, ἵνα εἰδῶ εἰ ἐπίστασαι ἃ χρὴ ἐραστὴν περὶ παιδικῶν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλους λέγειν. Τούτων δέ τι, ἔφη, σταθμᾷ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὧν ὅδε λέγει; Πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν ἔξαρνος εἶ οὗ λέγει ὅδε; Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἔφη, ἀλλὰ μὴ ποιεῖν εἰς τὰ παιδικὰ μηδὲ συγγράφειν. Οὐχ ὑγιαίνει, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, ἀλλὰ ληρεῖ τε καὶ μαίνεται.

2. Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον Ὦ Ἱππόθαλες, οὔ τι τῶν μέτρων δέομαι ἀκοῦσαι οὐδὲ μέλος εἴ τι πεποίηκας εἰς τὸν νεανίσκον, ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας, ἵνα εἰδῶ τίνα τρόπον προσφέρει πρὸς τὰ παιδικά. Ὅδε δήπου σοι, ἔφη, ἐρεῖ· ἀκριβῶς γὰρ ἐπίσταται καὶ μέμνηται, εἴπερ, ὡς λέγει, ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἀεὶ ἀκούων διατεθρύληται. Νὴ τοὺς θεούς, ἔφη ὁ Κτήσιππος, πάνυ γε. καὶ γάρ ἐστι καταγέλαστα, ὦ Σώκρατες. τὸ γὰρ ἐραστὴν ὄντα καὶ διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων τὸν νοῦν προσέχοντα τῷ παιδὶ ἴδιον μὲν μηδὲν ἔχειν λέγειν, ὃ οὐχὶ κἂν παῖς εἴποι, πῶς οὐχὶ καταγέλαστον; ἃ δὲ ἡ πόλις ὅλη ᾄδει περὶ Δημοκράτους καὶ Λύσιδος τοῦ πάππου τοῦ παιδὸς καὶ πάντων πέρι τῶν προγόνων, πλούτους τε καὶ ἱπποτροφίας καὶ νίκας Πυθοῖ καὶ Ἰσθμοῖ καὶ Νεμέᾳ τεθρίπποις τε καὶ κέλησι, ταῦτα ποιεῖ τε καὶ λέγει, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἔτι τούτων κρονικώτερα. τὸν γὰρ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους ξενισμὸν πρώην ἡμῖν ἐν ποιήματί τινι διῆλθεν, ὡς διὰ τὴν τοῦ Ἡρακλέους συγγένειαν ὁ πρόγονος αὐτῶν ὑποδέξαιτο τὸν Ἡρακλέα, γεγονὼς αὐτὸς ἐκ Διός τε καὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου ἀρχηγέτου θυγατρός, ἅπερ αἱ γραῖαι ᾄδουσι, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἃ οὗτος λέγων τε καὶ ᾄδων ἀναγκάζει καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀκροᾶσθαι. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας εἶπον Ὦ καταγέλαστε Ἱππόθαλες, πρὶν νενικηκέναι ποιεῖς τε καὶ ᾄδεις εἰς σαυτὸν ἐγκώμιον; Ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς ἐμαυτόν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔτε ποιῶ οὔτε ᾄδω. Οὐκ οἶει γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Τὸ δὲ πῶς ἔχει; ἔφη. Πάντων μάλιστα, εἶπον, εἰς σὲ τείνουσιν αὗται αἱ ᾠδαί. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἕλῃς τὰ παιδικὰ τοιαῦτα ὄντα, κόσμος σοι ἔσται τὰ λεχθέντα καὶ ᾀσθέντα καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἐγκώμια ὥσπερ νενικηκότι, ὅτι τοιούτων παιδικῶν ἔτυχες· ἐὰν δέ σε διαφύγῃ, ὅσῳ ἂν μείζω σοι εἰρημένα ᾖ ἐγκώμια περὶ τῶν παιδικῶν, τοσούτῳ μειζόνων δόξεις καλῶν τε κἀγαθῶν ἐστερημένος καταγέλαστος εἶναι. ὅστις οὖν τὰ ἐρωτικά, ὦ φίλε, σοφός, οὐκ ἐπαινεῖ τὸν ἐρώμενον πρὶν ἂν ἕλῃ, δεδιὼς τὸ μέλλον ὅπῃ ἀποβήσεται. καὶ ἅμα οἱ καλοί, ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοὺς ἐπαινῇ καὶ αὔξῃ, φρονήματος ἐμπίμπλανται καὶ μεγαλαυχίας· ἢ οὐκ οἶει; Ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ὅσῳ ἂν μεγαλαυχότεροι

ὦσιν, δυσαλωτότεροι γίγνονται; Εἰκός γε. Ποίός τις οὖν ἄν σοι δοκεῖ θηρευτὴς εἶναι, εἰ ἀνασοβοῖ θηρεύων καὶ δυσαλωτοτέραν τὴν ἄγραν ποιοῖ; Δῆλον ὅτι φαῦλος. Καὶ μὲν δὴ λόγοις τε καὶ ᾠδαῖς μὴ κηλεῖν ἀλλ' ἐξαγριαίνειν πολλὴ ἀμουσία· ἦ γάρ; Δοκεῖ μοι. Σκόπει δή, ὦ Ἱππόθαλες, ὅπως μὴ πᾶσι τούτοις ἔνοχον σαυτὸν ποιήσεις διὰ τὴν ποίησιν· καίτοι οἶμαι ἐγὼ ἄνδρα ποιήσει βλάπτοντα ἑαυτὸν οὐκ ἄν σε ἐθέλειν ὁμολογῆσαι ὡς ἀγαθός ποτ' ἐστὶν ποιητής, βλαβερὸς ὢν ἑαυτῷ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη· πολλὴ γὰρ ἂν ἀλογία εἴη· ἀλλὰ διὰ ταῦτα δή σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνακοινοῦμαι, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἔχεις, συμβούλευε, τίνα ἄν τις λόγον διαλεγόμενος ἢ τί πράττων προσφιλὴς παιδικοῖς γένοιτο.

3. Οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰπεῖν· ἀλλ' εἴ μοι ἐθελήσαις αὐτὸν ποιῆσαι εἰς λόγους ἐλθεῖν, ἴσως ἂν δυναίμην σοι ἐπιδεῖξαι, ἃ χρὴ αὐτῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἀντὶ τούτων ὧν οὗτοι λέγειν τε καὶ ᾄδειν φασί σε. Ἀλλ' οὐδέν, ἔφη, χαλεπόν. ἂν γὰρ εἰσέλθῃς μετὰ Κτησίππου τοῦδε καὶ καθεζόμενος διαλέγῃ, οἶμαι μὲν καὶ αὐτός σοι πρόσεισι· φιλήκοος γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, διαφερόντως ἐστίν, καὶ ἅμα, ὡς Ἑρμαῖα ἄγουσιν, ἀναμεμιγμένοι ἐν ταὐτῷ εἰσιν οἵ τε νεανίσκοι καὶ οἱ παῖδες. πρόσεισιν οὖν σοι· εἰ δὲ μή, Κτησίππῳ συνήθης ἐστὶν διὰ τὸν τούτου ἀνεψιὸν Μενέξενον· Μενεξένῳ μὲν γὰρ δὴ πάντων μάλιστα ἑταῖρος ὢν τυγχάνει. καλεσάτω οὖν οὗτος αὐτόν, ἐὰν ἄρα μὴ προσίῃ αὐτός. Ταῦτα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρὴ ποιεῖν. καὶ ἅμα λαβὼν τὸν Κτήσιππον προσῄ εἰς τὴν παλαίστραν· οἱ δ' ἄλλοι ὕστεροι ἡμῶν ἦσαν.

Εἰσελθόντες δὲ κατελάβομεν αὐτόθι τεθυκότας τε τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰ ἱερεῖα σχεδόν τι ἤδη πεποιημένα, ἀστραγαλίζοντάς τε δὴ καὶ κεκοσμημένους ἅπαντας. οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ ἐν τῇ αὐλῇ ἔπαιζον ἔξω, οἱ δέ τινες τοῦ ἀποδυτηρίου ἐν γωνίᾳ ἠρτίαζον ἀστραγάλοις παμπόλλοις, ἐκ φορμίσκων τινῶν προαιρούμενοι· τούτους δὲ περιέστασαν ἄλλοι θεωροῦντες. ὧν δὴ καὶ ὁ Λύσις ἦν, καὶ εἱστήκειν ἐν τοῖς παισί τε καὶ νεανίσκοις ἐστεφανωμένος καὶ τὴν ὄψιν διαφέρων, οὐ τὸ καλὸς

εἶναι μόνον ἄξιος ἀκοῦσαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλός τε κἀγαθός. καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ ἀποχωρήσαντες ἐκαθεζόμεθα — ἦν γὰρ αὐτόθι ἡσυχία — καί τι ἀλλήλοις διελεγόμεθα. περιστρεφόμενος οὖν ὁ Λύσις θαμὰ ἐπεσκοπεῖτο ἡμᾶς, καὶ δῆλος ἦν ἐπιθυμῶν προσελθεῖν. τέως μὲν οὖν ἠπόρει τε καὶ ὤκνει μόνος προσιέναι· ἔπειτα ὁ Μενέξενος ἐκ τῆς αὐλῆς μεταξὺ παίζων εἰσέρχεται, καὶ ὡς εἶδεν ἐμέ τε καὶ τὸν Κτήσιππον, ἦει παρακαθιζησόμενος· ἰδὼν οὖν αὐτὸν ὁ Λύσις εἵπετο καὶ συμπαρεκαθέζετο μετὰ τοῦ Μενεξένου. προσῆλθον δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ Ἱπποθάλης, ἐπειδὴ πλείους ἑώρα ἐφισταμένους, τούτους ἐπηλυγισάμενος προσέστη ᾗ μὴ ᾤετο κατόψεσθαι τὸν Λύσιν, δεδιὼς μὴ αὐτῷ ἀπεχθάνοιτο· καὶ οὕτω προσεστὼς ἠκροᾶτο.

Καὶ ἐγὼ πρὸς τὸν Μενέξενον ἀποβλέψας, Ὦ παῖ Δημοφῶντος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πότερος ὑμῶν πρεσβύτερος; Ἀμφισβητοῦμεν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁπότερος γενναιότερος, ἐρίζοιτ' ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Πάνυ γε, ἔφη. Καὶ μὴν ὁπότερός γε καλλίων, ὡσαύτως. Ἐγελασάτην οὖν ἄμφω. Οὐ μὴν ὁπότερός γε, ἔφην, πλουσιώτερος ὑμῶν, οὐκ ἐρήσομαι· φίλω γάρ ἐστον. ἦ γάρ; Πάνυ γ', ἐφάτην. Οὐκοῦν κοινὰ τά γε φίλων λέγεται, ὥστε τούτῳ γε οὐδὲν διοίσετον, εἴπερ ἀληθῆ περὶ τῆς φιλίας λέγετον. Συνεφάτην.

4. Ἐπεχείρουν δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρωτᾶν, ὁπότερος δικαιότερος καὶ σοφώτερος αὐτῶν εἴη. μεταξὺ οὖν τις προσελθὼν ἀνέστησε τὸν Μενέξενον, φάσκων καλεῖν τὸν παιδοτρίβην· ἐδόκει γάρ μοι ἱεροποιῶν τυγχάνειν. ἐκεῖνος μὲν οὖν ᾤχετο· ἐγὼ δὲ τὸν Λύσιν ἠρόμην, Ἦ που, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Λύσι, σφόδρα φιλεῖ σε ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἡ μήτηρ; Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ' ὅς. Οὐκοῦν βούλοιντο ἄν σε ὡς εὐδαιμονέστατον εἶναι; Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Δοκεῖ δέ σοι εὐδαίμων εἶναι *ἄν* ἄνθρωπος δουλεύων τε καὶ ᾧ μηδὲν ἐξείη ποιεῖν ὧν ἐπιθυμοῖ; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔμοιγε, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν εἴ σε φιλεῖ ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἡ μήτηρ καὶ εὐδαίμονά σε ἐπιθυμοῦσι γενέσθαι, τοῦτο παντὶ τρόπῳ δῆλον ὅτι προθυμοῦνται ὅπως ἂν εὐδαιμονοίης. Πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; ἔφη. Ἐῶσιν ἄρα σε ἃ

βούλει ποιεῖν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιπλήττουσιν οὐδὲ διακωλύουσι ποιεῖν ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμῇς; Ναὶ μὰ Δία ἐμέ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ μάλα γε πολλὰ κωλύουσιν. Πῶς λέγεις; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. βουλόμενοί σε μακάριον εἶναι διακωλύουσι τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὃ ἂν βούλῃ; ὧδε δέ μοι λέγε. ἦν ἐπιθυμήσῃς ἐπί τινος τῶν τοῦ πατρὸς ἁρμάτων ὀχεῖσθαι λαβὼν τὰς ἡνίας, ὅταν ἁμιλλᾶται, οὐκ ἂν ἐᾷέν σε ἀλλὰ διακωλύοιεν; Μὰ Δί' οὐ μέντοι ἄν, ἔφη, ἐᾷεν. Ἀλλὰ τί μήν; Ἔστιν τις ἡνίοχος παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς μισθὸν φέρων. Πῶς λέγεις; μισθωτῷ μᾶλλον ἐπιτρέπουσιν ἢ σοὶ ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βούληται περὶ τοὺς ἵππους, καὶ προσέτι αὐτοῦ τούτου ἀργύριον τελοῦσιν; Ἀλλὰ τί μήν; ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὁρικοῦ ζεύγους, οἶμαι, ἐπιτρέπουσίν σοι ἄρχειν, κἂν εἰ βούλοιο λαβὼν τὴν μάστιγα τύπτειν, ἐᾷεν ἄν. Πόθεν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐᾷεν; Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐδενὶ ἔξεστιν αὐτοὺς τύπτειν; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, τῷ ὀρεοκόμῳ. Δούλῳ ὄντι ἢ ἐλευθέρῳ; Δούλῳ, ἔφη. Καὶ δοῦλον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡγοῦνται περὶ πλείονος ἢ σὲ τὸν υἱόν, καὶ ἐπιτρέπουσι τὰ ἑαυτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ σοί, καὶ ἐῶσιν ποιεῖν ὅ τι βούλεται, σὲ δὲ διακωλύουσι; καί μοι ἔτι τόδε εἰπέ. σὲ αὐτὸν ἐῶσιν ἄρχειν σεαυτοῦ, ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐπιτρέπουσί σοι; Πῶς γάρ, ἔφη, ἐπιτρέπουσιν; Ἀλλ' ἄρχει τίς σου; Ὅδε, παιδαγωγός, ἔφη. Μῶν δοῦλος ὤν; Ἀλλὰ τί μήν; ἡμέτερός γε, ἔφη. Ἦ δεινόν, ἦ δ' ἐγώ, ἐλεύθερον ὄντα ὑπὸ δούλου ἄρχεσθαι. τί δὲ ποιῶν αὖ οὗτος ὁ παιδαγωγός σου ἄρχει; Ἄγων δήπου, ἔφη, εἰς διδασκάλου. Μῶν μὴ καὶ οὗτοί σου ἄρχουσιν, οἱ διδάσκαλοι; Πάντως δήπου. Παμπόλλους ἄρα σοι δεσπότας καὶ ἄρχοντας ἐκὼν ὁ πατὴρ ἐφίστησιν. ἀλλ' ἆρα ἐπειδὰν οἴκαδε ἔλθῃς παρὰ τὴν μητέρα, ἐκείνη σε ἐᾷ ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βούλῃ, ἵν' αὐτῇ μακάριος ᾖς, ἢ περὶ τὰ ἔρια ἢ περὶ τὸν ἱστόν, ὅταν ὑφαίνῃ; οὔ τι γάρ που διακωλύει σε ἢ τῆς σπάθης ἢ τῆς κερκίδος ἢ ἄλλου του τῶν περὶ ταλασιουργίαν ὀργάνων ἅπτεσθαι. καὶ ὃς γελάσας, Μὰ Δία, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ μόνον γε διακωλύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τυπτοίμην ἂν εἰ ἁπτοίμην. Ἡράκλεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μῶν μή τι ἠδίκηκας τὸν πατέρα ἢ τὴν μητέρα; Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἔφη.

5. Ἀλλ' ἀντὶ τίνος μὴν οὕτω σε δεινῶς διακωλύουσιν εὐδαίμονα εἶναι καὶ ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἂν βούλῃ, καὶ δι' ἡμέρας ὅλης τρέφουσί σε ἀεί τῳ δουλεύοντα καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ ὀλίγου ὢν ἐπιθυμεῖς οὐδὲν ποιοῦντα; ὥστε σοι, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὔτε τῶν χρημάτων τοσούτων ὄντων οὐδὲν ὄφελος, ἀλλὰ πάντες αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἄρχουσιν ἢ σύ, οὔτε τοῦ σώματος οὕτω γενναίου ὄντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλος ποιμαίνει καὶ θεραπεύει· σὺ δὲ ἄρχεις οὐδενός, ὦ Λύσι, οὐδὲ ποιεῖς οὐδὲν ὧν ἐπιθυμεῖς. Οὐ γάρ πω, ἔφη, ἡλικίαν ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες. Μὴ οὐ τοῦτό σε, ὦ παῖ Δημοκράτους, κωλύῃ, ἐπεὶ τό γε τοσόνδε, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἡ μήτηρ σοι ἐπιτρέπουσιν καὶ οὐκ ἀναμένουσιν ἕως ἂν ἡλικίαν ἔχῃς. ὅταν γὰρ βούλωνται αὐτοῖς τι ἢ ἀναγνωσθῆναι ἢ γραφῆναι, σέ, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, πρῶτον τῶν ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ ἐπὶ τοῦτο τάττουσιν. ἦ γάρ; Πάνυ γ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν ἔξεστί σοι ἐνταῦθ' ὅ τι ἂν βούλῃ πρῶτον τῶν γραμμάτων γράφειν καὶ ὅ τι ἂν δεύτερον· καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκειν ὡσαύτως ἔξεστιν. καὶ ἐπειδάν, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, τὴν λύραν λάβῃς, οὐ διακωλύουσί σε οὔτε ὁ πατὴρ οὔτε ἡ μήτηρ ἐπιτεῖναί τε καὶ ἀνεῖναι ἣν ἂν βούλῃ τῶν χορδῶν, καὶ ψῆλαι καὶ κρούειν τῷ πλήκτρῳ. ἦ διακωλύουσιν; Οὐ δῆτα. Τί ποτ' ἂν οὖν εἴη, ὦ Λύσι, τὸ αἴτιον ὅτι ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐ διακωλύουσιν, ἐν οἷς δὲ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν κωλύουσιν; Ὅτι, οἶμαι, ἔφη, ταῦτα μὲν ἐπίσταμαι, ἐκεῖνα δ' οὔ. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἄριστε· οὐκ ἄρα τὴν ἡλικίαν σου περιμένει ὁ πατὴρ ἐπιτρέπειν πάντα, ἀλλ' ᾗ ἂν ἡμέρᾳ ἡγήσηταί σε βέλτιον αὑτοῦ φρονεῖν, ταύτῃ ἐπιτρέψει σοι καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἔφη. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τί δέ; τῷ γείτονι ἆρ' οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς ὅρος ὅσπερ τῷ πατρὶ περὶ σοῦ; πότερον οἴει αὐτὸν ἐπιτρέψειν σοι τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν οἰκονομεῖν, ὅταν σε ἡγήσηται βέλτιον περὶ οἰκονομίας ἑαυτοῦ φρονεῖν, ἢ αὐτὸν ἐπιστατήσειν; Ἐμοὶ ἐπιτρέψειν οἶμαι. Τί δ'; Ἀθηναίους οἴει σοι οὐκ ἐπιτρέψειν τὰ αὑτῶν, ὅταν αἰσθάνωνται ὅτι ἱκανῶς φρονεῖς; Ἔγωγε. Πρὸς Διός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τί ἄρα ὁ μέγας βασιλεύς; πότερον τῷ πρεσβυτάτῳ υἱεῖ, οὗ ἡ τῆς Ἀσίας ἀρχὴ γίγνεται μᾶλλον ἂν ἐπιτρέψειεν ἐψομένων κρεῶν ὅτι ἂν βούληται ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὸν ζωμόν, ἢ ἡμῖν,

εἰ ἀφικόμενοι παρ' ἐκεῖνον ἐνδειξαίμεθα αὐτῷ, ὅτι ἡμεῖς κάλλιον φρονοῦμεν ἢ ὁ ὑὸς αὐτοῦ περὶ ὄψου σκευασίας; Ἡμῖν δῆλον ὅτι, ἔφη. Καὶ τὸν μέν γε οὐδ' ἂν σμικρὸν ἐάσειεν ἐμβαλεῖν· ἡμᾶς δέ, κἂν εἰ βουλοίμεθα δραξάμενοι τῶν ἁλῶν, ἐᾷ ἂν ἐμβαλεῖν. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Τί δ' εἰ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὁ ὑὸς αὐτοῦ ἀσθενοῖ, ἆρα ἐᾷ ἂν αὐτὸν ἅπτεσθαι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ ὀφθαλμῶν, μὴ ἰατρικὸν ἡγούμενος, ἢ κωλύοι ἄν; Κωλύοι ἄν. Ἡμᾶς δέ γε εἰ ὑπολαμβάνοι ἰατρικοὺς εἶναι, κἂν εἰ βουλοίμεθα διανοίγοντες τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐμπάσαι τῆς τέφρας, οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν κωλύσειεν, ἡγούμενος ὀρθῶς φρονεῖν. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ἡμῖν ἐπιτρέποι ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τῷ ὑεῖ, περὶ ὅσων ἂν δόξωμεν αὐτῷ σοφώτεροι ἐκείνωι εἶναι; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

6. Οὕτως ἄρα ἔχει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Λύσι· εἰς μὲν ταῦτα, ἃ ἂν φρόνιμοι γενώμεθα, ἅπαντες ἡμῖν ἐπιτρέψουσιν, Ἕλληνές τε καὶ βάρβαροι καὶ ἄνδρες καὶ γυναῖκες, ποιήσομέν τε ἐν τούτοις ὅ τι ἂν βουλώμεθα, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμᾶς ἑκὼν εἶναι ἐμποδιεῖ, ἀλλ' αὐτοί τε ἐλεύθεροι ἐσόμεθα ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλων ἄρχοντες, ἡμέτερά τε ταῦτα ἔσται· ὀνησόμεθα γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν· εἰς ἃ δ' ἂν νοῦν μὴ κτησώμεθα, οὔτε τις ἡμῖν ἐπιτρέψει περὶ αὐτὰ ποιεῖν τὰ ἡμῖν δοκοῦντα, ἀλλ' ἐμποδιοῦσι πάντες καθ' ὅ τι ἂν δύνωνται, οὐ μόνον οἱ ἀλλότριοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἡ μήτηρ καὶ εἴ τι τούτων οἰκειότερόν ἐστιν, αὐτοί τε ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐσόμεθα ἄλλων ὑπήκοοι, καὶ ἡμῖν ἔσται ἀλλότρια· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὀνησόμεθα. συγχωρεῖς οὕτως ἔχειν; Συγχωρῶ. Ἆρ' οὖν τῳ φίλοι ἐσόμεθα καί τις ἡμᾶς φιλήσει ἐν τούτοις, ἐν οἷς ἂν ὦμεν ἀνωφελεῖς; Οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. Νῦν ἄρα οὐδὲ σὲ ὁ πατὴρ οὐδὲ ἄλλος ἄλλον οὐδένα φιλεῖ, καθ' ὅσον ἂν ᾖ ἄχρηστος. Οὐκ ἔοικεν, ἔφη. Ἐὰν μὲν ἄρα σοφὸς γένῃ, ὦ παῖ, πάντες σοι φίλοι καὶ πάντες σοι οἰκεῖοι ἔσονται· χρήσιμος γὰρ καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἔσει· εἰ δὲ μή, σοὶ οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς οὔτε ὁ πατὴρ φίλος ἔσται οὔτε ἡ μήτηρ οὔτε οἱ οἰκεῖοι. οἷόν τε οὖν ἐπὶ τούτοις, ὦ Λύσι, μέγα φρονεῖν, ἐν οἷς τις μήπω φρονεῖ; Καὶ πῶς ἄν; ἔφη. Εἰ δ' ἄρα σὺ διδασκάλου δέει, οὔπω

πρότερον ἔδοξεν. τότε μὲν γάρ, εἰ ὁ ἕτερος φιλοῖ, φίλω εἶναι ἄμφω· νῦν δέ, ἂν μὴ ἀμφότεροι φιλῶσιν, οὐδέτερος φίλος. Κινδυνεύει, ἔφη. Οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν φίλον τῷ φιλοῦντι οὐδὲν μὴ οὐκ ἀντιφιλοῦν. Οὐκ ἔοικεν. Οὐδ' ἄρα φίλιπποί εἰσιν οὓς ἂν οἱ ἵπποι μὴ ἀντιφιλῶσιν, οὐδὲ φιλόρτυγες, οὐδ' αὖ φιλόκυνές γε καὶ φίλοινοι καὶ φιλογυμνασταὶ καὶ φιλόσοφοι, ἂν μὴ ἡ σοφία αὐτοὺς ἀντιφιλῇ. ἢ φιλοῦσι μὲν ταῦτα ἕκαστοι, οὐ μέντοι φίλα ὄντα, ἀλλὰ ψεύδεθ' ὁ ποιητής, ὃς ἔφη

ὄλβιος, ᾧ παῖδές τε φίλοι καὶ μώνυχες ἵπποι
καὶ κύνες ἀγρευταὶ καὶ ξένος ἀλλοδαπός;

Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἀλλ' ἀληθῆ δοκεῖ λέγειν σοι; Ναί. Τὸ φιλούμενον ἄρα τῷ φιλοῦντι φίλον ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὦ Μενέξενε, ἐάν τε *μὴ* φιλῇ ἐάν τε καὶ μισῇ· οἷον καὶ τὰ νεωστὶ γεγονότα παιδία, τὰ μὲν οὐδέπω φιλοῦντα, τὰ δὲ καὶ μισοῦντα, ὅταν κολάζηται ὑπὸ τῆς μητρὸς ἢ ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρός, ὅμως καὶ μισοῦντα ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ πάντων μάλιστά ἐστι τοῖς γονεῦσι φίλτατα. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχειν. Οὐκ ἄρα ὁ φιλῶν φίλος ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλ' ὁ φιλούμενος. Ἔοικεν. Καὶ ὁ μισοῦμενος ἐχθρὸς ἄρα, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁ μισῶν. Φαίνεται. Πολλοὶ ἄρα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν φιλοῦνται, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν φίλων μισοῦνται, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐχθροῖς φίλοι εἰσίν, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ἐχθροί, εἰ τὸ φιλούμενον φίλον ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ φιλοῦν. καίτοι πολλὴ ἀλογία, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, μᾶλλον δέ, οἶμαι, καὶ ἀδύνατον, τῷ τε φίλῳ ἐχθρὸν καὶ τῷ ἐχθρῷ φίλον εἶναι. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, ἔοικας λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον, τὸ φιλοῦν ἂν εἴη φίλον τοῦ φιλουμένου. Φαίνεται. Τὸ μισοῦν ἄρα πάλιν ἐχθρὸν τοῦ μισουμένου. Ἀνάγκη. Οὐκοῦν ταὐτὰ ἡμῖν συμβήσεται ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὁμολογεῖν, ἅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πρότερον, πολλάκις φίλον εἶναι μὴ φίλου, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἐχθροῦ, ὅταν ἢ μὴ φιλοῦν τις φιλῇ ἢ καὶ μισοῦν φιλῇ· πολλάκις δ' ἐχθρὸν εἶναι μὴ ἐχθροῦ ἢ καὶ φίλου, ὅταν ἢ *μὴ* μισοῦν τις μισῇ ἢ καὶ φιλοῦν μισῇ. Κινδυνεύει, ἔφη. Τί οὖν δὴ χρησώμεθα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μήτε οἱ φιλοῦντες φίλοι ἔσονται μήτε οἱ φιλούμενοι μήτε οἱ φιλοῦντές τε καὶ φιλούμενοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα

ἄλλους τινὰς ἔτι φήσομεν εἶναι φίλους ἀλλήλοις γιγνομένους; Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πάνυ εὐπορῶ ἔγωγε. Ἆρα μή ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Μενέξενε, τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐζητοῦμεν; Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, *ἔφη*, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Λύσις. καὶ ἅμα εἰπὼν ἠρυθρίασεν· ἐδόκει γάρ μοι ἄκουτ' αὐτὸν ἐκφεύγειν τὸ λεχθὲν διὰ τὸ σφόδρα προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν τοῖς λεγομένοις· δῆλος δ' ἦν καὶ ὅτε ἠκροᾶτο οὕτως ἔχων.

10. Ἐγὼ οὖν βουλόμενος τόν τε Μενέξενον ἀναπαῦσαι καὶ ἐκείνου ἡσθεὶς τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, οὕτω μεταβαλὼν πρὸς τὸν Λύσιν ἐποιούμην τοὺς λόγους, καὶ εἶπον Ὦ Λύσι, ἀληθῆ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν ὅτι εἰ ὀρθῶς ἡμεῖς ἐσκοποῦμεν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε οὕτως ἐπλανώμεθα. ἀλλὰ ταύτῃ μὲν μηκέτι ἴωμεν· καὶ γὰρ χαλεπή τίς μοι φαίνεται ὥσπερ ὁδὸς ἡ σκέψις· ᾗ δὲ ἐτράπημεν, δοκεῖ μοι χρῆναι ἰέναι, σκοποῦντας κατὰ τοὺς ποιητάς· οὗτοι γὰρ ἡμῖν ὥσπερ πατέρες τῆς σοφίας εἰσὶν καὶ ἡγεμόνες. λέγουσι δὲ δήπου οὐ φαύλως ἀποφαινόμενοι περὶ τῶν φίλων, οἳ τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες· ἀλλὰ τὸν θεὸν αὐτόν φασὶν ποιεῖν φίλους αὐτούς, ἄγοντα παρ' ἀλλήλους. λέγουσι δέ πως ταῦτα, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ὠδί·

αἰεί τοι τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον

καὶ ποιεῖ γνώριμον· ἢ οὐκ ἐντετύχηκας τούτοις τοῖς ἔπεσιν; Ἔγωγ', ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς τῶν σοφωτάτων συγγράμμασιν ἐντετύχηκας ταῦτα ταὐτὰ λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ φίλον εἶναι; εἰσὶν δέ που οὗτοι οἱ περὶ φύσεώς τε καὶ τοῦ ὅλου διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις. Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εὖ λέγουσιν; Ἴσως, ἔφη. Ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ ἥμισυ αὐτοῦ, ἴσως δὲ καὶ πᾶν, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς οὐ συνίεμεν. δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡμῖν ὅ γε πονηρὸς τῷ πονηρῷ, ὅσῳ ἂν ἐγγυτέρω προσίῃ καὶ μᾶλλον ὁμιλῇ, τοσούτῳ ἐχθίων γίγνεσθαι. ἀδικεῖ γάρ· ἀδικοῦντας δὲ καὶ ἀδικουμένους ἀδύνατόν που φίλους εἶναι. οὐχ οὕτως; Ναί, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ταύτῃ μὲν ἂν τοίνυν τοῦ λεγομένου τὸ ἥμισυ οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἴη, εἴπερ οἱ πονηροὶ ἀλλήλοις ὅμοιοι. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Ἀλλά μοι δοκοῦσιν λέγειν τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ὁμοίους εἶναι ἀλλήλοις καὶ φίλους, τοὺς

δὲ κακούς, ὅπερ καὶ λέγεται περὶ αὐτῶν, μηδέποτε ὁμοίους μηδ' αὐτοὺς αὑτοῖς εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐμπλήκτους τε καὶ ἀσταθμήτους· ὃ δὲ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἀνόμοιον εἴη καὶ διάφορον, σχολῇ γ' ἄν τῳ ἄλλῳ ὅμοιον ἢ φίλον γένοιτο· ἢ οὐ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτως; Ἔμοιγ', ἔφη. Τοῦτο τοίνυν αἰνίττονται, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, οἱ τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον λέγοντες, ὡς ὁ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνος μόνῳ φίλος, ὁ δὲ κακὸς οὔτε ἀγαθῷ οὔτε κακῷ οὐδέποτε εἰς ἀληθῆ φιλίαν ἔρχεται. συνδοκεῖ σοι; Κατένευσεν. Ἔχομεν ἄρα ἤδη, τίνες εἰσὶν οἱ φίλοι· ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμῖν σημαίνει, ὅτι οἳ ἂν ὦσιν ἀγαθοί. Πάνυ γε, ἔφη, δοκεῖ.

11. Καὶ ἐμοί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· καίτοι δυσχεραίνω τί γε ἐν αὐτῷ· φέρε οὖν, ὦ πρὸς Διός, ἴδωμεν τί καὶ ὑποπτεύω. ὁ ὅμοιος τῷ ὁμοίῳ καθ' ὅσον ὅμοιος φίλος, καὶ ἔστιν χρήσιμος ὁ τοιοῦτος τῷ τοιούτῳ; μᾶλλον δὲ ὧδε· ὁτιοῦν ὅμοιον ὁτῳοῦν ὁμοίῳ τίνα ὠφελίαν [ἔχειν] ἢ τίνα βλάβην ἂν ποιῆσαι δύναιτο, ὃ μὴ καὶ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ; ἢ τί ἂν παθεῖν, ὃ μὴ καὶ ὑφ' αὑτοῦ πάθοι; τὰ δὴ τοιαῦτα πῶς ἂν ὑπ' ἀλλήλων ἀγαπηθείη, μηδεμίαν ἐπικουρίαν ἀλλήλοις ἔχοντα; ἔστιν ὅπως; Οὐκ ἔστιν. Ὃ δὲ μὴ ἀγαπῷτο, πῶς φίλον; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἀλλὰ δὴ ὁ μὲν ὅμοιος τῷ ὁμοίῳ οὐ φίλος· ὁ δὲ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ καθ' ὅσον ἀγαθός, οὐ καθ' ὅσον ὅμοιος, φίλος ἂν εἴη; Ἴσως. Τί δέ; οὐχ ὁ ἀγαθός, καθ' ὅσον ἀγαθός, κατὰ τοσοῦτον ἱκανὸς ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ; Ναί. Ὁ δέ γε ἱκανὸς οὐδενὸς δεόμενος κατὰ τὴν ἱκανότητα. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Ὁ δὲ μή του δεόμενος οὐδέ τι ἀγαπῴη ἄν. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Ὁ δὲ μὴ ἀγαπῶν οὐδ' ἂν φιλοῖ. Οὐ δῆτα. Ὁ δὲ μὴ φιλῶν γε οὐ φίλος. Οὐ φαίνεται. Πῶς οὖν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἡμῖν φίλοι ἔσονται τὴν ἀρχήν, οἳ μήτε ἀπόντες ποθεινοὶ ἀλλήλοις — ἱκανοὶ γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς καὶ χωρὶς ὄντες — μήτε παρόντες χρείαν αὐτῶν ἔχουσιν; τοὺς δὴ τοιούτους τίς μηχανὴ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι ἀλλήλους; Οὐδεμία, ἔφη. Φίλοι δέ γε οὐκ ἂν εἶεν μὴ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιούμενοι ἑαυτούς. Ἀληθῆ.

12. Ἄθρει δή, ὦ Λύσι, πῇ παρακρουόμεθα. ἆρά γε ὅλῳ τινὶ ἐξαπατώμεθα; Πῶς δή; ἔφη. Ἤδη ποτέ του ἤκουσα λέγοντος, καὶ ἄρτι ἀναμιμνήσκομαι, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ καὶ

οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς πολεμιώτατοι εἶεν· καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸν Ἡσίοδον ἐπήγετο μάρτυρα, λέγων ὡς ἄρα

καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ
καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ,

καὶ τἆλλα δὴ πάντα οὕτως ἔφη ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι μάλιστα τὰ ὁμοιότατα πρὸς ἄλληλα φθόνου τε καὶ φιλονικίας καὶ ἔχθρας ἐμπίμπλασθαι, τὰ δ' ἀνομοιότατα φιλίας. τὸν γὰρ πένητα τῷ πλουσίῳ ἀναγκάζεσθαι φίλον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἀσθενῆ τῷ ἰσχυρῷ τῆς ἐπικουρίας ἕνεκα, καὶ τὸν κάμνοντα τῷ ἰατρῷ· καὶ πάντα δὴ τὸν μὴ εἰδότα ἀγαπᾶν τὸν εἰδότα καὶ φιλεῖν. καὶ δὴ καὶ ἔτι ἐπεξῄει τῷ λόγῳ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον, λέγων ὡς ἄρα παντὸς δέοι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ φίλον εἶναι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον εἴη τούτου· τὸ γὰρ ἐναντιώτατον τῷ ἐναντιωτάτῳ εἶναι μάλιστα φίλον. ἐπιθυμεῖν γὰρ τοῦ τοιούτου ἕκαστον, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ ὁμοίου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ξηρὸν ὑγροῦ, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμοῦ, τὸ δὲ πικρὸν γλυκέος, τὸ δὲ ὀξὺ ἀμβλέος, τὸ δὲ κενὸν πληρώσεως, καὶ τὸ πλῆρες δὲ κενώσεως· καὶ τἆλλα οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον. τροφὴν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ· τὸ γὰρ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου οὐδὲν ἂν ἀπολαῦσαι. καὶ μέντοι, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ κομψὸς ἐδόκει εἶναι ταῦτα λέγων· εὖ γὰρ ἔλεγεν. ὑμῖν δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πῶς δοκεῖ λέγειν; Εὖ γε, ἔφη ὁ Μενέξενος, ὥς γε οὑτωσὶ ἀκοῦσαι. Φῶμεν ἄρα τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ μάλιστα φίλον εἶναι; Πάνυ γε. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐκ ἀλλόκοτον, ὦ Μενέξενε; καὶ ἡμῖν εὐθὺς ἄσμενοι ἐπιπηδήσονται οὗτοι οἱ πάσσοφοι ἄνδρες, οἱ ἀντιλογικοί, καὶ ἐρήσονται εἰ οὐκ ἐναντιώτατον ἔχθρα φιλίᾳ; οἷς τί ἀποκρινούμεθα; ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν; Ἀνάγκη. Ἆρ' οὖν, φήσουσιν, τὸ ἐχθρὸν τῷ φίλῳ φίλον ἢ τὸ φίλον τῷ ἐχθρῷ; Οὐδέτερα, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῷ ἀδίκῳ, ἢ τὸ σῶφρον τῷ ἀκολάστῳ, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῷ κακῷ; Οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ γε κατὰ τὴν ἐναντιότητά τί τῳ φίλον ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα φίλα εἶναι. Ἀνάγκη. Οὔτε ἄρα τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ οὔτε τὸ ἐναντίον τῳ ἐναντίῳ φίλον. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

13. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τόδε σκεψώμεθα, μὴ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς λανθάνει τὸ φίλον ὡς ἀληθῶς οὐδὲν τούτων ὄν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν φίλον οὕτω ποτὲ γιγνόμενον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Πῶς, ἦ δ' ὅς, λέγεις; Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκ οἶδα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι αὐτὸς εἰλιγγιῶ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ λόγου ἀπορίας, καὶ κινδυνεύει κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν παροιμίαν τὸ καλὸν φίλον εἶναι. ἔοικε γοῦν μαλακῷ τινι καὶ λείῳ καὶ λιπαρῷ· διὸ καὶ οὕτως ῥᾳδίως διολισθαίνει καὶ διαδύεται ἡμᾶς, ἅτε τοιοῦτον ὄν. λέγω γὰρ τἀγαθὸν καλὸν εἶναι· σὺ δ' οὐκ οἴει; Ἔγωγε. Λέγω τοίνυν ἀπομαντευόμενος, τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φίλον εἶναι τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακόν· πρὸς ἃ δὲ λέγων μαντεύομαι, ἄκουσον. δοκεῖ μοι ὡσπερεὶ τρία ἅττα εἶναι γένη, τὸ μὲν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κακόν, τὸ δ' οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν· τί δὲ σοί; Καὶ ἐμοί, ἔφη. Καὶ οὔτε τἀγαθὸν τἀγαθῷ οὔτε τὸ κακὸν τῷ κακῷ οὔτε τἀγαθὸν τῷ κακῷ φίλον εἶναι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ὁ ἔμπροσθεν λόγος ἐᾷ· λείπεται δή, εἴπερ τῷ τί ἐστιν φίλον, τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν φίλον εἶναι ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ τοῦ τοιούτου οἷον αὐτό ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ δήπου τῷ κακῷ φίλον ἄν τι γένοιτο. Ἀληθῆ. Οὐδὲ μὴν τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἔφαμεν ἄρτι· ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Οὐκ ἄρα ἔσται τῷ μήτε ἀγαθῷ μήτε κακῷ τὸ τοιοῦτον φίλον οἷον αὐτό. Οὐ φαίνεται. Τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἄρα τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν μόνῳ μόνον συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι φίλον. Ἀνάγκη, ὡς ἔοικεν.

14. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ παῖδες, ὑφηγεῖται ἡμῖν τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον; εἰ γοῦν ἐθέλοιμεν ἐννοῆσαι τὸ ὑγιαῖνον σῶμα, οὐδὲν ἰατρικῆς δεῖται οὐδὲ ὠφελίας· ἱκανῶς γὰρ ἔχει, ὥστε ὑγιαίνων οὐδεὶς ἰατρῷ φίλος διὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν. ἦ γάρ; Οὐδείς. Ἀλλ' ὁ κάμνων, οἶμαι, διὰ τὴν νόσον. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Νόσος μὲν δὴ κακόν, ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὠφέλιμον καὶ ἀγαθόν. Ναί. Σῶμα δέ γέ που κατὰ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν. Οὕτως. Ἀναγκάζεται δέ γε σῶμα διὰ νόσον ἰατρικὴν ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν. Δοκεῖ μοι. Τὸ μήτε κακὸν ἄρα μήτε ἀγαθὸν φίλον γίγνεται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διὰ κακοῦ παρουσίαν. Ἔοικεν. Δῆλον δέ γε ὅτι πρὶν γενέσθαι αὐτὸ κακὸν

ὑπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ οὐ ἔχει. οὐ γὰρ δή γε κακὸν γεγονὸς ἔτι ἂν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐπιθυμοῖ καὶ φίλον εἴη· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἔφαμεν κακὸν ἀγαθῷ φίλον εἶναι. Ἀδύνατον γάρ. Σκέψασθε δὴ ὃ λέγω. λέγω γὰρ ὅτι ἔνια μέν, οἷον ἂν ᾖ τὸ παρόν, τοιαῦτά ἐστι καὶ αὐτά, ἔνια δὲ οὔ. ὥσπερ εἰ ἐθέλοι τις χρώματί τῳ ὁτιοῦν ἀλεῖψαι, πάρεστίν που τῷ ἀλειφθέντι τὸ ἐπαλειφθέν. Πάνυ γε. Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ἔστιν τότε τοιοῦτον τὴν χρόαν τὸ ἀλειφθέν, οἷον τὸ ἐπόν; Οὐ μανθάνω, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἀλλ' ὧδε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. εἴ τίς σου ξανθὰς οὔσας τὰς τρίχας ψιμυθίῳ ἀλείψειεν, πότερον τότε λευκαὶ εἶεν ἢ φαίνοιντ' ἄν; Φαίνοιντ' ἄν, ἦ δ' ὅς. Καὶ μὴν παρείη γ' ἂν αὐταῖς λευκότης. Ναί. Ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἂν εἶεν λευκαί πω, ἀλλὰ παρούσης λευκότητος οὔτε τι λευκαὶ οὔτε μέλαιναί εἰσιν. Ἀληθῆ. Ἀλλ' ὅταν δή, ὦ φίλε, τὸ γῆρας αὐταῖς ταὐτὸν τοῦτο χρῶμα ἐπαγάγῃ, τότε ἐγένοντο οἱόνπερ τὸ παρόν, λευκοῦ παρουσίᾳ λευκαί. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ; Τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐρωτῶ νῦν δή, εἰ ᾧ ἄν τι παρῇ, τοιοῦτον ἔσται τὸ ἔχον οἷον τὸ παρόν· ἢ ἐὰν μὲν κατά τινα τρόπον παρῇ, ἔσται, ἐὰν δὲ μή, οὔ; Οὕτω μᾶλλον, ἔφη. Καὶ τὸ μήτε κακὸν ἄρα μήτε ἀγαθὸν ἐνίοτε κακοῦ παρόντος οὔπω κακόν ἐστιν, ἔστιν δ' ὅτε ἤδη τὸ τοιοῦτον γέγονεν. Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν μήπω κακὸν ᾖ κακοῦ παρόντος, αὕτη μὲν ἡ παρουσία ἀγαθοῦ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ ἐπιθυμεῖν· ἡ δὲ κακὸν ποιοῦσα ἀποστερεῖ αὐτὸ τῆς τε ἐπιθυμίας ἅμα καὶ τῆς φιλίας τἀγαθοῦ. οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἐστὶν οὔτε κακὸν οὔτε ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ κακόν· φίλον δὲ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐκ ἦν. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ φαῖμεν ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἤδη σοφοὺς μηκέτι φιλοσοφεῖν, εἴτε θεοὶ εἴτε ἄνθρωποί εἰσιν οὗτοι· οὐδ' αὖ ἐκείνους φιλοσοφεῖν τοὺς οὕτως ἄγνοιαν ἔχοντας ὥστε κακοὺς εἶναι· κακὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀμαθῆ οὐδένα φιλοσοφεῖν. λείπονται δὴ οἱ ἔχοντες μὲν τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο, τὴν ἄγνοιαν, μήπω δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ὄντες ἀγνώμονες μηδὲ ἀμαθεῖς, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἡγούμενοι μὴ εἰδέναι ἃ μὴ ἴσασιν. διὸ δὴ καὶ φιλοσοφοῦσιν οἱ οὔτε ἀγαθοὶ οὔτε κακοί πω ὄντες· ὅσοι δὲ κακοί, οὐ φιλοσοφοῦσιν, οὐδὲ οἱ ἀγαθοί· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἐναντίον τοῦ ἐναντίου οὔτε τὸ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου φίλον ἡμῖν

ἐφάνη ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις. ἢ οὐ μέμνησθε; Πάνυ γε, ἐφάτην. Νῦν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Λύσι τε καὶ Μενέξενε, παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐξηυρήκαμεν ὃ ἔστιν τὸ φίλον καὶ οὔ. φαμὲν γὰρ αὐτό, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ πανταχοῦ, τὸ μήτε κακὸν μήτε ἀγαθὸν διὰ κακοῦ παρουσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλον εἶναι. Παντάπασιν ἐφάτην τε καὶ συνεχωρείτην οὕτω τοῦτ' ἔχειν.

15. Καὶ δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ πάνυ ἔχαιρον, ὥσπερ θηρευτής τις, ἔχων ἀγαπητῶς ὃ ἐθηρευόμην. κἄπειτ' οὐκ οἶδ' ὁπόθεν μοι ἀτοπωτάτη τις ὑποψία εἰσῆλθεν, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ εἴη τὰ ὡμολογημένα ἡμῖν· καὶ εὐθὺς ἀχθεσθεὶς εἶπον Βαβαί, ὦ Λύσι τε καὶ Μενέξενε, κινδυνεύομεν ὄναρ πεπλουτηκέναι. Τί μάλιστα; ἔφη ὁ Μενέξενος. Φοβοῦμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὴ ὥσπερ ἀνθρώποις ἀλαζόσιν λόγοις τισὶν τοιούτοις ἐντετυχήκαμεν περὶ τοῦ φίλου. Πῶς δή; ἔφη. Ὧδε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, σκοπῶμεν· φίλος ὃς ἂν εἴη, πότερόν ἐστίν τῳ φίλος ἢ οὔ; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Πότερον οὖν οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα καὶ δι' οὐδέν, ἢ ἕνεκά του καὶ διά τι; Ἕνεκά του καὶ διά τι. Πότερον φίλου ὄντος ἐκείνου τοῦ πράγματος, οὗ ἕνεκα φίλος ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ, ἢ οὔτε φίλου οὔτε ἐχθροῦ; Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη, ἔπομαι. Εἰκότως γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ' ὧδε ἴσως ἀκολουθήσεις, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἐγὼ μᾶλλον εἴσομαι ὅ τι λέγω. ὁ κάμνων, νυνδὴ ἔφαμεν, τοῦ ἰατροῦ φίλος· οὐχ οὕτως; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν διὰ νόσον ἕνεκα ὑγιείας τοῦ ἰατροῦ φίλος; Ναί. Ἡ δέ γε νόσος κακόν; Πῶς δ' οὔ; Τί δὲ ὑγίεια; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ οὐδέτερα; Ἀγαθόν, ἔφη. Ἐλέγομεν δ' ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι τὸ σῶμα, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν ὄν, διὰ τὴν νόσον, τοῦτο δὲ διὰ τὸ κακόν, τῆς ἰατρικῆς φίλον ἐστίν· ἀγαθὸν δ' ἡ ἰατρική· ἕνεκα δὲ τῆς ὑγιείας τὴν φιλίαν ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἀνῄρηται· ἡ δὲ ὑγίεια ἀγαθόν. ἦ γάρ; Ναί. Φίλον δὲ ἢ οὐ φίλον ἡ ὑγίεια; Φίλον. Ἡ δὲ νόσος ἐχθρόν. Πάνυ γε. Τὸ οὔτε κακὸν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διὰ τὸ κακὸν καὶ τὸ ἐχθρὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φίλον ἐστὶν ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ φίλου. Φαίνεται. Ἕνεκα ἄρα τοῦ φίλου τὸ φίλον *τοῦ φίλου* φίλον διὰ τὸ ἐχθρόν. Ἔοικεν.

16. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα ἥκομεν, ὦ παῖδες, πρόσσχωμεν τὸν νοῦν μὴ ἐξαπατηθῶμεν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φίλον τοῦ φίλου τὸ φίλον γέγονεν, ἐῶ χαίρειν, καὶ τοῦ ὁμοίου γ' *ὅτι* τὸ ὅμοιον φίλον γίγνεται, ὃ ἔφαμεν ἀδύνατον εἶναι· ἀλλ' ὅμως τόδε σκεψώμεθα, μὴ ἡμᾶς ἐξαπατήσῃ τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον. ἡ ἰατρική, φαμέν, ἕνεκα τῆς ὑγιείας φίλον. Ναί. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια φίλον; Πάνυ γε. Εἰ ἄρα φίλον, ἕνεκά του. Ναί. Φίλου γέ τινος δή, εἴπερ ἀκολουθήσει τῇ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίᾳ. Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐκεῖνο φίλον αὖ ἔσται ἕνεκα φίλου; Ναί. Ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἀπειπεῖν ἡμᾶς οὕτως ἰόντας, ἢ ἀφικέσθαι ἐπί τινα ἀρχήν, ἣ οὐκέτ' ἐπανοίσει ἐπ' ἄλλο φίλον, [ἀλλ' ἥξει] ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο ὅ ἐστιν *τὸ* πρῶτον φίλον, οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα φαμὲν πάντα φίλα εἶναι; Ἀνάγκη. Τοῦτο δή ἐστιν ὃ λέγω, μὴ ἡμᾶς τἆλλα πάντα ἃ εἴπομεν ἐκείνου ἕνεκα φίλα εἶναι, ὥσπερ εἴδωλα ἄττα ὄντα αὐτοῦ, ἐξαπατᾷ, ἢ δ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ πρῶτον, ὃ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐστι φίλον. ἐννοήσωμεν γὰρ οὑτωσί· ὅταν τίς τι περὶ πολλοῦ ποιῆται, οἷόνπερ ἐνίοτε πατὴρ υἱὸν ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων χρημάτων προτιμᾷ, ὁ δὴ τοιοῦτος ἕνεκα τοῦ τὸν υἱὸν περὶ παντὸς ἡγεῖσθαι ἆρα καὶ ἄλλο τι ἂν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῖτο; οἷον εἰ αἰσθάνοιτο αὐτὸν κώνειον πεπωκότα, ἆρα περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῖτ' ἂν οἶνον, εἴπερ τοῦτο ἡγοῖτο τὸν υἱὸν σώσειν; Τί μήν; ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἀγγεῖον, ἐν ᾧ ὁ οἶνος ἐνείη; Πάνυ γε. Ἆρ' οὖν τότε οὐδὲν περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖται κύλικα κεραμέαν ἢ τὸν υἱὸν τὸν αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ τρεῖς κοτύλας οἴνου ἢ τὸν υἱόν; ἢ ὧδέ πως ἔχει· πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη σπουδὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐστὶν ἐσπουδασμένη, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἕνεκά του παρασκευαζομένοις, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ, οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα παρασκευάζεται. οὐχ ὅτι πολλάκις λέγομεν, ὡς περὶ πολλοῦ ποιούμεθα χρυσίον καὶ ἀργύριον· ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον οὕτω τό γε ἀληθὲς ἔχῃ· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν ὃ περὶ παντὸς ποιούμεθα, ὃ ἂν φανῇ ὄν, ὅτου ἕνεκα καὶ χρυσίον καὶ πάντα τὰ παρασκευαζόμενα παρασκευάζεται. ἆρ' οὕτως φήσομεν; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ φίλου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος; ὅσα γάρ φαμεν φίλα εἶναι ἡμῖν

ἕνεκα φίλου τινὸς ἑτέρου, ῥήματι φαινόμεθα λέγοντες αὐτό· φίλον δὲ τῷ ὄντι κινδυνεύει ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἰς ὃ πᾶσαι αὗται αἱ λεγόμεναι φιλίαι τελευτῶσιν. Κινδυνεύει οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχειν. Οὐκοῦν τό γε τῷ ὄντι φίλον οὐ φίλου τινὸς ἕνεκα φίλον ἐστίν; Ἀληθῆ.

17. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀπήλλακται, μὴ φίλου τινὸς ἕνεκα τὸ φίλον φίλον εἶναι· ἀλλ' ἆρα τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν φίλον; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Ἆρ' οὖν διὰ τὸ κακὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖται, καὶ ἔχει ὧδε· εἰ τριῶν ὄντων ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ μήτε ἀγαθοῦ μήτε κακοῦ, τὰ δύο λειφθείη, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἐκποδὼν ἀπέλθοι καὶ μηδενὸς ἐφάπτοιτο μήτε σώματος μήτε ψυχῆς μήτε τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ δή φαμεν αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτὰ οὔτε κακὰ εἶναι οὔτε ἀγαθά, ἆρα τότε οὐδὲν ἂν ἡμῖν χρήσιμον εἴη τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ἄχρηστον ἂν γεγονὸς εἴη; εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἡμᾶς ἔτι βλάπτοι, οὐδὲν ἂν οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δεοίμεθα, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἂν τότε γένοιτο κατάδηλον, ὅτι διὰ τὸ κακὸν τἀγαθὸν ἠγαπῶμεν καὶ ἐφιλοῦμεν, ὡς φάρμακον ὂν τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κακὸν νόσημα· νοσήματος δὲ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν δεῖ φαρμάκου. ἆρ' οὕτω πέφυκέ τε καὶ φιλεῖται τἀγαθὸν διὰ τὸ κακὸν ὑφ' ἡμῶν, τῶν μεταξὺ ὄντων τοῦ κακοῦ τε καὶ τἀγαθοῦ, αὐτὸ δ' ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα οὐδεμίαν χρείαν ἔχει; Ἔοικεν, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὕτως ἔχειν. Τὸ ἄρα φίλον ἡμῖν ἐκεῖνο, εἰς ὃ ἐτελεύτα πάντα τὰ ἄλλ', ἃ ἕνεκα ἑτέρου φίλου φίλα ἔφαμεν εἶναι, οὐδὲν δὴ τούτοις ἔοικεν. ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ φίλου ἕνεκα φίλα κέκληται, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὄντι φίλον πᾶν τοὐναντίον τούτου φαίνεται πεφυκός· φίλον γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀνεφάνη ὂν ἐχθροῦ ἕνεκα· εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐχθρὸν ἀπέλθοι, οὐκέτι, ὡς ἔοικ', ἔσθ' ἡμῖν φίλον. Οὔ μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὥς γε νῦν λέγεται. Πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς Διός, ἐὰν τὸ κακὸν ἀπόληται, οὐδὲ πεινῆν ἔτι ἔσται οὐδὲ διψῆν οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων; ἢ πείνη μὲν ἔσται, ἐάνπερ ἄνθρωποί τε καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα ᾖ, οὐ μέντοι βλαβερά γε; καὶ δίψα δὴ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἐπιθυμίαι, ἀλλ' οὐ κακαί, ἅτε τοῦ κακοῦ ἀπολωλότος; ἢ γελοῖον τὸ ἐρώτημα, ὅ τί ποτ' ἔσται τότε ἢ μὴ ἔσται; τίς γὰρ οἶδεν; ἀλλ' οὖν τόδε γ' ἴσμεν, ὅτι καὶ νῦν ἔστιν πεινῶντα βλάπτεσθαι,

ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ὠφελεῖσθαι. ἢ γάρ; Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ διψῶντα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων πάντων ἐπιθυμοῦντα ἔστιν ἐνίοτε μὲν ὠφελίμως ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἐνίοτε δὲ βλαβερῶς, ἐνίοτε δὲ μηδέτερα; Σφόδρα γε. Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν ἀπολλύηται τὰ κακά, ἅ γε μὴ τυγχάνει ὄντα κακά, τί προσήκει τοῖς κακοῖς συναπόλλυσθαι; Οὐδέν. Ἔσονται ἄρα αἱ μήτε ἀγαθαὶ μήτε κακαὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ ἐὰν ἀπόληται τὰ κακά. Φαίνεται. Οἷόν τε οὖν ἐστιν ἐπιθυμοῦντα καὶ ἐρῶντα τούτου οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ἐρᾷ μὴ φιλεῖν; Οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Ἔσται ἄρα καὶ τῶν κακῶν ἀπολομένων, ὡς ἔοικεν, φίλ' ἄττα. Ναί. Οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γε τὸ κακὸν αἴτιον ἦν τοῦ φίλον τι εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν τούτου ἀπολομένου φίλον ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ. αἰτίας γὰρ ἀπολομένης ἀδύνατόν που ἦν ἔτ' ἐκεῖνο εἶναι, οὗ ἦν αὕτη ἡ αἰτία. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις. Οὐκοῦν ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν τὸ φίλον φιλεῖν τι καὶ διά τι· καὶ ᾠήθημεν τότε γε διὰ τὸ κακὸν τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν; Ἀληθῆ. Νῦν δέ γε, ὡς ἔοικε, φαίνεται ἄλλη τις αἰτία τοῦ φιλεῖν τε καὶ φιλεῖσθαι. Ἔοικεν. Ἆρ' οὖν τῷ ὄντι, ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς φιλίας αἰτία, καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν φίλον ἐστὶν τούτῳ οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ τότε ὅταν ἐπιθυμῇ, ὃ δὲ τὸ πρότερον ἐλέγομεν φίλον εἶναι, ὕθλος τις ἦν, ὥσπερ ποίημα Κρόνῳ συγκείμενον; Κινδυνεύει, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τό γε ἐπιθυμοῦν, οὗ ἂν ἐνδεὲς ᾖ, τούτου ἐπιθυμεῖ. ἢ γάρ; Ναί. Τὸ δ' ἐνδεὲς ἄρα φίλον ἐκείνου οὗ ἂν ἐνδεὲς ᾖ; Δοκεῖ μοι. Ἐνδεὲς δὲ γίγνεται οὗ ἄν τι ἀφαιρῆται. Πῶς δ' οὔ; Τοῦ οἰκείου δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅ τε ἔρως καὶ ἡ φιλία καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τυγχάνει οὖσα, ὡς φαίνεται, ὦ Μενέξενέ τε καὶ Λύσι. Συνεφάτην. Ὑμεῖς ἄρα εἰ φίλοι ἐστὸν ἀλλήλοις, φύσει πῃ οἰκεῖοί ἐσθ' ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς. Κομιδῇ, ἐφάτην. Καὶ εἰ ἄρα τις ἕτερος ἑτέρου ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ παῖδες, ἢ ἐρᾷ, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐπεθύμει οὐδὲ ἤρα οὐδὲ ἐφίλει, εἰ μὴ οἰκεῖός πῃ τῷ ἐρωμένῳ ἐτύγχανεν ὢν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ κατά τι τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος ἢ τρόπους ἢ εἶδος. Πάνυ γε, ἔφη ὁ Μενέξενος· ὁ δὲ Λύσις ἐσίγησεν. Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. τὸ μὲν δὴ φύσει οἰκεῖον ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν πέφανται φιλεῖν. Ἔοικεν, ἔφη.

Ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τῷ γνησίῳ ἐραστῇ καὶ μὴ προσποιήτῳ φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν παιδικῶν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Λύσις καὶ ὁ Μενέξενος μόγις πως ἐπενευσάτην, ὁ δὲ Ἱπποθάλης ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς παντοδαπὰ ἠφίει χρώματα.

18. Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, βουλόμενος τὸν λόγον ἐπισκέψασθαι, Εἰ μέν τι τὸ οἰκεῖον τοῦ ὁμοίου διαφέρει, λέγοιμεν ἄν τι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὦ Λύσι τε καὶ Μενέξενε, περὶ φίλου, ὅ ἔστιν· εἰ δὲ ταὐτὸν τυγχάνει ὂν ὅμοιον τε καὶ οἰκεῖον, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀποβαλεῖν τὸν πρόσθεν λόγον, ὡς οὐ τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα ἄχρηστον· τὸ δὲ ἄχρηστον φίλον ὁμολογεῖν πλημμελές. Βούλεσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ ὥσπερ μεθύομεν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου, συγχωρήσωμεν καὶ φῶμεν ἕτερόν τι εἶναι τὸ οἰκεῖον τοῦ ὁμοίου; Πάνυ γε. Πότερον οὖν καὶ τἀγαθὸν οἰκεῖον φήσομεν παντί, τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἀλλότριον εἶναι; ἢ τὸ μὲν κακὸν τῷ κακῷ οἰκεῖον, τῷ δὲ ἀγαθῷ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τῷ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθῷ μήτε κακῷ τὸ μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακόν; Οὕτως ἐφάτην δοκεῖν σφίσιν ἕκαστον ἑκάστῳ οἰκεῖον εἶναι. Πάλιν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ παῖδες, οὗς τὸ πρῶτον λόγους ἀπεβαλόμεθα περὶ φιλίας, εἰς τούτους εἰσπεπτώκαμεν· ὁ γὰρ ἄδικος τῷ ἀδίκῳ καὶ ὁ κακὸς τῷ κακῷ οὐδὲν ἧττον φίλος ἔσται ἢ ὁ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ. Ἔοικεν, ἔφη. Τί δέ; τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἂν ταὐτὸν φῶμεν εἶναι, ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁ ἀγαθὸς τῷ ἀγαθῷ μόνον φίλος; Πάνυ γε. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦτό γε ᾠόμεθα ἐξελέγξαι ἡμᾶς αὐτούς· ἢ οὐ μέμνησθε; Μεμνήμεθα. Τί οὖν ἂν ἔτι χρησαίμεθα τῷ λόγῳ; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδέν; δέομαι οὖν, ὥσπερ οἱ σοφοὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, τὰ εἰρημένα ἅπαντα ἀναπεμπάσασθαι. εἰ γὰρ μήτε οἱ φιλούμενοι μήτε οἱ φιλοῦντες μήτε οἱ ὅμοιοι μήτε οἱ ἀνόμοιοι μήτε οἱ ἀγαθοὶ μήτε οἱ οἰκεῖοι μήτε τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα διεληλύθαμεν — οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἔτι μέμνημαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους — ἀλλ' εἰ μηδὲν τούτων φίλον ἐστίν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκέτι ἔχω τί λέγω.

Ταῦτα δ' εἰπὼν ἐν νῷ εἶχον ἄλλον ἤδη τινὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων κινεῖν· κᾆτα, ὥσπερ δαίμονές τινες, προσελθόντες οἱ παιδαγωγοί, ὅ τε τοῦ Μενεξένου καὶ ὁ τοῦ Λύσιδος, ἔχοντες αὐτῶν τοὺς ἀδελφούς, παρεκάλουν καὶ ἐκέλευον αὐτοὺς οἴκαδ' ἀπιέναι·

ἤδη γὰρ ἦν ὀψέ· τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ οἱ περιεστῶτες αὐτοὺς ἀπηλαύνομεν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐφρόντιζον ἡμῶν, ἀλλ' ὑποβαρβαρίζοντες ἠγανάκτουν τε καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐκάλουν, καὶ ἐδόκουν ἡμῖν ὑποπεπωκότες ἐν τοῖς Ἑρμαίοις ἄποροι εἶναι προσφέρεσθαι, ἡττηθέντες οὖν αὐτῶν διελύσαμεν τὴν συνουσίαν. ὅμως δ' ἔγωγε ἤδη ἀπιόντων αὐτῶν, Νῦν μέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Λύσι τε καὶ Μενέξενε, καταγέλαστοι γεγόναμεν ἐγώ τε, γέρων ἀνήρ, καὶ ὑμεῖς. ἐροῦσι γὰρ οἵδε ἀπιόντες ὡς οἰόμεθα ἡμεῖς ἀλλήλων φίλοι εἶναι — καὶ ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐν ὑμῖν τίθημι — οὔπω δὲ ὅ τι ἔστιν ὁ φίλος οἷοί τε ἐγενόμεθα ἐξευρεῖν.

COMMENTARY.

ABBREVIATIONS.

G., Goodwin's Greek Grammar.
G M T., Goodwin's Greek Moods and Tenses.
H., Hadley-Allen's Greek Grammar.
M., Meisterhans, Grammatik der Attischen Inschriften.
R., Riddell's Digest of Platonic Idioms.
Schm., Schmelzer's annotated edition of the dialogues.

The opening lines closely resemble the beginning of the Lysis or the Republic, and have been imitated in several non-Platonic dialogues. Though the sentences are so simple and natural, they were doubtless elaborated with great care. The story goes that after Plato's death a tablet was found, containing the first few lines of the Republic written and re-written, each time in a different order, showing that the author subjected his work to a constant revision.

P. **1.** 1. ἐκ and ἀπὸ are often synonymous. So in inscriptions we find ἐκ and also ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἄθω (Meisth. 173).

Potidaea, a Corinthian colony situated on the western arm of the Chalcidian peninsula, revolted from the Delian Confederacy in 432 B.C. An Athenian army of 3000 hoplites, sent to reduce the city to submission, met a large force of Corinthians and Chalcidians before Potidaea, and, after a brief engagement, was victorious. The defeated army was driven within the walls, the city was blockaded by the Athenians on land and sea, and since the entire army was not needed for the siege, some of the soldiers, among whom was Socrates, returned home. Our dialogue is accordingly supposed to take place in the year before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when Socrates was about 37 years of age. Grote, VI. 67–75, Thuc. I. 62–4.

2. διὰ χρόνου, "after a long absence."

οἷον ("as"), like οἷα and ἅτε (cf. l. 8, **19.** 16, **21.** 23, **73.** 32), gives a reason on the writer's authority, ὡς is non-committal, and puts the responsibility elsewhere. H. 977–8, G. 1574–5.

3. συνήθεις διατριβάς, "my usual occupation" (conversation).

The palaestra was a stretch of trodden earth, where the young men wrestled (παλαίειν) and exercised in the open air, and was surrounded by

colonnades. The opportunity for meeting the youthful athletes in the moments of rest or idleness made it a favorite resort for Socrates and other teachers. Cf. **29.** 8.

The sacred enclosure of Basile, which she shared with Codrus and Neleus (v. App.), was situated near the Itonian gate. This goddess has been identified by Wieseler with Athena and by Loeschke with Magna Mater (cf. Harrison, Myth. and Mon. 51, 229), but the recent theory advanced by E. Meyer (Herm. XXX. 287) seems the most satisfactory. He believes that Neleus ("pitiless") and Basile ("queen") were the earliest Athenian gods of the dead, and cites a relief (found 1893) which represents the Attic hero Echelos carrying away Basile in his chariot, an evident parallel to the rape of Persephone.

14. *πολλοὺς . . . τεθνάναι.* The actual loss was 150 men (Thuc. I. 63).

The *-ι* appended to *οὕτως* indicated that a gesture accompanies the word (so **72.** 17, cf. **11.** 14, **26.** 3, **27.** 11, *τουτί* **10.** 25), and is necessarily colloquial and familiar.

15. *ἐπιεικῶς ἀληθῆ*, a colloquial expression, "fairly correct"; nearly equivalent to *ἱκανῶς* (**53.** 25).

16. *παρεγένου μέν;* *μέν* expects an affirmative answer.

παρεγενόμην. The repetition in the answer of a word contained in the question is the most frequent form of reply in the Charm. (22 cases), and is used here more (proportionately) than in any other dialogue. *πάνυ γε* and *ναί* are also very common.

Δεῦρο, a familiar ellipsis, like our "Here!" for "Come here!"

18. *ἄγων.* *ἀγαγών* would be more logical, but the present participle, like the present imperative, of *ἄγω* is more common than the aorist, perhaps owing to the continuity inherent in the meaning of the verb. Cf. Od. 1. 30.

21. *ἀνέροιτο.* The so-called "iterative optative," really a past general supposition, which gains generic force from the repetition implied in the leading verb (*διηγούμην*). There is no iteration in the optative itself. H. 894, G. 1393. 2, G M T. 462, R. 77. Cf. **12.** 31.

ἠρώτων ἄλλος ἄλλος. Cf. l. 7, *ἠσπάζοντο ἄλλος ἀλλοθεν*, Sym. 220 C. *θαυμάζοντες ἄλλος ἄλλῳ ἔλεγεν.*

2. 1. *περί τε τῶν νέων.* This the only place in the Charm. where single *τε* is used, and it is very rare in the earlier dialogues, but it becomes frequent in the later works; the Timaeus, in particular, has as many as two hundred. *τὰ νῦν* for *νῦν* is also characteristic of the later period (v. Introd. p. x).

2–8. Note the detailed color, the broad and leisurely tone given by the accumulation of participles in this section; there are five in a bunch at the beginning (v. A. J. P. IX. 137 ff.).

11. *ὑόν* is expressed here for the sake of contrast with *ἀνεψιόν* (cf. Prot. 310 A, Euthyd. 275 A), otherwise it would be omitted.

13. Charmides is called *μειράκιον* here, *νεανίσκος* in l. 27, *νεανίας* in **3.** 9, and *ἀνήρ* in **2.** 32. The first is the most exact designation, about 14 years old, between *παῖς* and *νέος*; the second implies no definite age; the third connotes vigor and youthful strength; and the last is a general term applicable to any male person. A similar interchange of these synonyms is seen in Ant. 3 δ. 6–8, Hdt. III. 53, Prot. 309 A.

16. *Ἐμοὶ — οὐδὲν σταθμητόν*, "you must not judge by me."

17. *λευκὴ στάθμη εἰμί*. Like many other proverbs, *λευκὴ στάθμη* is elliptical, and the full form, as given by Sophocles (in a fragment), is *λευκῷ λίθῳ λευκὴ στάθμη*. Socrates means that fair youths are all so attractive to him that an individual makes no more impression on him than "a chalk line on marble." Socrates was very fond of proverbs (cf. [**13.** 27], **16.** 5, **22.** 20, [**32.** 12], **37.** 3, 5, **49.** 8, 12, **50.** 12, **54.** 18, **57.** 18, **59.** 20, **66.** 23, **69.** 6, **71.** 12), and quotes more than a hundred during his participation in the Platonic dialogues; their use is in keeping with his familiar style (v. Introd. p. xv).

ἀτεχνῶς is often used in comparisons and with proverbs (cf. **37.** 5), less commonly with metaphors (Euthyd. 303 E), just as *ὡς ἀληθῶς* and *τῷ ὄντι* (**38.** 27, **49.** 12). *ἀτεχνῶς* is especially frequent in Ar. and Pl., but rare elsewhere; this shows that its sphere is colloquial.

18. *ἀτάρ* always stands the first word in the sentence, and presents a sudden contrast. It is poetic and at the same time familiar.

19. *τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος*. Cf. **6.** 13 *καλλίων καὶ μείζων*. A commanding figure was prized as highly as a fair face in the estimation of manly beauty.

21. *ἡνίκα* is more exact than *ὅτε*, to which it bears the same relation as *καιρός* to *χρόνος*; "at the moment that he entered." Cf. Pind. P. 1. 48.

23. *τὸ μὲν ἡμέτερον*, "our (admiration)."

26. *ὥσπερ ἄγαλμα*. So Aristaenetus calls Laïs *ἔμψυχος τῆς Ἀφροδίτης εἰκών* (I. 1), and we often say, "as pretty as a picture."

29. *ἀποδῦναι*, "take off his clothes," to exercise in the palaestra.

εἰ ἐθέλοι, δόξει. The eager expectation of Charmides causes a change from the optative conclusion to the certain indicative future. It is the reverse in **5.** 2–4.

31. *Ἡράκλεις*, cf. **60.** 33, also *νὴ Δία* l. 11, **9.** 32, **46.** 16; *μὰ (τὸν) Δία* **41.** 10, **44.** 3, **47.** 5, **55.** 18, **60.** 32, **69.** 4; *νὴ τὸν κύνα* **22.** 11 (v. Note); *νὴ τοὺς θεούς* **49.** 24; *πρὸς Διός* **61.** 31, **67.** 12, **73.** 28. Socrates swears more freely than any other Platonic interlocutor, and is very fond of interjections (cf. *βαβαί* **71.** 11, his favorite). We see from Ar. that *νὴ Δία* was common in low life, and Demosthenes uses it four times as often as all the other orators together

(Rehd.-Bl. Ind.). These two great men swore so freely that they exhausted the supply of oaths commonly used, and had to borrow from the women. So "by Athena" was a favorite oath of Demosthenes, and "by Hera" of Socrates (cf. **29.** 32).

32. *τυγχάνει προσόν*, "is perhaps added."

3. 3. *τί οὐκ ἀπεδύσαμεν αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ τοῦτο;* The aorist regularly follows *τί οὐ*, since the surprise that the deed has not been done is equivalent to a demand that it be done at once (Krüger). Cf. l. 8, and often. The present is sometimes found, as Prot. 310 E, though the aorist was used 310 A. Tr. "Why not investigate (*lit.* lay bare) this very point?" The thought and language appear again in I Alc. 132 A. — *τοῦτο*, like *ταῦτα* in the line above, refers to *τὴν ψυχήν*; v. Note **34.** 24.

πρότερον τοῦ εἴδους, "before the body."

4. *πάντως* means "surely"; so **63.** 15, and always in answers, whereas it usually means "at any rate" (cf. **9.** 31).

7. *τοῦτο τὸ καλόν*, *i.e.* poetic skill.

8. *τῆς Σόλωνος συγγενείας*, v. Note **6.** 8.

10. *οὐδὲ αἰσχρὸν ἂν ἦν κτλ.* The Athenian boys were always attended by a *παιδαγωγός*, a faithful slave who took them to and from the school and gymnasium. They were taught to be modest and retiring, and the peculiar conditions of Athenian society made a chaperon as necessary to them as to the girls. The classic description of a guarded education is given in Ar. Nub. 961–83 (cf. Luc. Amor. 44), and Autolycus in Xenophon's Symposium is an example of a model boy.

12. Παῖ, but *ὦ Σώκρατες*. Contrast *ὦ παῖ* **62.** 29. The omission of *ὦ* is as unusual in Greek as is the insertion of O in Latin. It gives a more earnest or rougher tone, and is appropriate to commands, reproaches, or eager requests (cf. **50.** 29 *Νικία*, Sym. 172 A, etc.).

14. *ἀσθενείας ἧς*. This attraction of the relative to the case of its antecedent is post-Homeric,[1] but common in Hdt. and all Attic authors except Euripides. Cf. **70.** 1, R. 189 a, H. 994, G. 1031.

15. *βαρύνεσθαι τὴν κεφαλήν*, "to have a headache."

18. *μόνον ἐλθέτω*, cf. Phaedo 63 E *ἀλλὰ μόνον τὸ ἑαυτοῦ παρασκευαζέτω*, Menex. 236 C *ἀλλὰ μόνον εἰπέ*.

ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἐγένετο. Cf. Euth'o 4 D *ὅπερ οὖν καὶ ἔπαθεν* and Euthyd. 283 A *ὅπερ οὖν καὶ συνέβη*, all formulae of transition.

22. *τὸν μὲν — κατεβάλομεν*, "we made one man stand up, and we pushed the other man off the end of the bench." Their excitement was so great that

[1] The case cited from Homer by Riddell is a partitive genitive, and not attraction at all.

they made room for two people instead of one. The whole tone of this passage is playful and ironical, and must not be taken too seriously. The sportive metaphors *ἀνήγετο* ("set sail") and *περιέρρεον* ("a regular flood"), the mock solemnity of the poetic quotation, and the exaggerated phrases *οὐκέτι ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ* ("all out-of-doors") and *ὑπὸ τοῦ θρέμματος ἐαλωκέναι*, all show that Socrates is giving free rein to his humorous fancy. His confusion is no more real than his perplexity a little later (**18.** 20), or the dizziness (**69.** 5) which he pretends that Protagoras' eloquence produced (Prot. 328 D). Moreover, the style of his conversation is patronizing and paternal, not at all in the manner of a lover (cf. **26.** 9). However, most scholars agree that "a sensual element was the innocent foundation of his intellectual inclination" (Zeller), and his features are those of a man naturally gross (v. Introd. p. xiv). Alcibiades, though he mentions Charmides as one of the favorites of Socrates (Sym. 222 B), bears emphatic testimony to the absolute purity of the philosopher's life (id. 219 C). Furthermore, Xenophon, whose purpose was to defend Socrates from all calumny, reports language as erotic as any in our dialogue (Sym. 4. 28), and he also tells how his master reproved the failings of others (Mem. I. 2. 29, 3. 8), as he could not have done unless his own life was blameless.

27. *ἀμήχανόν τι οἷον*, "I can't tell you how." *ἀμήχανόν τι* is more usually joined with *ὅσον* or *ὡς* (Rep. 527 E), like *θαυμαστὸν ὅσον* (**33.** 18), and is so used often by Plato, to whom this colloquial phrase is peculiar.

29. *ὦ γεννάδα*. Similar forms of address are *ὦ γενναῖος* (Phaedr. 227 C), *γενναιότατε* (ib. 235 D), *μακάριε* (**5.** 12, **15.** 22, **50.** 20), *ἀγαθέ, βέλτιστε* (**11.** 11, **48.** 12), and *ἄριστε* (**40.** 30, **50.** 25, **61.** 22), *φιλότης, φίλε* and *φίλη κεφαλή* (Ion 531 D), *θαυμάσιε, δαιμόνιε* (**52.** 31). Contrast *ὦ μαρέ* **9.** 27 (v. Note). Each has its peculiar force, according to the context (v. Campb. Theaet. p. 283).

31. *Κυδίαν*. This is the only fragment of a poet of whom nothing is known, and some words have probably been lost from the quotation. As it stands, the sense seems to be, "Take care lest the fawn come in sight of the lion and be devoured." The fawn is the lover, and the lion is the beloved who awakens the devouring passion (cf. Hor. Od. III. 20). There was a proverb, *μὴ πρὸς λέοντα δορκὰς ἄψωμαι μάχης*.

4. 4. Though Demosthenes mentions incantations contemptuously (25. 80), their use was not confined to the lower classes (Aesch. Eum. 618). They consisted in the repetition of the names of gods, or of mystic, unintelligible words, like our "counting-out" rhymes, and were used more especially to drive away snakes or bugs, to win love (Theoc. 2), or to aid childbirth (Theaet. 149 C), though they were a recognized remedy in popular medical

practice (cf. Rep. 426 B, Euthyd. 290 A). The φύλλον here mentioned may have been a sort of amulet; such was the moly used by Odysseus, such was the laurel leaf put in the mouth on leaving a house, so to-day people carry horse-chestnuts to avert rheumatism.

10. τοὔνομά μου σὺ ἀκριβοῖς; "Are you sure about my name?" Εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε, "If I am not mistaken."

11. οὐ — σοῦ ὀλίγος λόγος ἐστίν. περί σου might be expected, but we find the same use in ὧν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, Apol. 26 B, etc. So the Greek could say λέγειν τινά, instead of περί τινος. Cf. Note **23**. 13.

περὶ τῆς ἐπῳδῆς οἷα τυγχάνει οὖσα. The subject of the relative clause is anticipated. This prolepsis is especially common in Plato; cf. **9**. 19, **13**. 3–4, **18**. 18, **20**. 10, **57**. 31. It is most frequently used with verbs of knowing and fearing, and a person is generally the object of the verb.

16. μὴ δύνασθαι τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον — ἀλλ'. There is no conclusion to this premise, for the construction changes at ὥσπερ and an independent sentence begins. Again, λέγουσι (dat. plu. of ppl.) does not agree with ἰατρῶν, as grammatical consistency requires, but with the intervening αὐτοῖς. This looseness and irregularity of structure is characteristic of Socrates' manner of speaking (v. Introd. p. xv.).

25. Stallbaum explains ταῦτα as the object of λέγουσι and also the subject of ἔχει, but it is simpler to take ταῦτα with λέγουσι alone and οὕτως with ἔχει, *i.e.* ταῦτα λέγουσι καὶ οὕτως ἔχει.

30. καὶ εἶπον. In the earlier dialogues εἶπον precedes the sentence quoted, ἔφην and ἦν δ' ἐγώ are interposed.

31. τὸ ταύτης τῆς ἐπῳδῆς. τό ("this matter of") gives a strong demonstrative force, and, since pointing is vulgar, it is decidedly familiar in tone.

32. Zalmoxis. The Greeks had a legend that Zalmoxis was a Thracian slave of Pythagoras, who, obtaining his freedom, returned to his native country, where he taught the doctrine of immortality. To prove his thesis, he hid himself in a subterranean chamber for three years, and made his friends believe, when he returned, that he had been living in the other world (Hdt. IV. 94–6). The story was evidently invented for purposes of ridicule. Incantations are often derived from Thrace and ascribed to Musaeus or Orpheus (Eur. Alc. 968), while Thessaly was famous for its magic (Gorg. 513 A). The same association of mystery with distant lands leads Theocritus to make Assyria (II. 162) responsible for his love-charm, and Lucian (Nekyo. 6) to refer his sorcery to Zoroaster.

33. ἀπαθανατίζειν, "make men immortal," with the underlying meaning, "teach that men are immortal." This was the region where the Orphic rites originated.

33–34. *λέγονται — ἔλεγεν — ἔλεγον — λέγοιεν — λέγει.* The Greeks in general, and Plato in particular, had no objection to the frequent repetition of a word, although extreme cases, like the above, give a certain naïveté and imitate the freedom of living conversation. Cf. **16.** 30–31 *βούλεται*, **29.** 32 f. *ὀρθοῖς*, **30.** 7–9 *ἔπαινος*, **32.** 34 f. *ναῦς*, **39.** 15–16 *ἔδωκας*, **48.** 25–7, 30–1 *λέγειν* (v. Note). In **71.** 34 the disagreeable accumulation of *φίλον φίλον κτλ.* is essential to philosophic accuracy. Almost identical phrases recur often (v. Note **33.** 22) in the same way. Isocrates was the first to attach importance to variety of phraseology, and English style has learned through Cicero to follow his example.

5. 2–4. *οὐ δεῖ*, then *εἴη*. The change from the indicative to the optative may mark a transition from fact to inference, and may also be due to the need of emphasizing the dependence of the verb, as it is further removed from the principal clause. Cf. Note **2.** 29, R. 282. For the indicative *δεῖ* cf. *εἰ μέλλει* in l. 10. Artistic authors are more likely to keep the indicative in *orat. obl.*, so it is more common in Thucydides than in Xenophon.

4. *τοῦ διαφεύγειν.* Plato, Euripides, and Xenophon use the genitive of the articular infinitive with great freedom, but the dative is unusual. In Plato the present is much the most common tense (A. J. P. III. 193).

6. *οὗ ἔχοντος.* The genitive absolute (cf. **21.** 12–13) is rarely found in Plato and the poets; it belongs to the narrative, and is frequently and skilfully used by the great orators. The construction with the relative pronoun is very unusual (cf. l. 14, I Alc. 127 B); only fifteen cases are found in all the orators (A. J. P. VI. 310).

7. *πάντα ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς κτλ.* Cf. Rep. 403 D.

10–14. Notice how each clause in this section begins with the emphatic word of the preceding clause (Schm.). This is the same chain-figure that is so impressive in the first chapter of John's gospel.

17. *ὅπως — μηδείς σε πείσει*, "Don't let any one persuade you." This elliptical or independent use of *ὅπως* is familiar in tone, but as forcible as the imperative. In fact, it is an exact equivalent, as may clearly be seen from Ar. Ran. 377 *ἔμβα χὤπως* (*καὶ ὅπως*) *ἀρεῖς*. It is mostly confined to Plato and Aristophanes (A. J. P. IV. 4), H. 886, G. 1352, G M T. 271–4. For the mood, v. App.

21. *ἑκατέρου* depends on *ἰατροί*, v. App.

22. *πλούσιον οὕτω.* This adverb is found after the modified adjective in Phaedr. 256 E, Rep. 500 A; so *πάνυ* and *λίαν* often, sometimes *πολύ*.

23–24. *ἐγὼ οὖν — πείσομαι οὖν.* *οὖν* is often repeated after a parenthesis, just as *ἄν* may appear twice (v. Note **34.** 1) or even thrice (Apol. 31 A) in the course of a long sentence. R. 266.

26. ἐπᾷσαι, "to be treated."

30–31. διάνοια and σῶμα are often thus contrasted (Rep. 371 E, 395 D, Prot. 326 B, etc.). A still more common antithesis is that of λόγος and ἔργον, which Thucydides in particular presents with wearisome persistency (cf. Rep. 396 A).

33. τῇ ἰδέᾳ, "human form" (cf. **25.** 13), like εἶδος in **2.** 30.

34. οὗ τὴν ἐπῳδήν. The construction follows the analogy of φάρμακον, which often signifies *a means of obtaining*, rather than *a remedy for*; so μνήμης τε καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον εὑρέθη (Phaedr. 274 E).

6. 2. εἰς ὅσον ἡλικίας ἥκει, "considering his age."

4. πᾶσιν, dative of manner (respect). H. 780, G. 1182.

5. οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι ἄλλον οὐδένα κτλ. Two ideas are blended in this sentence, "No one can show a lineage better than his," and "No one *else* can boast of such a lineage." γεννήσειαν from γεννάω, causal of γίγνομαι. "What two families in alliance would be likely to produce a nobler and better (son)?"

8. ἥ τε γὰρ πατρῷα ὑμῖν οἰκία. This was Eupatrid on both sides; v. Introd. p. vii. In the following scheme it is not certain whether Solon is the brother or only the cousin of Dropides.



ὑμῖν is the dative of reference concentrated so as to include the idea of possession. R. 28.

9. Anacreon was the court poet of Hipparchus, son of Pisistratus, for some eight years (522–514 B.C.), and during his stay in Athens made many friends among the noble families. He is especially famous for his songs of wine and love. — Solon was as great a poet as he was a legislator; by his elegies he stirred his countrymen to warlike action and gave them wise counsel. It was in his youth that he wrote love songs and celebrated the praises of his friends. His poems were so highly esteemed that they were sung at

the national festivals and often quoted by the orators. Plato cites him **38.** 10, **39.** 6, **65.** 9.

12. Pyrilampes may be the same as the friend of Pericles (Plut. Per. 13), who was famous for his peacocks. He had two sons, Demus, who was very beautiful (Ar. Vesp. 98, Gorg. 481 D), and Antiphon, who is one of the speakers in the Parmenides. Nothing is known about his embassies, but Demus received a gold cup and sixteen minas from the King (Lys. 19. 25), and this may point to a hereditary friendship in the family.

18. *οὐδένα — ὑποβεβηκέναι*, "inferior in no way to any of your predecessors"; v. App.

20. *ἱκανῶς πέφυκας*, "you are well enough equipped."

μακάριόν σε — ἡ μήτηρ ἔτικτεν. This is imitated from such Homeric passages as Od. 3. 95, and may have become proverbial. Cf. Note **9.** 16.

24. Abaris belongs to the same company as Zalmoxis, Orpheus, and the other fabulous magicians. He is said to have subsisted without food, and bearing an arrow, the token of Apollo's favor, to have come to Athens and saved all Greece from pestilence by certain sacrifices.

28. *Ἀνερυθριάσας.* Cf. **56.** 2, **66.** 5, Prot. 312 A, Euthyd. 275 D; v. Introd. p. xvi.

30. *τὸ αἰσχυντηλόν*, v. Note **9.** 9.

οὐκ ἀγεννῶς, v. Note **13.** 33.

32. *ἐξάρνῳ* agrees with *αὐτῷ* understood, and this depends on *ῥᾴδιον.*

33. *αὐτὸν καθ' ἑαυτοῦ λέγειν.* Αὐτός is often used with the reflexive when the action is unnatural or difficult. Cf. **17.** 26 *αὐτὴ αὑτῆς ἀκούσεται*; G. 997. **13.** 12–13, however (*ἀγνοοῦντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτόν*), may be merely emphatic (so **18.** 33, **31.** 18, **38.** 28) and **16.** 3 for contrast with *τοὺς ἄλλους.*

7. 3. *εἶπον ὅτι — φαίνει*, v. Note **14.** 17.

5. *σκεπτέον* and *ποιητέον* are the two most common forms of the verbal in *-τέος*, which is frequent in Euripides, Aristophanes, Plato, and Xenophon, and is familiar in tone.

7. *εἰ οὖν σοι φίλον.* Formula for beginning a discussion; cf. *εἰ οὖν μή τι διαφέρει* (**37.** 19) or *κωλύει* (Prot. 310 A), and *εἴ τι βούλεσθε* (ib. 317 C). Cf. Note **22.** 31.

τούτου γε ἕνεκα, "so far as this is concerned." *οὗτος* usually refers to the second person; here *τούτου* means "your scruple." *ὅδε* is the regular demonstrative of the first person; cf. Note **29.** 21, also Soph. El. 387.

16. *οὐκοῦν τούτου γε — αὐτὸ κτλ.* *αὐτό* is not pleonastic, but repeats the demonstrative *τοῦτο*, in the same way that *αὐτός* replaces a noun after some words have intervened. R. 223. Cf. also Thuc. IV. 93, Xen. Cyr. I. 3. 15 *πειράσομαι τῷ πάππῳ ἀγαθῶν ἱππέων κράτιστος ὢν ἱππεὺς συμμαχεῖν αὐτῷ.*

26. *εἴ τι λέγουσιν*, "if they are right." Cf. Note **31.** 34.

27. *πάνυ γε*, v. Note **1.** 16.

28. *ἐν γραμματιστοῦ*, v. App. **3.** 30 *ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ*. Cf. Note **54.** 23. Tr. *ἐν*, "with."

τὰ ὅμοια γράμματα, *i.e.* letters like the copy.

27–34. This section contains an epitome of ordinary Greek education: 1. *γράμματα*, consisting of writing and reading from the epic and gnomic poets. 2. Playing upon the lyre. 3. Gymnastic exercises, as here enumerated.

32. *παγκρατιάζειν*. The pancration was a combination of wrestling and boxing, a sort of "free fight," which lasted till one party was exhausted or admitted defeat. In the pancration the hands were bare, but in boxing (*πυκτεύειν*) they were covered with strips of leather studded with nails.

34. *ὀξέως καὶ ταχύ*. *ταχύς* is *swift*, *ὀξύς* is *quick*, implying bold, decisive action. Plato uses pairs of synonyms, not for stylistic effect, like Isocrates, but to give greater clearness of definition. Cf. **29.** 23 *ἑταίρω τε καὶ φίλω*, **56.** 5 *φαῦλος καὶ ἄχρηστος*, **68.** 10 *ἀγαπᾶν καὶ φιλεῖν* (v. Note).

8. 10. *κάλλιον καὶ σφόδρα μᾶλλον ἤ*. Here *μᾶλλον* is not superfluous, but adds force to the comparison. The addition is natural when other words intervene, as here. Cf. Phaedo 79 E, *ὁμοιότερόν ἐστι ψυχῇ τῷ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μή*, Xen. Sym. 1. 4, but in Gorg. 487 A, *αἰσχυντηροτέρω μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος*, there is no such excuse. The pleonasm is as old as Homer, and common in Shakespeare and other early English writers. R. 166.

19. *τοῦτο δρῶν*. The verb is often repeated by the substitution of *δράω*. Cf. **10.** 8, **21.** 26, etc. *ποιέω* (Ar. Plut. 524, etc.) and *πράττω* (Aesch. 1. 25) are less common. R. 55.

25. *ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου* ("according to this argument"). Cf. **4.** 23, Gorg. 516 D, I Alc. 116 C. Similar formulae for drawing a conclusion are *ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων* **13.** 9, Gorg. 477 C (the most common form), *ἐκ τῶν (προ) εἰρημένων* Phaedo 94 A, etc., and *ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν* I Alc. 118 A, etc.

26. *τὰ ἕτερα*, "one or the other."

28. *εἰ δ' οὖν ὅτι μάλιστα — οὖσαι*. "Or supposing that (*εἰ — μάλιστα*) of the nobler actions (*καλλίους οὖσαι*) there are as many (*μηδὲν ἐλάττους*) quite as quick and vehement" (Jow.). *οὖσαι* has to do double duty, being complementary to *τυγχάνουσιν* with *ἐλάττους* and descriptive with *καλλίους*; v. App.

31. *μᾶλλόν τι — ἡσυχιότης τις*. Cf. *πράττειν τι*, **10.** 10. The indefinite *τις*, like Lat. *quidam*, gently qualifies the statement, and is thus used very often in Plato; so l. 34 *τῶν καλῶν τι*, **13.** 33, **33.** 21 (v. Note).

31–34. Though the definition is here rejected as insufficient, the *κόσμιοι* (cf. *κοσμίως*, **7.** 22) are mentioned with the *σώφρονες* in the Gorgias (506 E) and *αἰδώς* is coupled with *δίκη* in the Protagoras (322 C D).

9. 4. *εἰς σεαυτὸν ἀποβλέψας*. Introspection is an unusual element in Platonic dialectic, although Socrates taught self-knowledge (v. Note **13.** 14), to which introspection is the chief means.

πάντα συλλογισάμενος, so Gorg. 476 B *διασκεψάμενος εἰπέ*.

6. *εἰπὲ εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως*, so Gorg. 521 A *εὖ καὶ γενναίως*.

10. *αἰδώς* is *modesty*, which regards other people, while *αἰσχύνη* is *shame*, which considers one's self. The difference appears best in Eur. Hec. 968. Aristotle (Eth. Nic. 4. 9) shows that *αἰδώς* is a virtue, *αἰσχύνη* a vice; yet they are often synonymous, as here.

15. *καλῶς λέγειν*. The infinitive is not governed directly by *πιστεύεις*, but is added to make the meaning clearer; this is called the epexegetic infinitive, and is common. Cf. *εἰδέναι* **51.** 25.

Ὁμήρῳ πιστεύεις; So Socrates asks *Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέτης εἶ*, Prot. 309 A. The quotation here is from Od. 17. 347; cf. **22.** 20, **41.** 25, **54.** 24, **66.** 20. The Homeric poems were an important part of every boy's education (v. Note **7.** 27–34), so that Homer became as familiar to the Greek as our Bible is to us. Indeed, this constant influence on the style and thought of Greek writers is as powerful as that of King James' Version on English literature. So Plato, though he banishes Homer from his ideal state, is constrained to quote from the great epic most frequently, — in fact, more than a hundred times, — and shows great accuracy and appreciation of the meaning. Hesiod held somewhat the same position, so that Lysis recognizes readily the quotation selected by Socrates (**66.** 22; cf. **11.** 30).

16. *κεχρημένῳ*, "needy."

26. *τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν* was an old and popular maxim, as appears from Tim. 72 A and from Rep. 433 A, where it is proposed as a definition of justice, but its ambiguity is a serious defect. It may mean, "Mind your own business," or "Remain in private life," or "Do your duty" (v. Introd. p. xvi).

27. *ὦ μαρέ*. Cf. **23.** 29. Contrast **3.** 29 (Note). This playful abuse appears again in Phaedr. 236 E, Theag. 124 E, and is parallel to *ὑβριστὴς* or *πανοῦργος εἶ* in Sym. 175 E. Meno 80 B, etc.

30. *ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Χαρμίδης*. *ὅς* is the article with its original demonstrative force, kept also in the phrase *καὶ ὅς*. Cf. *καὶ τόν* **62.** 3. *ἦ δ' ὅς* has become so absolutely a phrase that it is practically equivalent to *ἔφη* and takes *Χαρμίδης* as a fresh subject. So *ἦ δ' ὅς ἂν ἀνήρ* Ar. Lys. 514. In later times its meaning was so completely obscured that grammarians gloss it by *ἔφασαν*, or even *ὦ φίλε*. In Plato it never stands first.

32. The Socratic elenchus is no respecter of persons, but seeks only the truth; cf. Prot. 348 C, Phil. 14 B, Phaedr. 275 C, also **15.** 14–24.

34. *ὅτι δὴ τί γε;* "Because what?" sc. *γίγνεται.* The shift of attitude is due to a sort of self-interruption. Cf. Rep. 343 A, 449 B.

10. 6. *ὑμᾶς διδάσκειν, i.e.* to write your own names, too.

8. *πολυπραγμονεῖν* is the recognized opposite of *τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν,* cf. Rep. 433 A–D.

13. *πράττειν δήπου τί, i.e. πράττειν τι δήπου.*

16. *λήκυθον καὶ στλεγγίδας.* These hung from the girdle of every well-dressed Athenian youth, especially when visiting the palaestra, so that the illustration includes the entire visible costume. Cf. II Hipp. 368 B C *ἃ εἶχες περὶ τὸ σῶμα — δακτύλιον — καὶ στλεγγίδα καὶ λήκυθον.* Hippias, at any rate, fulfilled the conditions of our dialogue, for he had himself made everything that he wore.

18. *ἐργάζεσθαί τε καὶ πράττειν.* Cf. Note **11.** 29.

22. *Ἠινίττετο,* "used symbolic language," lit. "riddles."

26. *παντὸς μᾶλλον,* cf. **11.** 2, **20.** 25, **71.** 2, and *πάντων μάλιστα* **7.** 8; tr. "surely."

31. *μηδὲ τὸν λέγοντα μηδὲν εἰδέναι.* In I Alc. Socrates tells Alcibiades that he is in just this predicament (113 B, etc.), and the dialogue is devoted to a proof of his statement. The Prot. and Gorg. show clearly that the great sophists were equally ignorant, although it is not put in so many words. — *μηδὲ — εἰδέναι,* "not even the speaker knew."

32. *εἰς τὸν Κριτίαν ἀπέβλεπεν.* Protagoras, too, casts a deprecatory side-glance at Hippias (Prot. 318 E).

33. *ἀγωνιῶν.* Cf. **63.** 7. Protagoras (333 E) suffers in the same way (*τετραχύνθαι τε καὶ ἀγωνιᾶν καὶ παρατετάχθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀποκρίνεσθαι*), and Nicias twists and turns in his confusion (**48.** 22 *στρέφεται ἄνω καὶ κάτω*). — *φιλοτίμως ἔχων,* "jealous."

11. 5. *ὑπέχειν λόγον,* "be responsible for."

6. *ὑπεκίνει αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον.* The nominative of *αὐτός* is always emphatic, the oblique cases always may be. So here, "that very man." Cf. Note **6.** 33. For *ὑπεκίνει,* cf. **75.** 32 *τινὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων κινεῖν.* Tr. "bring into the conversation."

7. *ποιητὴς.* Critias was, in fact, a dramatist himself; v. Introd. p. xv.

8. *διατιθέντι.* The regular idiom for reciting poetry; cf. Leg. 658 D *Ῥαψῳδὸν καλῶς Ἰλιάδα — διατιθέντα.*

14. *συγχωρεῖς,* "admit."

18. *ἃ ἠρώτων.* We might expect *ἅ,* but the plural is suggested by the general conception of the subject and the separate examples cited, rather

than by the subject itself. Cf. Phaedo 62 D *τάχ' ἂν οἰηθείη ταῦτα, φευκτέον εἶναι.* Indeed, the neuter plural is a sort of collective and not a real plural, for it takes a singular verb.

21. *οὐ — ποιοῦντες.* The participle must be causal; for if it were conditional, the negative would be *μή*. H. 1025, G. 1612, G M T. 832.

22. *ὅρα μὴ ἐκεῖνον κωλύει. μή* is construed with the subjunctive when fear is felt for the future, but with the indicative when the action is present or past. H. 888, G. 1380, G M T. 369, R. 62. Cf. **48.** 30, **69.** 1. *σκεψώμεθα μὴ — λανθάνει.* We prefer an indirect question with such verbs, and tr. *μή* "whether."

25–27. *ὡμολόγηκα — ὡμολόγησα.* Cf. **22.** 6–7. The aorist is a sort of shorthand to the perfect; v. Gild. ad Pind. P. 1. 73.

27. *οὐ ταὐτὸν καλεῖς τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πράττειν;* Demosthenes uses these synonyms without any distinction in 19. 6 and 21. 41, and confounds *ἐργάζεσθαι* with *δρᾶν* in 23. 71, just as Socrates does with *ποιεῖν* in **10.** 17. Usually, however, the difference is that *πράττειν* is "to be busy," "to achieve," *ποιεῖν* "to create," "make."

29. *ἔμαθον γὰρ παρ' Ἡσιόδου.* The quotation is from the "Works and Days," v. 309. Cf. **68.** 3; v. Note **9.** 14. Critias' use of this passage is sophistic, for all that Hesiod meant by *ἔργον* was agriculture, and *οὐδέν* modifies *ὄνειδος* (v. Note **65.** 9). He said, "Agriculture is no disgrace." Critias makes his words mean, "No work is disgraceful." Protagoras interprets Simonides in much the same way (Prot. 339 A D); v. Note **41.** 25. It was this verse that Socrates' accusers claimed that he misinterpreted somewhat in the way which Critias here ridicules (Xen. Mem. I. 2. 56).

32. *σκυτοτομοῦντι — καθημένῳ.* All trades which caused the laborer to remain seated, and lose the healthy exercise so highly valued, were considered degrading to both body and soul (v. Rep. 495 D), and were called by the general term *βάναυσοι* ("vulgar"). Sparta went so far as to forbid its citizens to learn a trade; while, on the other hand, the Phocians and Locrians did not allow their slaves to enter business, and most of the laborers were citizens. Athens lay midway between these extremes, and, though the trades were at first generally despised and left to slaves and aliens, in the days of national disaster many citizens were forced to join this company. Shoemakers were considered especially low and degraded, and are often mentioned with contempt even by Plato himself. Cf. Rep. 456 D, Theaet. 180 D.

ταριχοπωλοῦντι. Smoked or salt fish were brought from the Black Sea, especially the Sea of Azov, from Gades (mod. Cadiz), and from Egypt.

34. *ποίησιν πράξεως καὶ ἐργασίας ἄλλο.* The comparative meaning of *ἄλλος* permits its construction with the genitive. Tr. "Doing is different

from accomplishing and working." ἕτερος is used in the same way; cf. **14.** 34, **20.** 14. Instead of the simple genitive after ἄλλος, we sometimes find πλήν (Soph. 228 A), or παρά *c. acc.* (**27.** 7, Gorg. 507 A), and, of course, ἤ **64.** 34, H. 753 g, G. 1154.

12. 1. ποίημα and ποίησις are both "doing."—3. τὰ καλῶς—ποιούμενα ἔργα ἐκάλει, "things well done he called 'works.'" In the next clause τὰς τοιαύτας ποιήσεις is simply a repetition of τὰ—ποιούμενα, as ἐργασίας τε καὶ πράξεις repeats ἔργα just preceding. So οἰκεῖα (5) is the same as τὰ αὑτοῦ, "one's own," and ἀλλότρια (6) is equivalent to τὰ τῶν ἄλλων.

7. τὸν τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττοντα, τοῦτον. The resumptive use of the demonstrative appears again in ll. 16–17, τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρᾶξιν—ταύτην λέγεις. Cf. **44.** 11.

12. Prodicus taught all branches of knowledge, but paid especial attention to synonyms, and his superfine distinctions are parodied and ridiculed in the Protagoras (337 A), where Critias appears in his company (336 D). Cf. **50.** 15.

13. τίθεσθαι, "define."

14. δήλον μόνον ἐφ' ὅ τι ἂν φέρῃς κτλ. "Only tell me what you mean by the name." Socrates often insists that a clear conception of the thing itself shall underlie the name by which it is called. Cf. Note **10.** 31, Phaedr. 237 C, Gorg. 488 C D.

20. τὸ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν, "what I think."

23. σαφῶς σοι διορίζομαι. The confidence and almost arrogant pride of Critias is characteristic of his sophistic training. Cf. **13.** 25, ὡς τὰ γράμματά φησιν καὶ ἐγώ and Gorg. 450 C ὀρθῶς λέγων, ὡς ἐγώ φημι. v. Introd. p. xvi. So Gorgias (448 A) and Hippias (II. 363 D) profess to answer any question. Protagoras (318 A, 328 B) is sure of success.

24. οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει—τόδε γε μέντοι—θαυμάζω. This is not a partial assent, but a modest, ironic, but none the less positive, disagreement. Cf. **41.** 13, I. Alc. 124 D Ἴσως, λέγω μέντοι, v. Note **39.** 2.

25, 31. ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι σωφρονοῦσιν, τὰ δέοντα πράττει. These topics are taken up by Xenophon in his Mem. IV. 6. 7–9, I. 2. 50, III. 9. 11, etc., and Teichmüller (II. 70) thinks our passage is intended to ridicule Xenophon's imperfect treatment. Cf. Note. **21.** 1; v. Introd. p. xxviii.

31. ὃν ἰφῶτο. Optative in a complementary clause, instead of the more usual subjunctive with ἄν. Cf. **59.** 31, Gorg. 482 C (Gild.).

34. τῷ ἰατρῷ. This should properly be the accusative as the subject of γιγνώσκειν, but the proximity of ἀνάγκη changes it to the dative of reference. Cf. **22.** 27, R. 183.

13. 1. ὅταν μέλλῃ ὀνήσεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔργου οὗ ἂν πράττῃ. The sub-

junctive *πράττῃ* is assimilated from the indicative (*πράττει*) to the mood of the general supposition. H. 919 a, G. 1439, G M T. 563. Cf. Note **20.** 34, **22.** 8.

9. *ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ὡμολογημένων*, viz. *τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρᾶξιν σωφροσύνην εἶναι* **12.** 23.

The longer and more elaborate sentences of Critias' speech (**13.** 8–**14.** 2) show his rhetorical bent; v. Introd. p. xv.

11. *ἀναθείμην*, "take back.". A metaphor from the game of *πεσσοί* (cf. Hipparch. 229 E *ὥσπερ πεττεύων ἐθέλω ἀναθέσθαι*), which resembled checkers in that the pieces were all alike, and chess in that the main object of the game was to pen up the opponent's pieces. Socrates, too, was always willing to give up anything that was proved to be wrong; cf. Prot. 354 E and Gorg. 461 D, where the same verb is used; v. also Note **52.** 28 *μετατίθεσθαι*.

οὐκ ἂν αἰσχυνθείην τότε μή — φάναι. *μή* is used with the infinitive to renew the negative meaning inherent in *αἰσχυνθείην*, after the analogy of verbs of denying and hindering, tr. "not ashamed to admit" (*φάναι*). *οὐχ* belongs to *ὀρθῶς — εἰρηκέναι*. H. 1029, G. 1615, G M T. 815. Cf. **17.** 32.

14. *γνῶθι σεαυτόν* was an old maxim, which was usually a great favorite with Socrates, and indeed often identified by him with *σωφροσύνη*. Cf. Tim. 72 A, Xen. Mem. IV. 2. 24–30, etc.

17. *τῶν εἰσιόντων*, "to the worshippers" (lit. "those who enter").

18. *δεῖν* is probably another form of *δέον*, the accusative absolute participle. Cf. **20.** 11, H. 973, G. 1569. If it be taken as infinitive, we may cf. Leg. 626 B, *ὡς — οὐδὲν ὄφελος ὄν, — γίγνεσθαι*, Rep. 383 A, where the infinitive depends on the idea of thinking implied in *ὡς*.

22. *λέγει*, then *φησί* in addition. This is the superfluous "says he" of English speech; cf. Xen. Oec. 4. 23, 17. 10. In the latter instance *ἔφη* is repeated a second time; v. Note **49.** 22, R. 266 e.

26. *παθεῖν*, "felt."

27. These maxims were inscribed on a pillar in the vestibule of Apollo's temple at Delphi. *Μηδὲν ἄγαν* expresses the true Greek spirit better than any other phrase; self-restraint in morals, good taste in art, temperance in daily life, moderation in all things. *Ἐγγύη, πάρα δ' ἄτη* (*πάρα* for *πάρεστι*), "Give a pledge and evil awaits thee," in other words, "Beware of rash promises, be prudent."

33. *σαφὲς οὐδὲν πάνυ*, lit. "in no way very clear," a sort of litotes, by which we negative the opposite of what we mean, in order to make our meaning all the stronger. So **14.** 14 *οὐ σμικράν*, **4.** 11 *οὐ — σοῦ ὀλίγος λόγος* for *πολὺς λόγος*, **6.** 30 *οὐκ ἀγεννῶς* for *θαρραλέως*, **46.** 19 *οὐ σφόδρα*, **55.** 18 *οὐ φαῦλος*. So *οὐ πάνυ ἤθελεν* **7.** 20, whereas (Prot. 338 E) *πάνυ*

οὐκ ἤθελεν ("he was very unwilling") expresses the same idea directly. οὐ πάνυ (**42.** 28) is used chiefly by Plato and Xenophon, and is equivalent to our slang "not much." It is ironic and modest, and only rarely (as **56.** 20–21) to be taken literally. R. 139, Cope, Gorg. App.

34. ἐλέγομεν. Critias' conceit leads him to include Socrates in the judgment of error which he passes upon himself.

τούτου σοι διδόναι λόγον, "give you a chance to speak about it."

14. 1. αὐτὸν ἑαυτόν, v. Note **6.** 33.

3. σὺ μὲν ὡς φάσκοντος — προσφέρει, "you address me as if I said." ὡς ὁμολογήσοντος, "as if I would agree."

5–6. ζητῶ — διὰ τὸ μὴ αὐτὸς εἰδέναι. Cf. **15.** 18, **19.** 7 ἀεὶ ὅμοιος, **23.** 9, **24.** 25, **56.** 5, **63.** 25. Socrates always professes ignorance; cf. Gorg. 453 A B, 455 B, 458 E, and constantly; v. Introd. p. xvi.

8. σκόπει. καὶ γὰρ σκοπῶ. Cf. Parm. 144 D ἄθρει. ἀλλ' ἀθρῶ καὶ ὁρῶ. Soph. 268 A, Gorg. 448 B Ἐρώτα. ἐρωτῶ δή.

13. τί ἡμῖν χρησίμη. χρήσιμος πρός τι is more usual, but cf. **73.** 13, Rep. 382 C. εἰς and ἐπί are also found.

15. εἰ ἀποδέχει τοῦτο. So Theaet. 207 C, etc. Similarly εἴ μου μανθάνεις Rep. 394 C. Formulae of assumption, cf. Note **18.** 13.

17. ὅτι οἰκήσεις. There is no need of supplying any verb, for ὅτι is merely a *sign of quotation*, and has no influence on the construction. Cf. **7.** 3 εἶπον ὅτι μοι εἰκότα φαίνει. This usage is very common in Plato (cf. **14.** 17, App. **9.** 26, **63.** 4) and Xenophon, and also in Demosthenes and Andocides (A. J. P. V. 221). H. 928 b, G. 1477, G M T. 711. Cf. Prot. 318 C εἴποι ἄν — ὅτι πρὸς γραφικήν.

18. ὑπὲρ τῆς σωφροσύνης. In the later orators ὑπέρ is preferred to περί for the meaning "concerning," and is very common. It occurs also in Plato, but less often.

29. ἀλλ' οὐχ ἕξεις. This is a common formula for anticipating the opponent's admission. Cf. Prot. 354 D.

30. τίνος ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἑκάστη, "to what does each science refer?" Cf. **17.** 9.

32. πλήθους ὅπως ἔχει. Genitive of specification. This special form is found generally with ἔχειν and without the article. Cf. Gorg. 451 C πῶς ἔχει πλήθους, 470 E παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει.

15. 6. τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο. ἐκεῖνο is "what I said before"; it may define a relative more clearly, make an attributive or appositive clearer, or, as here, be itself explained by the following clause with asyndeton. Cf. Euthyd. 296 B, etc. The phrase appears in Aristophanes and Euripides, but not elsewhere.

11. σε πολλοῦ δεῖ, "you are far from."

13. *οἷον ποιεῖς!* Exclamation of disgust (cf. I. Alc. 113 E, I. Hipp. 290 D), or of disappointment (Euth'o 15 E). Cf. *ποῖον* **23**. 26, **46**. 22 (Note).

18. Socrates depends on his own convictions rather than the opinions of others (cf. Phaedo 91 A). He constantly insists on brief replies to his questions (Gorg. 448 D E, Prot. 334 D), and professes indifference whether he or his opponent is proved to be in the wrong (cf. Note **9**. 32, Gorg. 458 A B). This section is a partial statement of the principles underlying Socrates' dialectic and didactic method. Cf. Note **14**. 5–6; v. Introd. p. xiv.

20. *τῶν ὄντων ὅπῃ ἔχει*, "the facts as they are."

23. *ἔα χαίρειν*, "leave out of the question."

30. *καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης.* We cannot, of course, know the opposite of what we know, in the sense of fully understanding it; but since we know the *limits* of any conception that we possess, we can at least know where its opposite *begins* its territory, though we do not know its full extent. It is on this ambiguity of the word "know" that Socrates' argument rests.

34. *τί τις οἶδεν καὶ οἴεται*, sc. *εἰδέναι.*

16. 5. *τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι.* At the beginning of a symposium or drinking-bout, three bowls were dedicated and three libations poured, — one to the gods, one to the heroes, and one to Zeus the Saviour. Since three is a perfect number, and the full ceremony was essential, the phrase was proverbial for the complete performance of any duty (Schol.). Cf. Phileb. 66 D *τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι τὸν αὐτὸν διαμαρτυράμενοι λόγον ἐπεξέλθωμεν.* Aes. Eum. 729 *τοῦ πάντα κραίνοντος τρίτου Σωτῆρος.*

6. *ἃ μὴ οἶδεν εἰδέναι.* The subject of *εἰδέναι* is *τινά*, not *αὐτόν*; so **19**. 27, **21**. 34, etc.

11. *ἄλλο τι* is merely a phrase for introducing a question, and is not translated. It expects an affirmative answer and affects the whole sentence. *ἄλλο* here seems to stand for an unexpressed proposition present in the speaker's mind. The fuller form *ἄλλο τι ἤ* usually refers to some special portion of the sentence; v. Note **22**. 22, R. 22. This form of question is akin to litotes; v. Note **13**. 33.

22. *τί δὲ ἀκοήν.* It is better to take this accusative as the object of thought, the accusative of general reference, rather than to supply *λέγεις*, especially as *δοκεῖ* precedes. Cf. *τί τοῦτο*; **12**. 29, Rep. 472 B, R. 20, 21.

31. *βουλήσεις βούλεται.* Cf. l. 23 *ἀκοῶν ἀκούει*, l. 26 *αἰσθήσεις αἰσθάνονται*, l. 34 *φόβους φοβεῖται*, **3**. 14 *ἀσθενείας ἧς ἀσθενοῖ*, **14**. 21, **21**. 10–11 *οἰκία οἰκουμένη* and *πόλις πολιτευομένη*, **30**. 7–8, **31**. 16–17, **34**. 16, **37**. 4, **38**. 2, 26, etc. This etymological construction is most common in the accu-

sative, but is found in all cases, with the relative and in the passive, as in the passages cited. Although just here the philosophic subject demands its use, this figure, as a rule, belongs to legal and political formulæ and to familiar speech. The epic is too dignified to admit it, and it is not abundant in history, but the dramatists and orators use it frequently, though under limits. Isocrates avoids it, but its free and varied use by Socrates is consistent with his popular style; v. Introd. p. xv.

17. 13. *Εἰ οὖν τι εὕροιμεν μεῖζον* κτλ. "If we could find something '*greater*,' which is *greater* than self and *greater* than other *great things*, but not *greater* than those things (in comparison) of which the others are *greater*, then that thing, if it is greater than itself, would also be less than itself." Socrates is showing that science differs from the object of its relation, so he simply substitutes *μεῖζον* for *ἐπιστήμη*, and instead of *ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν*, we get *μεῖζον τῶν (ἄλλων) μειζόνων*, and *ὧν δὲ τἆλλα μείζω ἐστὶν μηδενὸς μεῖζον* for *ὧν αἱ ἄλλαι ἐπιστῆμαί εἰσιν οὐδενὸς ἐπιστήμη*. For the argument, cf. Rep. 438 B.

22–24. *ὅ τι περ ἄν — αὐτοῦ ἦν*. "Will not whatever has a nature relative to (*πρός*) self have also the nature of (the object) to which its nature was (directed)?"

28. *ὄψεται αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν*, v. Note **6.** 33.

29. *οὐδὲν μή ποτε ἴδῃ*. The subjunctive (usually aor.) with *οὐ μή* is used in independent sentences to express emphatic denial. This combination of negatives cannot be explained by the ellipsis of a verb of fear (v. Gild. in L. and S. *οὐ μή*), but *οὐ* is independent (no!), while *μή* gives the immediate negation of the verb. Goodwin holds (G M T. App. II.) that *οὐ μή* developed from the independent subjunctive with *μή* (as *μὴ φαῦλον ᾖ*, "it may prove bad"). This had become practically a cautious assertion, so that the negative force of *μή* was held in abeyance, and in the combined form *οὐ* would be the real negative, *μή* merely a survival. H. 1032, G. 1360, G M T. 294.

32. *ἀπιστεῖται μὴ — σχεῖν*. The infinitive after verbs with a negative idea may take *μή* to renew the negation. H. 1029, G. 1615, G M T. 815.

34. *ἀδύνατον*, sc. *τὴν ἑαυτῶν δύναμιν πρὸς ἑαυτὰ σχεῖν*.

18. 2. *τοῖς μὲν — δέ τισιν*. So *ἄλλος δέ* corresponds to *ὁ μέν* in Il. 6. 147; so also *ἔνιοι δέ*.

4. *κατὰ πάντων*, "in every detail."

5. *τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν — πέφυκεν ἔχειν*, "has its own nature."

8. *πιστεύω ἐμαυτῷ ἱκανὸς εἶναι*. *ἱκανός* is not attracted to the dative, because it refers to the subject of the principal verb. R. 182.

10. *εἴ ὅτι μάλιστα ἔχει*, "if it really is (possible)."

πρὶν ἂν ἐπισκέψωμαι. *πρίν* takes the subj. and opt. only after negatives or their equivalents. H. 924 a, G. 1471. 2, G M T. 645-648, Gild. in L. and S.

13. *μαντεύομαι.* Cf. **69.** 10, Rep. 349 A. A favorite expression for the assumption of an axiomatic truth. Cf. Note **14.** 5-6.

14. *ὦ παῖ Καλλαίσχρου.* Cf. **29.** 20, **56.** 2, *ὦ παῖ Ἱερωνύμου*, **59.** 14, **61.** 9, and often. The tone is familiar, with perhaps a touch of mock solemnity. For the parenthesis, cf. **33.** 27, **36.** 5, **63.** 28, **67.** 28, **75.** 28, **76.** 9, Introd. p. xv.

16. *πρὸς τῷ δυνατῷ*, "beside being possible."

20. Notice the humor as well as the vulgar simile (*τοὺς χασμωμένους*); v. Introd. p. xiv. Cf. **3.** 27-30, **26.** 5, **64.** 8. Few authors use similes so frequently as Plato (cf. **66.** 13, **71.** 8, **75.** 11, 25, 32, etc.), but the Socratic example often provoked protest by its vulgarity (Gorg. 491 A, I. Hipp. 288 C D).

28. *αὖθις ἐπισκεψόμεθα* is the formula for introducing the fuller consideration of a question.

29. *τί μᾶλλον οἷόν τε εἰδέναι, i.e.* "What use is it for increasing our knowledge of the matter?"

19. 9-10. *πλέον τι — ἐπιστήμη.* "Will it be able to do more than decide that one is knowledge and the other is not?" *τοσοῦτον*, "this much and no more."

13-14. *Ἀλλὰ — ἐπιστήμη.* "One is medicine, one is statesmanship, and one is nothing but knowledge."

17. *ὅτι* ("that") *μὲν ἐπίσταται.* To this corresponds *ὅ τι* ("what") *δὲ γιγνώσκει* (l. 19).

27. *εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδεν*, v. Note **16.** 6.

20. 1. *ὡς ἀληθῶς.* Cf. **22.** 14, **69.** 2, **72.** 16. Some explain the superfluous *ὡς* as the adverb of the article, since *τὸ ἀληθές* is used adverbially, and *τῇ ἀληθείᾳ* appears equivalent to *ὡς ἀληθῶς*, as *ἀληθείᾳ* to *ἀληθῶς*; v. Note **49.** 12.

9. *ὅτι — ἔχει, γνώσεται τὸν ἰατρόν.* Prolepsis; v. Note **4.** 14.

11. *δεῖν δὲ πεῖραν — ὄντινων.* "But when he wants to discover (*πεῖραν λαβεῖν*) its nature (*ἥτις ἔστιν*), will he not consider the subject-matter?" *δεῖν* is the participle, as in **13.** 18 (v. Note). *δεῖν* (*δέον*) and *πλεῖν* (*πλέον*) are peculiarly Attic. As *ὄντινων* is "the subject-matter," so *τῷ τινῶν εἶναι* is "by the nature of the subject."

19. *ᾗ ἰατρικός ἐστιν*, "(to see) in what way he is versed in medicine."

23. *ποτέροις ἑπακολουθῆσαι*, "to follow either one or the other." *πότερος* is usually interrogative, but in several places in Plato it is indefinite, and

(like ἄτερος) has the meaning here given (cf. **30.** 26). Photius would write it ποτερός when thus used.

29. οὔτε ἄλλον — ὁτιοῦν, "nor distinguish (διακρῖναι) any one else who knows anything at all."

πλήν γε τὸν αὐτοῦ ὁμότεχνον. Construction according to the idea in the speaker's mind, as if ὁ σώφρων were the subject of the sentence instead of ἡ σωφροσύνη; v. Introd. p. xv. Cf. Notes **29.** 26, **34.** 24.

34. The imperfects ᾔδει, ἤρχοντο (**21.** 5) ἠπιστάμεθα (ib. 6) ἤρχομεν (7), εἶχον (9) in the relative clauses are due to the assimilating influence of the imperfects in the respective principal sentences, although all refer to present time. H. 919 b, G. 1440, G M T. 559, R. 57. Cf. Note **13.** 2, **22.** 8. ὅτι οἶδεν and ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν are not affected, because they are not relative, but are governed by the laws of indirect discourse (εἰδέναι ὅτι, G M T. 663. 1).

21. 1. ἄλλον ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πεπονθότα ἐπισκέψασθαι, "to consider another man who has had this same experience." Socrates considers this same question somewhat less carefully in Xen. Mem. IV. 2. 25 ff.; v. Note **12.** 26.

10–11. ἔμελλεν οἰκεῖσθαι is equivalent to ἂν ᾠκεῖτο, and in the same tone is ἐλέγομεν, l. 15 (cf. Sym. 190 C τὰ ἱερὰ — ἠφανίζετο), where the imperfect expresses the unrealized future, or, from another point of view, past likelihood. H. 897, G. 1402. 3, G M T. 38, 428.

14. τοὺς εὖ πράττοντας εὐδαίμονας εἶναι. This conclusion is obtained through the ambiguity of εὖ πράττειν, which may mean "fare well" as readily as "do well." Cf. Gorg. 507 C τὸν ἀγαθὸν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς πράττειν, — τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα — εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, Rep. 354 A. Cf. Note **11.** 27.

20. ἣν νῦν εὑρίσκομεν σωφροσύνην. The antecedent is often incorporated in the relative clause (H. 995, G. 1037), but it is rarer that, as here, the *subject* of the principal verb is absorbed. Cf. Phaedo 88 D ὃν — ἔλεγε λόγον, νῦν εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταπέπτωκε, Crito 48 C.

22. 6. ῥᾳδίως, "carelessly."

8. ἃ μὲν ἴσασιν — ἃ δὲ μὴ ἐπίσταιντο. The latter is assimilated to the mood of the two optatives between which it stands. Cf. Note **20.** 34.

11. νὴ τὸν κύνα. Cf. **64.** 9. This oath, like νὴ τὸν χῆνα, also common in the Socratic school, seems to have been an euphemism for νὴ τὸν Ζῆνα, like our "by Gad," "Je-hosh-aphat," and the like. Cf. Note **2.** 31.

12. ἐνταῦθα = πρὸς τοῦτο.

13. προφαίνεσθαι καὶ ὅτι φοβοίμην. Cf. the shift from indicative to optative in **5.** 2–4; v. Note.

17. οἶμαι ληρεῖν με. με is not at all necessary, but gives emphasis. We should further expect ἐγώ, since the subject of the infinitive is the same as

that of the principal verb, but cf. Rep. 400 B *οἶμαι δέ με ἀκηκοέναι*, Sym. 175 E, etc.; v. Note **33**. 14.

20. *τὸ ἐμὸν ὄναρ* alludes to the proverb, *τὸ ἐμὸν ἐμοὶ λέγεις ὄναρ* (Rep. 563 D), and *εἴ τε διὰ κεράτων κτλ.* to Od. 19. 562 ff.: "Twain are the gates of shadowy dreams, the one is fashioned of horn, the one of ivory. Such dreams as pass through the portals of sawn ivory are deceitful and bear tidings that are unfulfilled. But the dreams that come forth through the gates of polished horn bring a true issue" (tr. Butcher and Lang).

ἄκουε δή is a formula often, though not exclusively (Gorg. 458 E, etc.), used for introducing a myth (Gorg. 523 A, Tim. 20 D), or anything, which, like the myth, is outside the dialectic, and so appears like a revelation (*ὄναρ*, cf. Phaedr. 230 E, Theaet. 201 D).

22. *ἄλλο τι*, "surely," but *ἄλλο — τι — ἤ*, below (l. 27), is merely a sign of interrogation.

26. *ἐκ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων*, "In this condition of things." So Leg. 959 C. Cf. Phaedo 68 A *ἀπηλλάχθαι συνόντος αὐτοῖς*, "to be rid of their company." This use of concrete for abstract is a species of metonymy. R. 312.

27. *ὑγιέσιν* is attracted to the dative by the proximity of *ὑμῖν*, but the more remote *κινδυνεύοντας* remains unchanged; v. Note **12**. 34.

31. *εἰ δὲ βούλοιό γε*. Cf. **69**. 25, I. Alc. 122 B *εἰ δ' αὖ ἐθέλοις ἀποβλέψαι*. R. 76.

34. *τοὺς ἀλαζόνας*, "the false."

23. 3. *ἔπομαι*, "I admit." *παρεμπίπτουσαν*, "interfering."

6. *τοῦτο δέ*. The repetition of *δέ* with *τοῦτο* gives greater force to the antithesis. Cf. **19**. 13 *τὸ δέ*, Phaedo 78 C.

9. *προσδίδαξον*. Ironic humility. Cf. **41**. 13; v. Introd. p. xiv.

τίνος ἐπιστημόνως, but later (l. 15) *περί τινων ἐπιστημόνως*. Both constructions are found, and often; v. Note **4**. 11.

13. *τῷ λόγῳ τῷ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι*. The infinitive clause *τὸ — εἶναι* is very naturally attracted to the case of *λόγῳ*, with which it is in apposition. R. 203.

26. *ποῖον πεττευτικόν*. Scornful denial. Cf. Note **46**. 22, Gorg. 490 D *ποίων ἱματίων*; I. Hipp. 285 D, Euthyd. 304 E; v. Note **15**. 13. R. 319.

29. With *ἢ τί* and with *ἦ τὸ ἀγαθόν*, sc. *οἶδεν*.

31. *τὸ ἐπιστημόνως — ποιοῦν*, "living scientifically was what made good fortune and happiness."

33. *μιᾶς οὔσης ταύτης*, viz. *τὸ ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν*.

24. 4. *τὸ εὖ γε — ἔσται*, "the good and useful performance of these actions will be lost."

28. *νῦν δὲ — παντα χῇ γάρ.* This combination always contradicts a hypothesis contrary to fact, and resembles *ἀλλὰ γάρ*. The particle *δέ* indicates that the condition is really different from the supposed case, and *γάρ* shows that the inference must also be different. We need supply no definite words, since *δέ* alone gives the general idea (Riddell). R. 149; v. Note **33**. 27.

30. *ἔθετο*, "defined"; v. Note **49**. 22.

25. 3. *μεγαλοπρεπῶς*, "generously," *i.e.* "off-hand." **68**. 11 has the more usual meaning of "magnificent," "grandiloquent."

6. *οὐδενὸς ὅτου*, "anything." The omission of the copula and attraction of the antecedent to the case of the relative is not unusual with this combination of words. H. 1003, G. 1035, R. 199. Cf. *θαυμαστὸν ὅσον* **33**. 18, *τούτου οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ* **74**. 8.

7. *εὐηθικῶν*, "easily persuaded." Cf. *ἡδὺς εἶ* Gorg. 491 E, *γλυκὺς εἶ* I. Hipp. 288 B, *χρηστὸς εἶ* Phaedr. 264 C. *εὐήθης* etymologically means the same as *χρηστός*. All these polite terms were originally ironical. So we say, "You're a *nice* fellow."

7–9. *ἡ ζήτησις — κατεγέλασεν αὐτῆς*. Cf. Prot. 361 A *δοκεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ ἄρτι ἔξοδος τῶν λόγων ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος κατηγορεῖν τε καὶ καταγελᾶν*. This personification is especially common with *λόγος*, as **18**. 26 *ὁ λόγος προΐοι*. Cf. **69**. 16, **71**. 14 (also **69**. 8), Phaedo 76 E, 89 B. The famous personification of the laws in the Crito is perhaps the most extended. For *κατεγέλασεν*, cf. **45**. 23 *μὴ ἡμῶν αὐτὴ ἡ ἀνδρεία καταγελάσῃ*.

11. *τὸ ἐμόν*, "as far as I am concerned." A colloquial expression not rare in Plato. Cf. **38**. 16 *τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει* and Note, Prot. 338 C Gorg. 458 D. The fuller form is *τὸ ἐμὸν μέρος*.

19. After *ἐπεί*, sc. *οἶομαι*. The infinitive is not common in relative clauses in *orat. obl.* (H. 947, G. 1524, G M T. 755), but even if it were, a state of *orat. obl.* is not in existence here.

30. *ὅσαι ἡμέραι*, "forever." Cf. Menex. 246 B. A colloquial phrase. Cf. *ὁσημέραι* Ar. Vesp. 479, Plut. 1006, *ὁσέτη* Thes. 624.

34. *ὡς ἀκολουθήσοντος*, sc. *διανοοῦ*.

26. 1. *εἰ μὴ πειθοίμην σοι τῷ ἐπιτρόπῳ*. This is mischievous irony, for Critias' own definitions have been demolished and his wisdom set at naught.

3. *οὗτοι!* Lat. *heus!* A familiar address, often with *σύ* (*οὗτος σύ*). It is frequent in the drama, and not rare in Plato. Cf. Sym. 172 A *ὦ Φαληρεὺς οὗτος*, 214 E *οὗτος, τί ἐν νῷ ἔχεις*.

5. *ἀλλὰ βεβουλεύμεθα*. Cf. Crito 46 A *οὐδὲ βουλεύεσθαι ἔτι ὥρα, ἀλλὰ βεβουλεῦσθαι*.

6. *ἀνάκρισιν δώσεις*. A legal formula. The *ἀνάκρισις* was the preliminary hearing before a magistrate, at which the accusation and the defence were received and depositions taken, to be sealed until the day of trial.

9. *οὐδεὶς οἷός τε ἔσται ἐναντιοῦσθαι*. A compliment to Charmides' beauty. Cf. Note **3**. 22. So at the end of the Protagoras, *Καλλίᾳ τῷ καλῷ χαριζόμενος*.

LACHES.

27. 1. *τεθέασθε τὸν ἄνδρα μαχόμενον*. He had been fighting in the full armor of a hoplite, — helmet, breastplate, and shield — though his spear had a blunt head, and had given an exhibition of his skill that the spectators might engage him as an instructor in the art. This exercise was as old as Homer (Il. 23. 811), and was considered part of a liberal education, fencing-masters ranking with the sophists, who taught rhetoric, philosophy, and the like. So, in the Gorgias (456 D E), *ὁπλομαχία* is classed with these studies. The instruction was, indeed, not confined to skill in handling weapons, but comprised tactics and strategy, in fact the whole art of war. Cf. **31**. 11–13.

2. *ἐκελεύσαμεν*, "invited." So **28**. 21, "advised." *κελεύω* merely means that the imperative mood was used, without implying a tone of command.

5. *αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύσηται*, "ask their advice."

6. *οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν*, equivalent to *οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν εἰπεῖν*.

στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ συμβουλευομένου, "guessing at the wishes of the consulter," since they desire to please him, but do not know just what he would like. Cf. Curt. IV. 11. 10: *Diu nemo quid sentiret ausus est dicere, incerta regis voluntate.*

7. *ἄλλα — παρὰ τὴν αὑτῶν δόξαν*, "at variance with their own judgment." Cf. **30**. 24, **31**. 24, **32**. 23, Note **11**. 31, R. 165, 174.

8. With *ἱκανούς* sc. *εἶναι*.

γνῶναι καὶ — εἰπεῖν. These are emphasized by Thucydides (II. 60. 5) as essential requisites of a statesman, and by Plato (Gorg. 487 A) as necessary to any teacher or investigator.

ἁπλῶς, "exactly."

9. *οὕτω*, "therefore," shows that *ἡγησάμενοι* is causal.

παρελάβομεν κτλ, "we invited you to a consultation concerning a question which we will now explain"; v. Note **34**. 23 *γεγονότες ἦσαν*.

11. *τόδε*, "as follows."

12. *πάππου*. The article is often omitted with words expressing kinship. Cf. Note **57**. 17. The eldest son was usually named for his grandfather, the second son often bore the name of his mother's father.

16. *γέγονεν* agrees in number with the predicate, as most frequently occurs when the subject is not expressed. Yet in Gorg. 502 C *λόγοι γίγνονται τὸ λειπόμενον* no such excuse can be offered. Cf. Note **40.** 23, R. 202.

16. *ποιεῖν* is construed with *ἀνεῖναι* ("allow") as well as with *βούλονται*.

νῦν δή. *δή* contrasts *νῦν* with the time of infancy, when parents take the most care, and *καὶ* lends emphasis to *ἄρχεσθαι*.

18. *ὑμῖν* depends on *ὄντας* and also on *μεμεληκέναι*.

19. *εἴπερ τισὶν ἄλλοις*, "more than any one else."

21. *πολλάκις*, "perhaps." So used chiefly after *εἰ* and *μή*. Cf. **45.** 24, Rep. 424 B *φοβουμένους — μὴ πολλάκις τις οἴηται*, 584 B. R. 143.

28. 1. With *ὑπομνήσοντες* and *παρακαλοῦντες* (fut., H. 423, G. 665) sc. *παρεκαλέσαμεν*. Without the words between the stars (v. App.) there would be an anacoluth; v. Note **4.** 16.

4. *συσσιτοῦμεν δή*. *δή*, "you know." Men who were single, or who preferred to eat with their friends rather than with their wives, organized a small club for this purpose. This arrangement was purely voluntary in Athens, but in Sparta it was established by law for all citizens.

5. *ὅπερ*, "as."

10. *ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν = ἡμῶν αὐτῶν*.

11. *ὑπαισχυνόμεθα τούσδε*, v. App. *ὑπό* qualifies the verb, "somewhat ashamed." Cf. **76.** 3.

12. *εἶων τρυφᾶν*, "let us live in idleness," the opposite of *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι*. Plato merely means that they took no part in public life, for in the Meno (94 A, C) he tells us that they received an excellent education.

16. *τάχ'*, "perhaps." *ἄν* by its position often brings an important word into prominence. Cf. *ὅτι ἄν* **32.** 5.

18. *ὅ τι ἄριστοι*, "as good as possible."

21. *ἐκέλευε*, "he urged us (again and again)," but **27.** 2 *ἐκελεύσαμεν*, "we invited you (and you needed no second invitation)."

23. *ἅμα μὲν — ἅμα δέ*, "partly — partly."

33. *ἀληθῆ γὰρ οἴει*. *γάρ*, "certainly," a common meaning in answers. The particle meets the doubt implied in *οἶμαι*, and is characteristic of the lively interchange of thought in animated conversation. Cf. *ἀλλά* in *ἀλλὰ δέομαι* **33.** 25 and *ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων* **30.** 20, **40.** 34; also **29.** 10 *Σωκράτης γὰρ ὅδε*, where *γάρ* indicates surprise, "really," so **33.** 32, **34.** 33.

ὡς, causal. Cf. **30.** 1.

29. 2. *σχεδόν τι*. Cf. **39.** 34, etc., *οὐ πάνυ τι* **42.** 28. *τι* thus limits the force of adverbs, as *τις* often modifies adjectives.

4. *ὀλιγώρως — διατίθεσθαι = ὀλιγωρεῖσθαί τε καὶ ἀμελεῖσθαι*. These words explain *ταῦτα*.

7. The deme Alopece could number three distinguished sons, — Aristides, Socrates, and Thucydides the statesman.

8. *ἐνταῦθα, i.e.* in the palaestra; v. Note **1.** 4, and Introd. p. xi.

15. Damon was the most famous music teacher of his time, and had among his pupils Pericles and Socrates, both of whom were also his intimate friends.

18. *οἱ ἡλίκοι ἐγώ*, "people of my age." A condensed expression for *οἱ τηλικοῦτοι ἡλίκος ἐγώ εἰμι.*

21. *τῷδε* refers to the speaker, a demonstrative of the *first person*, as often in tragedy. Here it is used playfully. Cf. Note **7.** 9.

συμβουλεῦσαι without reference to time, but *συμβουλεύειν* with emphasis on its duration.

22. *δίκαιος εἶ*, "it is just that you should."

23. *ἑταίρω τε καὶ φίλω*; v. Note **7.** 34.

24. *πρὶν — διενεχθῆναι*, "without ever having quarrelled with me." Cf. Xen. Anab. IV. 3. 12. Omit *πρότερον* in translation.

25. *περιφέρει*, "comes back to me."

26. *μειράκια — διαλεγόμενοι.* A construction according to sense rather than form. Cf. Theaet. 146 B *τῶν μειρακίων τινά*, where, however, BT have *τι*. Cf. Note **34.** 24.

29. *ὅδε*, the person present. *οὗτος* refers to the relative clause preceding.

32. *ὀρθοῖς*, "you do credit to." For the repetition in *ὀρθοῦντα — ὀρθή*, v. Note **4.** 34, and cf. *ἔπαινος — ἐπαινεῖ — ἐπαινοῦσιν* in **30.** 7–9.

33. *οἰκεῖα τὰ σὰ ἡμῖν*, "you will be intimate with us."

30. 3. *Δηλίου.* This was a sanctuary of Apollo, which lay in territory disputed by the Athenians and the Boeotians, and here in 424 B.C. the former sustained a serious defeat. On Socrates' behavior on this occasion, cf. Apol. 28 E, and Sym. 221 A. "He and Laches were retreating, as the troops were in flight, and there you might see him just as he is in the streets of Athens, calmly contemplating enemies as well as friends, and making very intelligible to anybody that whoever attacks him will be likely to meet with a stout resistance. I particularly observed how superior he was to Laches in presence of mind" (tr. Jowett).

5. Notice the shift of tense and meaning in *ἦν — ἔπεσε.*

ἔπεσε — πτῶμα; v. Note **16.** 31.

8. *καὶ εἰς ταῦτα*, "even in this respect" (with *ἐπαινεῖ*). *καὶ σύ*, "you also." *σε — αὐτόν = σεαυτόν.*

11–13. Cf. Rep. 328 D *μὴ οὖν ἄλλως ποίει, ἀλλὰ — σύνισθι* κτλ.

11. *ἀνεγνωρίσαμεν ἀλλήλους*, "we found one another out" (Jow.).

12. *σύνισθι* (*σύνειμι*).

15. ὅπως ἂν διασφίζητε. ὅπως and ὡς take ἄν in final clauses, because they were originally relative particles, and the sentence was governed by the laws of conditional relatives. H. 882, G. 1367, G M T. 325. Cf. A. J. P. IV. 422.

ὑμεῖς, you and the boys. τὴν ὑμετέραν, Lysimachus and Sophroniscus.

17. τί φατε; τί δοκεῖ; τὸ μάθημα κτλ. The rapid succession of questions adds vivacity to the dialogue.

22. νεώτερον. Yet he was nearly fifty at this time.

23. τῶνδε, masc.; τούτων, neut. with ἀπειρότερον, or masc. repeating τῶνδε.

24. παρά; v. Note **11**. 34.

26. πότερος, "one or the other"; v. Note **20**. 23.

29. καὶ γάρ is correlated with καὶ ἅμα in l. 32. Cf. **36**. 14.

ἄλλοθι = ἐν ἄλλοις ἔργοις.

31. βέλτιον ἴσχειν, "to be better."

οὐδενὸς — φαυλότερον, "it is inferior to none of the exercises."

34. οὗ γὰρ ἀγῶνος κτλ. "In the sport in which we take part and under the conditions to which it is subject, only those are trained who are trained in the implements of war."

31. 7. οὐ τἄν. Crasis for οὔ τοι ἄν.

8. οὐδὲν ἂν πάθοι. πάσχειν τι is a common euphemism for death.

9. ταύτῃ, *i.e.* τῇ τῶν ὅπλων ἐπιστήμῃ.

12. ταῦτα λαβών refers to the clause just before, and τούτων (in τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα) to πᾶν τὸ περὶ τὰς στρατηγίας.

14. τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα, "which are connected with these."

16. ὧν καθηγήσαιτ' ἄν, "of which this art would be the beginning."

18. αὐτὸν αὑτοῦ, "than he was before." Cf. Prot. 350 A οἱ ἐπιστήμονες τῶν μὴ ἐπισταμένων θαρραλεώτεροί εἰσιν, καὶ αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν, ἐπειδὰν μάθωσιν, ἢ πρὶν μαθεῖν, where the last two clauses explain the meaning of αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν; v. Note **6**. 33.

20. ὅτι καὶ εὐσχημονέστερον, sc. ἂν ποιήσειεν.

24. παρὰ ταῦτα; v. Note **27**. 7.

27. ὁτουοῦν, from ὁστισοῦν.

30. ἔστιν, emphatic.

31. οἱ ὑπισχνούμενοι = οἱ διδάσκοντες. ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι is similarly used. Cf. **36**. 11.

32. τί καὶ δέοι. καί, "also."

34. εἴ τι ἦν. τι is emphatic "(good for) anything." Cf. **7**. 26, **33**. 9, **47**. 20, **53**. 22 οἰομένῳ τι εἶναι, **54**. 17, Apol. 41 E ἐὰν δοκῶσί τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες.

Λακεδαιμονίους. The article is not necessary with the name of a people in the plural. R. 36. Laches was well acquainted with Spartan customs; v. Introd. p. xviii.

32. 5. ὅτι ἄν and ἐκείνοις ἄν; v. Note **28.** 16.

6. τιμηθείς is conditional.

7. ὥσπερ γε καὶ τραγῳδίας ποιητής. In Athens alone were original tragedies presented, although other cities had large and beautiful theatres, and poets came from all directions to display their talent in the literary center of Greece.

10. ἐπιδεικνύμενος — ἐπιδείκνυσιν; v. App.

τοῖσδε, *i.e.* the Athenians; v. Note **29.** 29.

11. εἰκότως. Often placed, like δικαίως, at the end of a sentence as an afterthought, and usually followed by an explanatory clause. Cf. Apol. 32 B ἐβούλεσθε ἀθρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ὡς — ἔδοξε, Dem. 21. 43.

12. τὴν μὲν Λακεδαίμονα. Sparta rigorously excluded all foreign influence and culture, in marked contrast to the Athenian policy (cf. Thuc. II. 39), so that Laches' argument is fallacious.

12–13. ἄβατον ἱερόν and ἄκρῳ ποδί ("with the tips of their toes") are proverbial expressions (cf. Isoc. Hel. 58 ἄβατον τοῖς πονηροῖς ὥσπερ ἱερόν, Cic. Coel. 28 *extremis, ut dicitur, digitis*); v. Note **2.** 17.

17. οὐ πάνυ ὀλίγοις. Litotes; v. Note **13.** 33.

18. ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔργῳ. The same as ἐν τῇ μάχῃ αὐτῇ **31.** 3, though here intended, in its literal meaning, to suggest a contrast with the boastful professions of these artists. Laches is preëminently a practical man, and is glad to appeal to facts, though his story does not really prove the uselessness of ὁπλομαχία.

19. αὐτόθεν, "on the spot," "immediately." Cf. Gorg. 470 E.

ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες, imitated by Cicero in De Orat. I. 20. 91 *quasi dedita opera*, etc.

20. ἐπίτηδες — ἐπιτηδευσάντων. A sort of pun or play on words (v. Note **38.** 12), which is accentuated by the position at the beginning and end. Cf. Note **34.** 4.

τὰ ὁπλιτικά, the plural with a tone of contempt, "the tricks of fencing."

23. παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους, "more than the rest." Cf. Note **11.** 34.

δεδυστυχήκασιν. Equivalent to the pres. tense. H. 849, G. 1263.

24. ἐπεὶ καί, "so for example."

25. ἐπιδεικνύμενον is ironical of course, as throughout the story. Cf. **33.** 9, **42.** 1, **46.** 23, **48.** 20, **53.** 17, 30; v. Note **23.** 9.

26. ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ = ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ. ἐν τ. ἀ. ὡς ἀληθῶς. For the pleonasm, cf. Phaedo 66 C ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι.

28. *ἐπεβάτευε*. He must have been a volunteer, for the marines (*ἐπιβάται*) were usually drawn from the lowest class of Athenian citizens (Thuc. VI. 43).

Notice the accumulated imperfects from l. 28 to **33.** 3, showing the gradual progress of the narrative.

29. *δορυδρέπανον*, "halbert," a spear (*δόρυ*) with a sickle-shaped (*δρέπανον*) point at the side near the head. A weapon like this was sometimes used to cut the rigging of the enemy's vessel.

33. 2. For the repetition of *ναῦς*, v. Note **4.** 34.

3. *ἐφίει*, v. App.

4. *ἀντελάβετο*, "it held fast." *τοῦ δόρατος*, "the shaft."

7, 8. *ἐκ τῆς τριήρους ὁλκάδος* for *ἐν τῇ τριήρει ὁλκάδι*. The preposition *ἐκ* is suggested by the idea of motion in *ἦν* ("arose") and *ὁρῶντες*. Similarly *εἰς* is often found in passages where movement is only implied by the context, not expressed by the verb. Cf. Phaedo 116 A *ἀνίσταται εἰς οἴκημά τι ὡς λουσόμενος*.

9. *ἐκεῖνο*, v. App.

ἴσως. Polite, but at the same time ironical. Cf. **42.** 1, **48.** 34.

εἴη ἄν τι; v. Note **31.** 34.

10. *δ' οὖν*, "at any rate."

This adventure may have occurred during Laches' expedition to Sicily in 427 B.C., when the Athenians undertook to aid the people of Leontini. Cf. Thuc. III. 90, 103, 115.

14. *οἷοιτο αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι*. The insertion of the reflexive as subject of the infinitive is more rare in Greek than its omission in Latin. Cf. Note **22.** 17.

16. *φυλαττόμενος*, "watched."

17. *ἴσχειν* depends on *δοκεῖ*, though the nearer *γένοιτο* remains unaffected. In the first clause *δοκεῖ* is used parenthetically (cf. *οἶμαι* **34.** 7), in the second it asserts its rights. Cf. R. 284.

18. *θαυμαστὸν ὅσον* was originally an ellipsis for *θαυμαστὸν ὅσον ἐστίν*, but is here combined to form a temporary compound, and stands in apposition or agreement with *τι*. Tr. "in some wonderful way"; v. Note **3.** 27.

21. *τοιαύτη τις*. *τις* makes *τοιαύτη* definite and specific. Cf. Notes **8.** 31, **49.** 20.

22. *ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον*. Cf. l. 11 *ὃ οὖν καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἶπον*, **34.** 21 *ὃ ἐγὼ ἄρτι ἔλεγον*, **37.** 15, **53.** 33. Similarly *χρὴ τόνδε μὴ ἀφιέναι*. Cf. **30.** 1 *μὴ ἀφίεσό γε τἀνδρός*, **36.** 21 *μὴ ἀφίεσθαι*, **53.** 33 *μὴ ἀφιέναι*; v. Note **4.** 33.

26. *ἔτι τοῦ διακρινοῦντος*. *ἔτι* modifies *δεῖν*, and is out of place as in Crat. 399 A *ἔτι τήμερον σοφώτερος*, or *γε* in *πρός γε ὑμᾶς* **27.** 4. This is called hyperbaton. R. 293, 295; v. Note **47.** 2.

δοκεῖ — ἡ βουλή. This use of a definite subject with δεῖ is quite rare (cf. Polit. 277 D), though it is common enough with δεῖται.

27. νῦν δέ introduces εὖ ἔχει, as the punctuation shows, but often, as in **54.** 14, it forms a close union with γάρ, and, like ἀλλὰ γάρ, implies an ellipsis of some such thought as "it is not so." Cf. Apol. 38 B νῦν δὲ οὐ γάρ ἐστιν. A close parallel to the parenthesis in the present passage is found in Il. 12. 326, where ἴομεν takes up the νῦν δέ, with which the sentence began, after an interruption of several verses; v. Note **24.** 28, where Riddell's explanation of νῦν δὲ — γάρ is given.

28. τὴν ἐναντίαν, sc. ψῆφον, as σύμψηφος shows.

30. τί δέ indicates surprise and disagreement. Cf. **35.** 23, Note **16.** 22.

32. τί γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ ποιοῖ. Cf. Phaedo 61 E. τις stands here for the speaker himself, as in Il. 1. 287 ὅ δ' ἀνὴρ ἐθέλει πᾶσι σημαίνειν, ἅ τιν' οὐ πείσεσθαι οἴω.

34. 1. For the repetition of κἂν — ἄν, cf. **31.** 7–8, **32.** 5–6, **33.** 16, 17 **40.** 4–5, **60.** 13, **62.** 4, **74.** 10–11, etc.; v. Note **5.** 23, R. 266 d.

ὑπό, not "by," but "under (the guidance of)."

4. οὖσιν, concessive; so ἐνὶ ὄντι in l. 12.

αὐτῷ — ἡμῖν. The first and last word afford a sharp contrast. Cf. Note **32.** 20.

6. ἴσως, v. Note **39.** 2.

9. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; γάρ often expresses surprise. Cf. l. 33; v. Note **28.** 33.

13. ἢ περὶ σμικροῦ οἴεσθε. Cf. Rep. 344 D ἢ σμικρὸν οἴει κτλ. Tr. περὶ σμικροῦ κινδυνεύειν, "have a small matter at stake."

16. οἶκος — οἰκήσεται; v. Note **16.** 31.

24. γεγονότες ἦσαν. This periphrastic form of the pluperfect foreshadows the modern use of auxiliary verbs in forming the tenses. Cf. μισοῦντες γίγνονται Leg. 908 B. Similarly the aor. part. is used with ἔχω in tragedy (λύσας ἔχω), and μέλλω with the inf. takes the place of the future, as in l. 8 and **27.** 10.

αὐτοῦ τούτου. The neuter pronoun here refers to a feminine noun (ἀγωνία), the natural gender taking precedence of the grammatical. Cf. **3.** 3, **35.** 21, **39.** 4, **40.** 23; also Rep. 526 C, where αὐτὸ τοῦτο refers to γεωμετρία, I. Alc. 115 D. Cf. Note **29.** 26.

26. οὐκοῦν ἔτι πρότερον, sc. ἐσκοποῦμεν ἄν.

τίνος ὄντος τούτου. The participle is often used with the interrogative, where we expect the indicative. Cf. **42.** 25. The case is due to τούτου above.

28. πῶς λέγεις is an indication that Plato regarded the subject as difficult. Cf. πῶς φεύγων, **41.** 23. In **40.** 6 Socrates explains an obscure point of his own accord.

31. *σκεπτόμεθα*. This form is almost unknown in Attic, *σκοπέω* being used in the present system. Cobet ascribes its (rare) occurrence in Plato to the influence of Homer.

33. *οὐ γάρ*; v. Note l. 7.

35. 1. *φαρμάκου*, "ointment."

2. *πρὸς ὀφθαλμούς*. Parts of the body may dispense with the article.

τίς του. Both pronouns are indefinite, the first enclitic receiving its accent from the second; so *τίς τι* in l. 10.

6. *προσοιστέον* (*προσφέρω*).

οὐκοῦν ἐνὶ λόγῳ marks the conclusion of the inductive process.

11. *ἐσκόπει*. The imperfect is employed, because the preceding gradual process of investigation is still present to the mind.

12. *περὶ τοῦ ὃ κτλ*. Plato is the only Attic prose writer that freely uses an article to introduce a relative clause. The dependent sentence is equivalent to a substantive, and the construction is similar to the articular infinitive with subject and object. R. 30.

14. *τὸν σύμβουλον* is object, not subject.

τεχνικός, "an expert."

21. *τοῦτο θεραπεῦσαι*. *τοῦτο* refers to *ψυχῆς*, and *τούτου*, just below, to *ψυχῆς θεραπείαν*; v. Note **34.** 24.

27. *ἕν καὶ πλείω*. With numbers, *καὶ* often means "or."

28. *ἀληθῆ λέγεις* is so stereotyped a phrase that it is practically a compound verb, and so takes a singular object, *τοῦτο*, though *ἀληθῆ* is plural. Cf. Dem. 7. 43, where the Mss. have *ἀληθῆ μὲν*, "surely," like *μὴν*, with which it was originally identical.

32. *εἰ μέν φαμεν ἔχειν*, sc. *ἐπιδεῖξαι*. *ἔχειν*, "can" (Tatham). Most editors sc. *διδασκάλους*, but this does not make as good sense.

36. 2. *οὔ φησι*, "denies." Cf. **37.** 7.

5. To *εἰ μέν* in **35.** 32 corresponds *εἰ δὲ μηδὲν κτλ*, while *ἢ εἴ τις — γεγόνασιν* is a parenthesis.

7. *αἰτίαν ἔχειν* is the passive of *αἰτιᾶσθαι*.

9. *ἐπιθυμῶ* gets from *ἐκ νέου ἀρξάμενος* (= *πάλαι*) the force of a perfect.

10. *σοφισταῖς*. The sophists were the earliest teachers in Greece who received pay for their instruction; they devoted themselves to all branches, especially rhetoric and philosophy. For various reasons they later gained a bad name, which they did not at first have, and which many of them did not deserve.

11. *ἐπηγγέλλοντο κτλ*. Cf. Prot. 318 A, where Protagoras says: "You will return home a better man . . . every day than you were before," and

319 A, when Socrates asks if he promises to make men good citizens, *Αὐτὸ — τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ἐπάγγελμα ὃ ἐπαγγέλλομαι.*

20. *ἐθαύμασα.* Dramatic aorist of sudden action. The use of the aorist, however, where the present might be expected, is not uncommon with verbs of emotion, especially in the tragic poets. Cf. Leg. 686 D *καὶ αὐτὸς ἐμαυτοῦ νῦν δὴ καταγέλασα*; GMT. 60.

22. *παρακελεύομαι* repeats *ἀντιδέομαι*, which the speaker had forgotten in the meantime. Cf. Note **43**. 14, **49**. 22.

23. *παρακελεύομαί σοι — λέγοντα.* The nearness to *ἐρωτᾶν* and the distance from *σοι* prevented the participle from agreeing with its pronoun. This looseness of concord is common enough in Plato. Cf. Note **4**. 16, **20**. 30, etc.

λέγοντα, ὅτι. *ὅτι* is merely a sign of quotation; v. Note **7**. 3.

27. *σὺ — εἴπετον.* The dual is due to the intervening vocatives. Cf. Euthyd. 283 B *εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατές τε καὶ ὑμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι.* The inclusion of more than one person in the address was an afterthought.

τίνι δή. *δή* lends a tone of impatience to the question.

δεινοτάτῳ, "especially skilled."

συγγεγόνατον, the regular word for "receive instruction," but here with the broader meaning, "converse with." Cf. **29**. 17 *συνδιατρίβειν*, Theaet. 142 C *συγγενόμενος τε καὶ διαλεχθείς*; v. Note **50**. 15.

30. *ἄλλοι* is, in sense at least, in apposition (not agreement) with *ὁμότεχνοι.*

32. *δώροις* for the sophists, *χάρισιν* for friends.

ἀμφότερα, adv.

34. *γεγονότε* (dual, sc. *ἐστόν*, but *δότε*, plu.). This shift of form, which appears early, shows that the dual was slowly dying. In fact, it received an artificial revival in the works of Xenophon and Plato.

37. 3. *μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ Καρί.* The Carians were the first people to serve as mercenary soldiers, and being less highly esteemed than the citizens, were often put in the most dangerous position during a battle. Furthermore, so many slaves came from Caria that Carian, like Thracian, became a synonym for slave, and consequently a term of reproach. Indeed, so bad was their reputation that they were classed with Cretans and Cappadocians as *τρία Κάππα κάκιστα.* Here, as in our proverb (*ἐν Καρὶ τὸν κίνδυνον*), alliteration, which has great influence in all folklore utterances, seems to have played an important part. *Κάρ*, then, in this passage means "a worthless fellow"; v. Note **2**. 17.

ὁ κίνδυνος κινδυνεύηται. This verb is regularly followed by *ἐν*. Cf. Rep. 424 C. Tr. "make a dangerous experiment."

5. *ἀτεχνῶς*; v. Note **2**. 16.

τὸ λεγόμενον is parenthetic and *ἡ κεραμεία* is the subject of *συμβαίνῃ*. For the proverb, cf. Gorg. 514 E *τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ πίθῳ τὴν κεραμείαν ἐπιχειρεῖν μαθεῖν*. . The *πίθος* was the largest kind of earthen jar, and to begin to learn the potter's art by attempting the most difficult piece of work would be labor wasted. Tr. *ἐν πίθῳ — γιγνομένῃ*, "to begin pottery with the wine-jar." Ceramic art was then at its height in Athens, and its products were exported to all parts of the Greek world.

7. *οὔ φατε*, "deny." Cf. **36**. 2.

12. *διδόναι λόγον*. Here, "answer," but in **38**. 1, "give account."

αὐτοὺς χρὴ γιγνώσκειν, "you must decide for yourselves."

18. *ὀλίγου*, "almost"; v. Note **61**. 3.

ἡλικίαν ἔχουσι, "are old enough." A temporary compound, hence no article.

19. *εἰ οὖν μήτι διαφέρει*; v. Note **7**. 7.

25. *ἀλλ' ἤ*, "except."

26. *ἐν τοῖς δημόταις*. When Athens became the head of the Attic state, the townships or demes were allowed to retain jurisdiction over matters of local interest. Each deme held assemblies, not only to elect its officers and to revise the list of its members, but also to celebrate its peculiar religious festivals, which it had preserved from ancient times.

38. 1. *ἐμπέσῃ*, "is driven." Cf. Phil. 19 A *οὐκ εἰς φαῦλόν γε ἐρώτημα — περιαγαγὼν ἡμᾶς ἐμβέβληκε Σωκράτης*. The dialectic power of the philosopher was irresistible, and is compared to a hunter's net, from which none can escape.

2. *βίον βεβίωκεν*; v. Note **16**. 31.

4. *ἐγώ*. The emphatic pronoun implies "though others may not like it, I do." So the speaker continues, *χαίρω γάρ*.

5. *τῷδε* and *τούτου* refer to the same person; v. Note **30**. 23.

10. *τὸν ταῦτα μὴ φεύγοντα*. *ταῦτα* is the testing just mentioned.

κατὰ τὸ τοῦ Σόλωνος. An allusion to the famous line, *γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος*, quoted more closely in **39**. 7.

11. *ἕωσπερ ἂν ζῇ*. Cf. Apol. 29 D *ἕωσπερ ἄν ἐμπνέω* ("breathe"), *οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν*.

αὐτό, "of itself," "alone."

12. *ἄηθες — ἀηδές*. A pun like *πατέρα — πατρίδα* in **30**. 2–3 (cf. **32**. 19–20), or *Παυσανίου παυσαμένου* Sym. 185 C, or *ὁμότροπός τε καὶ ὁμότροφος* Phaedo 83 D. Cf. Notes l. 20, **45**. 21–23, **47**. 21, R. 323; v. Introd. p. xv.

16. *τὸ ἐμόν*, "as far as I am concerned." Cf. *τὰ σὰ* and *τὰ ἡμέτερα* **29**. 34. These phrases usually designate the person and all his belongings,

though in **39.** 18 *τὰ ὑμέτερα* and **46.** 7, **51.** 15 *τὰ ἡμέτερα* mean little more than *ὑμεῖς* and *ἡμεῖς*. In l. 19. *τὸ ἐμόν* is "my feelings."

20. *οὐχ ἁπλοῦν*. Laches plays on the meaning of the word, the first *ἁπλοῦν* being "simple" ("straightforward") as in Aesch. Fr. 173 *ἁπλᾶ γάρ ἐστι τῆς ἀληθείας ἔπη*, while the second is "simple" in the sense of "single" (undivided).

26. *μουσικός*. Plato often uses this word in the sense of "symmetrically cultured and refined, both intellectually and morally."

ἁρμονίαν, "mode," or "scale." *τῷ ὄντι*, "really."

28. *ἡρμοσμένος εὖ*. Cf. Rep. 412 A *μουσικώτατον καὶ εὐαρμοστότατον*; tr. "well tuned."

αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ; v. Note **6.** 33.

τοῖς λόγοις is dat. of respect (H. 780, G. 1182), while *πρὸς τὰ ἔργα* follows *σύμφωνον*. For the thought, cf. Hdt. III. 157 *τοῖσι ἔπεσι τὰ ἔργα παρεχόμενον ὁμοῖα*; tr. "so that his words are in harmony with his deeds."

29. *ἀτεχνῶς*; v. Note **2.** 16.

δωριστί. Plato carefully distinguishes the ethical effects of these four modes in Rep. 399 A, and Aristotle agrees with him in commending the Dorian. This was distinctively Greek, for the others were mainly of Asiatic origin. The Phrygian was inspiring and exciting, the Ionian and Lydian were weak and effeminate, but the Dorian was firm and manly. The theory of Socrates regarding the Dorian mode is satirized by Aristophanes, Eq. 990 ff.

39. 2. *ὡς ἔοικε* is really ironical, for there is no doubt in the speaker's mind. Cf. Phaedo 61 B *ἄπειμι δέ, ὡς ἔοικε, τήμερον*, when the time of Socrates' death had already been announced to him. So l. 18, **45.** 13, and *ἴσως* l. 32, **42.** 1, **48.** 34, **52.** 22. Similarly in guarded, though real assent, as *ἔοικε* **31.** 32, **45.** 8, *ἴσως* **34.** 6, *φαίνονται* **44.** 34, **53.** 14, and often; v. Note **12.** 24.

τῶν ἔργων refers to his military achievements mentioned in **30.** 3.

3. *ἄξιον ὄντα λόγων καλῶν*, "such that we might expect noble words from him."

4. *τοῦτο*, *i.e.* *λόγοι καλοί*; v. Note **35.** 22.

συμβούλομαι (*not* *συμβουλεύομαι*) is said with reference to **38.** 16; tr. "I share his wishes."

8. *συγχωρείτω*, *i.e.* Solon.

11. *τῶν τοιούτων*, *i.e.* such apparent defects.

οὕτω σὺ παρ' ἐμοὶ διάκεισαι, "such has been my opinion of you" (Jow.).

15. *ἔδωκας — διδόναι — δώσειν*. The repetition is characteristic of conversational style; v. Note **4.** 34.

18. *μὴ οὐχ*; v. Note **13.** 11.

19. *συμβουλεύειν καὶ συσκοπεῖν.* Their willingness to give advice was shown **30.** 26–**39.** 16, and to join the investigation **37.** 31–**39.** 16. Lysimachus asks Socrates to represent Melesias and himself in the proposed discussion, and speak in their stead. By this action the dialogue is left entirely in the hands of the principal interlocutors.

25. *οὐ πάνυ*; v. Note **13.** 33.

26. *ὑμᾶς αὐτούς* = *ἀλλήλους.*

32. *ἴσως*; v. Note **39.** 2.

34. *σχεδόν τι*; v. Note **29.** 2.

μᾶλλον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, i.e. more thorough and philosophical.

40. 12. *σχολῇ ἂν σύμβουλοι κτλ.* Cf. Rep. 354 C.

19. *ταῖς ψυχαῖς* makes the relation of *ἀρετή* to *τοῖς υἱέσιν* more specific. This joining of the part affected with the person who is the object of the action (*σχῆμα καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος*) is common in the poets, but very rare in prose. Cf. Il. 14. 151 *Ἀχαιοῖσιν δὲ μέγα σθένος ἔμβαλ' ἑκάστῳ καρδίῃ.*

23. *ὅ τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν.* The participle *ὄν* agrees with the predicate *ὅ τι* instead of the subject *ἀρετή* understood. Cf. Rep. 354 C *τὸ δίκαιον — εἴσομαι εἴτε ἀρετή τις οὖσα τυγχάνει*; v. Note **27.** 16.

τούτου refers to *ὅπως ἂν — κτήσαιτο.*

27. *μέντοι*, "it is true." Cf. **46.** 16, **47.** 5.

28. *εἴποιμεν τί ἐστιν.* Exact definition is the chief aim of the Socratic dialectic, and is usually reached by the inductive process, which leads from concrete examples to general truths. Cf. Introd. p. xiv.

30. *τοίνυν* does not here draw a conclusion, but merely continues the argument.

περὶ ὅλης ἀρετῆς. The names of virtues and vices may stand without an article.

31. *μέρους.* The Protagoras, which, like the Republic and Meno, treats *περὶ ὅλης ἀρετῆς*, distinguishes (349 B C) five virtues as *parts* of virtue itself, — Temperance, Courage, Justice, Wisdom, Piety; v. **50.** 31. Four of these appear in Aesch. Sept. 610, and only four are found in the Republic, Piety being absent. See, however, Introd. p. xxviii.

34. *Ἀλλ'*; v. Note **28.** 33 *γάρ.*

41. 7. *καθ' ὅσον οἷόν τε*, since, as Plato maintains in his later dialogues, natural aptitude and tendency must be considered.

8. *πειρῶ*, imperat. mid.

11. *ἐν τῇ τάξει μένων.* The soldier speaks from his experience of the phalanx, where it was essential to keep each line of soldiers firm and unbroken that the enemy might be crushed by the united attack. So the poet Tyrtaeus urges the Spartans, *μάχεσθε παρ' ἀλλήλοισι μένοντες.*

13. *ἐγὼ αἴτιος*; v. Note **23**. 9.

14. *τὸ σὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι*. *αἴτιος* also takes the simple infinitive, as **42**. 8–9, or the genitive of the articular infinitive.

που, equivalent to *οἶμαι*.

17. *καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ*; v. Note **28**. 33. The answer, "Not you alone," suggested by Laches' remark, "I, at least, agree," is here suppressed.

24. *Σκύθαι*. The same was told of the Parthians. Cf. Hor. Od. I. 19. 10 *Scythas et versis animosum equis Parthum* and 35. 9 *Te profugi Scythae*. Their descendants, the Cossacks, have preserved this manner of fighting.

25. *Ὁμηρός που*. Il. 5. 223, 8. 108. *μήστωρ φόβοιο*, applied at different times to Aeneas, Hector, Diomed, and Patroclus, was explained by the ancients as "creator of flight," but is here interpreted by Plato as "skilled in flight"; the meaning which *μήστωρ* bears in other combinations, as *μήστωρ ἀυτῆς*. Plato abounds in these rather far-fetched arguments from Homer, and is perhaps parodying the practice of the subtile sophists, who paid much attention to interpretation of the poets; v. Notes **11**. 30, **65**. 9–10.

32. *τὸ τῶν Σκυθῶν*, "as far as the Scythians are concerned."

Laches' answer shows that he misses the dialectic bearing of the Homeric example.

42. 1. *ἴσως*; v. Note **39**. 2.

2. *Πλαταιαῖς*; v. App.

τοῖς γερροφόροις. The *γέρρα* were shields made of wicker-work, and covered with leather, which were sometimes stuck in the ground to form a sort of breastwork, behind which the bowmen took their stand (v. Hdt. IX. 61).

3–5. The present (imperf.) infinitives show the progress of the action, the aorist its result.

17. The sentence is so long that Socrates forgets the participle *βουλόμενος*, with which he began, and with *εἰσὶ γὰρ* breaks off abruptly, leaving the sentence without any finite verb; v. Introd. p. xv. Cf. Notes l. 32, **4**. 16, **36**. 27, **49**. 16, App. **39**. 25.

28. *οὐ πάνυ τι* and *σχεδόν τι* (l. 32); v. Note **29**. 3.

32. *σχεδόν τι*, "in fact it may be said that." *καὶ αὐτὸ κεκτήμεθα*, where we should expect *καὶ ὅ*. This free construction is very common in Plato.

οὗ καὶ πέρι. The antecedent of *οὗ* is something like *ἐν παντί*, as may be inferred from the context. *καὶ* has here a depreciatory force.

43. 3. *ταχυτῆτα* belongs to the agent, *τάχος* to the action.

ὀνομάζεις, "define."

7. *Ὀρθῶς γε σὺ λέγων*. Cf. **4**. 10, **11**. 17, Rep. 474 A *καλῶς γ'—ἐγὼ ποιῶν*.

9. *ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς*. With *οἷς*, sc. *ἐν* from the antecedent *ἅπασιν*. R. 190.

12. *τὸ διὰ πάντων πεφυκός*, "the universal character that pervades all" (Jow.). Cf. Meno 74 A *τὴν μίαν, ἣ διὰ πάντων ἐστίν*. Lit. "what is found in all cases."

14. *τοίνυν* has here almost the same meaning as *μέντοι*.

ἔμοιγε φαίνεται with *ὡς ἐγῷμαι* is pleonastic. Cf. **49.** 22 and Notes **36.** 22, **74.** 25.

44. 21. *ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ* shows that Laches yields the point unwillingly, yet he must admit that the wise man is not guided by constancy alone.

25. *εἰς φρέαρ καταβαίνοντες*. Doubtless to clean the well, or to find lost objects. The same example is used Prot. 350 A.

29. *εἴπερ οἵοιτό γε οὕτως* shows that Socrates does not agree with Laches, for it is only on the basis of Nicias' definition (**52.** 25) that we can appreciate the nobility of self-sacrifice, which looks beyond the present danger to the higher good.

45. 6. *πάλιν*, "on the contrary."

ᾧ λέγομεν, "our principle" or "proposition."

19. *βούλει* (cf. **46.** 2) is parenthetic, like *δοκεῖ* and *οἶμαι*; v. Note **48.** 9, G M T. 288.

21–23. *καρτερεῖν — καρτερήσωμεν, ἀνδρεία — ἀνδρείως*. A playful application of abstract terms; v. Note **38.** 12.

καταγελάσῃ. A not uncommon personification. Cf. Notes **25.** 9, **51.** 34.

24. *πολλάκις*; v. Note **27.** 21.

33. *κυνηγέτην* and **46.** 5 *χειμαζομένοις* are both favorite metaphors in Plato. So in Rep. 432 B Socrates tells Glaucon to stand beside the bush and watch lest justice escape (cf. *διέφυγεν*), and in Phil. 29 B says that he is deluged with perplexity (cf. *ἀποροῦσι*).

46. 2. *βούλει*; v. Note **45.** 19.

5. *χειμαζομένοις — ἀποροῦσι*. Plato often explains his metaphors by adding a simpler expression of the same idea. Cf. Gorg. 447 A *κατόπιν ἑορτῆς ἥκομεν καὶ ὑστεροῦμεν*, Prot. 314 A *κυβεύῃς τε καὶ κινδυνεύῃς*.

7. *τὰ ἡμέτερα*; v. Note **38.** 16.

10. *Δοκεῖτε τοίνυν κτλ.* More fully, *λέξω τοίνυν ἃ νοῶ· δοκεῖτε γάρ μοι*.

16. *μέντοι*; v. Note **40.** 27.

19. *καὶ οὐ σφόδρα*. We say "but," where the Greek said *καὶ*. For *οὐ σφόδρα*, cf. Note **13.** 33 *οὐ πάνυ*.

20. *σοφίαν τινά*. Here not one of the virtues, but equivalent to *ἐπιστήμη*.

22. *ποίαν σοφίαν;* Laches puts this question ironically, as a decided rejection of the definition (cf. Gorg. 490 E *ποῖα ὑποδήματα; φλυαρεῖς ἔχων;* v. Note **23.** 26), but Socrates chooses to take it literally.

26. *ἦ γε αὐλητική*. Ironical. Such illustrations from professions and trades are very characteristic of Socrates. Cf. **23.** 26, also **35.** 1, **40.** 13, **44.** 4, **47.** 13, **51.** 29 (all from medicine), **35.** 6 (from horse-training), Xen. Mem. I. 2. 37; v. Introd. p. xiv.

33. *ταύτην* stands alone, with *τὴν ἐπιστήμην* in apposition. This definition agrees with that given by Socrates in Xen. Mem. IV. 6. 11. Cf. Prot. 360 D.

34. *θαρραλέων* here means what inspires confidence, "safe." Cf. **51.** 10.

47. 2. *πρὸς τί* belongs to *βλέψας*. Such hyperbaton is not rare in conversation. R. 289; v. Note **33.** 26.

3. *πρὸς ὅ τι*. In repeating a question the indirect interrogative takes the place of the direct. Cf. Euthyph. 2 C ΕΥ. *τίνα γραφήν σε γέγραπται;* ΣΩ. *ἤντινα; οὐκ ἀγεννῆ*, Ar. Thes. 203 ΕΥΡ. *πῶς;* ΑΓ. *ὅπως; δοκῶν* κτλ.

5. *οὐ μέντοι*, "he does deny it, to be sure."

7. *οὔκ*, "No!" rejecting Socrates' proposition.

11. *ἐπεί*, "for." *αὐτίκα*, "for example," is regularly used to introduce an illustration. Cf. Prot. 359 E. Vergil uses *continuo* in the same way, Georg. I. 356. R. 143.

21. *καὶ γὰρ λέγει γέ τι*. Again a play on words. Socrates used *λέγει τι* as meaning, "speak wisely" (cf. **53.** 4), the opposite of *οὐδὲν λέγειν* (cf. l. 11), "talk nonsense," but Laches repeats the phrase in its literal sense. Cf. Notes **38.** 12, **46.** 23.

48. 1. *τοῦτο — γιγνώσκειν*, "this knowledge."

7–10. Laches' ridicule is here especially effective, for we know from Thucydides (VII. 50. 4) that the superstitious Nicias relied far too much on soothsayers; v. Note **51.** 34, Introd. p. xix.

9. *οἶει* is parenthetic and without influence on the construction; v. App. Cf. *οἶμαι* **2.** 13, **34.** 7, **39.** 33, **42.** 22, *δοκεῖ* **33.** 13, **54.** 16, *βούλει* **45.** 19, **46.** 2.

20. *εἰ μὴ εἰ*, "unless perhaps." Ironical.

22. *ἄνω καὶ κάτω*, we say "hither and thither." Cf. Ion. 541 E *παντοδαπὸς γίγνει στρεφόμενος ἄνω καὶ κάτω*, Note **10.** 33.

25–27. *λέγειν — λόγοι — λόγον — λόγοις*; v. Notes **4.** 34, **39.** 15.

26. *εἶχεν ἄν τινα λόγον*, "there would be some reason."

29. *Οὐδέν* answers *τί* in Laches' question.

34. *ἴσως*; v. Note **33.** 9.

πυνθάνεσθαι, πυνθάνου — πέπυσμαι. The threefold repetition of the same verb shows the weariness and disgust of the speaker, and with *πύστις* Socrates mockingly takes up the refrain. The latter word is used nowhere else by Plato.

49. 8. *οὐ παντὸς ἀνδρός* is perhaps taken from the proverb, *οὐ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐς Κόρινθον ἔσθ' ὁ πλοῦς*.

ὁπότε γε is causal, but is also conditional, as *μή* shows. R. 143.

12. *κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν*. The full form of the proverb is *κἂν κύων κἂν ὗς γνοίη*, and indicates what is easy and simple; v. App.

τῷ ὄντι, like *ὡς ἀληθῶς* (**50.** 12), often applies a simile, poetical citation, or proverb to the case in point. Cf. **38.** 27, Gorg. 492 E, etc., Note **2.** 17.

15. *τὴν Κρομμυωνίαν ὗν*. This fierce sow ravaged the plain of *Κρομμυών* in southern Megaris, until it was killed by the Athenian hero, Theseus.

16. The position of *οὐ παίζων* leads us to expect a contrasted participle in the next clause, but the sentence continues with the same construction as *λέγω*. Cf. Apol. 21 E, Note **4.** 17.

17. *τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι*, dat. dependent on *ἀναγκαῖον*, though properly the subject of the infinitive. R. 183.

20. *ἤ τινα κάπρον*. *τινα* here makes *κάπρον* more specific, with a reference to *ὗς* above, and so distinguishes it from the rest of the list; it also shows the indecision of the speaker (v. Aesch. Ag. 55). Cf. Note **33.** 21.

21. *ὁμοίως λέοντα — πεφυκέναι*, "that a lion and a stag or a bull and a monkey are equally brave."

22. *φάναι* is superfluous, but serves to repeat *συγχωρεῖν*. *φημί* often appears in this resumptive office. Cf. Sym. 175 D *καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι Εὖ ἂν ἔχοι, φάναι*. R. 266 e; v. Notes **13.** 23, **36.** 22.

τιθέμενον, "defining." Cf. **24.** 30.

27. *μηδὲ ἀνδρεῖα*, "also not brave."

30. *ἀλλ' ἄφοβον* is in contrast to *τὸ μὴ φοβούμενον*, not to *οὐ — ἀνδρεῖα καλῶ*.

34. *προμηθίας* is a characteristic addition in the mouth of the over-cautious Nicias; v. Introd. p. xix.

50. 6. *κοσμεῖ* refers to **48.** 28.

9. Lamachus was associated with Nicias on the Sicilian expedition, in order that the prudence of the latter and the fiery energy of the former might react on each other to the benefit of the army. Unfortunately, Lamachus was killed soon after reaching Sicily, and the dilatory tactics of Nicias ruined the undertaking; v. Plut. Alc. 18, Thuc. VI. 49, 101. Aristophanes puns on the warlike fury of Lamachus in Ach. 1071 *ἰὼ πόνοι τε καὶ μάχαι καὶ Λάμαχοι*.

12. The people of *Αἰξωνή* (cf. **56.** 25) were notorious for their love of slander; and since Laches was actually from this deme, he fears lest the proverb be applied (*ὡς ἀληθῶς*; v. Note **49.** 12) to him.

15. *Δάμων*; v. Note **29.** 15.

Plato often cites Prodicus when he wishes to distinguish related conceptions; v. Note **12.** 12.

πλησιάζει, "attends instruction," like *συνεῖναι*; v. Note **36.** 27.

18. *σοφιστῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα κτλ.* A sneer at Nicias.

19. *ἀνδρὶ ὃν ἡ πόλις κτλ.* Laches repays Nicias for his mock (?) politeness in l. 9. The latter's silence is consistent with his mild disposition.

22. *ὅποι βλέπων — τίθησιν*, "what he meant when he defined this." Cf. **47.** 2.

51. 3. *καὶ ἄλλ' ἄττα*; v. Note **40.** 31.

6. *ἔχε*, "stop!" shows that an important point has been reached. Cf. Prot. 349 E.

10. *ἃ μὴ δέος. μή*, because the sentence is abstract and universal. H. 1021, G. 1428, 1430, G M T. 518, 520.

12. *δέος — προσδοκίαν.* So Prot. 358 D *προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο.*

16. *μέλλοντα* is forced out of the attributive position to give greater force to the antithesis, *κακὰ — τὰ μὴ κακά.*

21. *τὸ τρίτον*, "a third point."

25. *εἰδέναι*; v. Note **9.** 15.

28. *εἰς ἅπαντας*, with *ἐφορᾷ* ("includes").

34. *οἴεται* personifies *στρατηγία*; v. Note **45.** 23.

ἀλλὰ ἄρχειν. Poetry (Il. 12. 195–264) and history (Anab. V. 6. 28 ff.) furnish many illustrations of this principle, but Nicias seems not to have applied it to his own conduct; v. Note **48.** 7, Introd. p. xix.

52. 25. *κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον* refers to the definition of *ἀνδρεία* as *ἐπιστήμη τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων*, with the further explanation of *δεινά* as *μέλλοντα κακά.*

27. *καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων*, "without reference to time" (Jow.).

28. *μετατίθεσθαι* is a figure borrowed from the game of *πεσσοί* (v. Note **13.** 11), which is used in a more extended manner in Rep. 334 E.

31. *δαιμόνιε* gives a slight suggestion of blame; v. Note **3.** 29. Cf. Il. 2. 190 and 200.

53. 1. *ᾧ γε μόνῳ προσήκει — τὰ μή*, "who alone is fitted to distinguish carefully things dangerous and safe." *προσομιλεῖν*, "to behave toward them."

4. *λέγειν τι*; v. Note **47.** 20.

16. *μεγάλην ἐλπίδα εἶχον.* The raillery hits Socrates as well as Nicias. Cf. **50.** 14.

18. *εὖ γε.* Ironical.

οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα, "no matter," "of no consequence." So Gorg. 447 B.

21. *οὐδὲν ἔτι διοίσει (διαφέρω)*, "make no difference."

23. *οὐδὲν πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπειν κτλ.* This familiar weakness of mankind

is well illustrated by Aesop's fable of the two wallets (359), whose moral reads: *οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰ μὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν κακὰ οὐχ ὁρῶσι, τὰ δὲ ἀλλότρια πάνυ ἀκριβῶς θεῶνται.*

25. *ἐπιεικῶς*, "sufficient."

27. *οἴει*, here, "think it *right*."

30. *σοφὸς γὰρ — εἶ*. Ironical.

54. 3. *Νικήρατον*, the son of Nicias mentioned **29.** 14.

9. *συμπροθυμήσει*, "help."

16. *δοκεῖ* has no influence on the construction. Cf. **33.** 13, Note **45.** 19.

14. *νῦν δ' ὁμοίως γάρ*; v. Note **33.** 27.

17. *ἄν τι δόξῳ συμβουλεύειν*; v. Note **31.** 34.

18. *ἔκφορος λόγου*, "traitor," "tell-tale." A proverbial expression, as appears from Ar. Thes. 472 *αὐταὶ* ("alone") *γάρ ἐσμεν, κοὐδεμί' ἔκφορος λόγου.*

23. *εἰς διδασκάλων*, "to school." The gen. depends on the idea of locality conveyed by the preposition (Gild.). Cf. **7.** 28, **60.** 24.

24. *τὸν Ὅμηρον*, Od. 17. 347. Cf. **9.** 14.

προβάλλεσθαι, "offer as defence," a military term.

25. *κεχρημένῳ*, "needy."

32. *τὸ δὲ νῦν εἶναι*; v. Note **62.** 17.

34. *ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ*. Usually *θέλῃ* in this phrase; v. App. **13.** 34. For the devout tone, cf. the close of the Apol. and Crito, also Apol. 40 A–C.

LYSIS.

55. 1. *ἐξ Ἀκαδημίας εὐθὺ Λυκείου*; v. Introd. p. vii. The Lyceum, afterwards so closely associated with the peripatetic instruction of Aristotle, was a gymnasium named from the neighboring shrine of Apollo *Λύκειος*, and was a favorite resort of Socrates. Cf. Euth'o 1 A, Sym. 223 D.

8. *οὐ παραβαλεῖς* is equivalent to a command. The future is more imperative than the present would be; v. Note **63.** 15. Cf. Ar. Av. 1212 *οὐ λέγεις*. Probably *παραβάλλω* is a nautical metaphor, "come alongside." Cf. Rep. 556 C.

10. *παρὰ τίνας τοὺς ὑμᾶς = τίνες εἰσὶν οὗτοι, οὓς λέγεις ὑμᾶς*. Cf. Gorg. 521 A, Phil. 11 A. The article adds clearness.

16. *καλῶς γε ποιοῦντες*; v. Note **4.** 12. Tr. "you are very kind."

18. *οὐ φαῦλος*; v. Note **13.** 33.

20. *ἐπὶ τῷ*. *τῷ* is better taken as masculine, "whom shall I see?"

56. 2. *ἠρυθρίασεν*; v. Note **6.** 28.

ὦ παῖ Ἱερωνύμου; v. Note **18.** 14.

4. *εἶ πορευόμενος*. A sort of periphrasis, though *εἶ* is emphatic. This

usage, which emphasizes by its fullness of expression the progress of the action, was considered provincial and vulgar. Cf. A. J. P. IV. 302.

5. *φαῦλος καὶ ἄχρηστος*; v. Notes **7.** 34, **14.** 5, 6.

6. *γνῶναι ἐρῶντα.* Cf. Sym. 212 B *αὐτὸς τιμῶ τὰ ἐρωτικὰ καὶ διαφερόντως ἀσκῶ*, Mem. II. 6. 28 *διὰ τὸ ἐρωτικὸς εἶναι*, Xen. Sym. III. 10.

8. *ἀστεῖον*, "amusing," "charming" (*lit.* "town-bred").

10. *παραταθήσεται*, "worn out."

11. *ἐκκεκώφωκε*, "deafened."

12. *εὐμαρία*, "opportunity."

14. *καταλογάδην*, "in prose."

16. *καταντλεῖν* "to deluge with." Cf. Rep. 344 D *ὥσπερ βαλανεὺς* ("bathmaster") *καταντλήσας κατὰ τῶν ὤτων.*

27. *νεανικόν*, "high-spirited," "generous." Cf. Rep. 425 C, 491 E.

29. *πρὸς αὐτόν* = *τὰ παιδικά.* Cf. Phaedr. 239 A, Phaedo 73 D, etc.

30. *σταθμᾷ*, "Do you attach any weight?"

33. *συγγράφειν*, "write prose." Cf. Sym. 177 B, where *καταλογάδην* is added.

ληρεῖ, "talk nonsense."

57. 5. *διατεθρύληται* "talked deaf." Cf. Rep. 358 C.

11. *πλούτους.* Plural of stateliness, though with the thought of each successive fortune. Cf. I. Alc. 122 B.

13. *κέλης*, "a race-horse," ridden by a jockey.

14. *κρονικώτερα*, "more absurd"; v. Note **74.** 21, Ar. Plut. 582.

18. *ἀρχηγέτου.* The tutelary hero, from whom all the members of the deme were supposed to derive their origin, but who really took his name from the deme itself.

δήμου without the article, since a repetition of *τοῦ* would not be euphonious. Plato never repeats the article in such cases. Cf. Note **27.** 12.

ἅπερ αἱ γραῖαι ᾄδουσι. It is well known that in all countries the old women preserve most faithfully the traditions of the past. Cf. Rep. 350 E *ταῖς γραυσὶ ταῖς τοὺς μύθους λεγούσαις*, Gorg. 527 A, Theaet. 176 B.

25. *ἕλῃς.* Figure from hunting, so *διαφύγῃ* and *θηρευτής* in A. Cf. Phaedr. 253 C.

31. *τὸ μέλλον.* Prolepsis; v. Note **4.** 14.

58. 1. *δυσαλώτεροι. τοσούτῳ* is omitted. Cf. Apol. 30 A, Gorg. 458 A.

2. *ἀνασοβοῖ.* A word imitating the sound, like our "shoo."

4. *κηλεῖν*, "to charm," "soothe."

6. *ὅπως μὴ — ποιήσεις.* Cf. **63.** 22; v. App. **5.** 17.

15. *ἐπιδεῖξαι*, "give a specimen" (teach a truth), but mid. "make a display," as the sophists did. Cf. App. **32.** 10, Apol. 40 A, etc.

16–24. Notice that Hippothales, who has hitherto answered briefly, becomes talkative when there is a prospect of seeing his beloved (Schm.).

19. Ἑρμαῖα. As Hermes was the god of athletic exercises, his festival was celebrated in the palaestra. A law of Solon forbade the presence of adults, but this appears to have become a dead letter.

25. προσῇ', *i.e.* προσῆα, impf. first sing. of πρόσειμι.

29. ἀστραγαλίζοντας. The ἀστράγαλοι were knuckle-bones, often used by boys and girls in their natural state, and tossed on the hand like our jackstones, but more frequently they were smoothed on four sides, marked 1, 3, 6, 4, and played like dice. Four ἀστράγαλοι were thrown from the hand, or from a box, and the thirty-five possible combinations bore the names of gods, heroes, and kings, or had some conventional value. The best throw (Ἀφροδίτη or Κῶος) was made when each die came up differently, the worst (κύων) when all were alike. The rules for real (cubical) dice were slightly different; v. Harp. Class. Dict.

κεκοσμημένους, *i.e.* with clean, white clothes.

31. ἠρτίαζον. Guessing at "odd and even," a favorite game for boys in all countries, the *morra*, which the Italians play with such passion, men as well as boys. Cf. Lat. *par impar ludere*, Suet. Aug. 71.

φορμίσκων, "small baskets."

Pater (Plato and Platonism, 114) praises the beautiful picture here presented, and compares it for lifelike charm to the "Beggar Boys" of Murillo.

34. ἐστεφανωμένος. The Greeks wore wreaths of leaves and flowers on all religious and festal occasions. Lysis had doubtless participated in the sacrifice.

τὸ καλὸς εἶναι is equivalent to ὅτι καλὸς ἦν, τὸ εἶναι being accusative after ἀκοῦσαι. For ἄξιος ἀκοῦσαι, cf. Rep. 496 A.

59. 11. ἐπηλυγισάμενος, "using them as a screen."

15. Ἀμφισβητοῦμεν. "We occasion dispute about this point."

16. γενναιότερος, perhaps "the nobler in character" (not in birth).

18. Ἐγελασάτην; v. App. **6.** 6.

20. κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. A Pythagorean proverb. Cf. Rep. 424 A, Phaedr. 279 C, etc.; v. Note **2.** 17.

25. παιδοτρίβην, "the trainer," teacher of gymnastics. His duties are defined in Gorg. 452 B.

60. 13. κἂν — ἄν. Cf. **62.** 4, **74.** 10, 11; v. Note **5.** 24.

28. For the ethical dative αὐτῇ, cf. Rep. 343 A, Soph. 229 E.

30. The σπάθη and κερκίς were the wooden blade and comb used in the upright loom for packing the threads of the woof, so as to make the web close.

33. Ἡράκλεις; v. Note **2.** 31.

ἀντὶ τίνος. "For what reason?" The causal use of ἀντί is poetic and rare. Ast cites no cases in Plato.

61. 1. ὀλίγου, "almost." Cf. **37.** 18, **63.** 4. The full phrase is ὀλίγου δεῖ. Cf. πολλοῦ δεῖς **56.** 23, παντὸς δέοι **68.** 12.

9. Μὴ οὐ τοῦτό σε κωλύῃ. Cf. **72.** 30. A form of cautious negation very common in Plato, where the idea of fear is present to the mind, but is not expressed by any verb. H. 867, G. 1350, G M T. 265.

18, 19. ἐπιτεῖναι, ἀνεῖναι, ψῆλαι, κρούειν, "tighten," "loosen," "play on the strings with the fingers," "strike them with the plectron" (a gold or silver rod used for the purpose).

21. διακωλύουσιν, κωλύουσιν; v. Note **4.** 34.

22. ὦ ἄριστε; v. Note **3.** 29.

24. αὑτοῦ, *i.e.* "your *former* self."

33. Ἀσίας, *i.e.* what we call Asia Minor (so Xen. Cyr. I. 1. 4, Hell. IV. 8. 27), though also used in the larger sense of the whole continent, or of the Persian empire.

34. ζωμόν, "broth."

62. 3. καὶ τόν; v. Note **9.** 30.

4. δραξάμενοι, "taking a handful."

9. ἐμπάσαι κτλ., "put in a pinch of ashes."

12. ἐκείνων. For the use of ἐκεῖνος for αὐτός, cf. Phaedo 106 B, Prot. 311 D.

17. ἑκὼν εἶναι. To our idiom the infinitive here seems superfluous. It is practically confined to negative sentences. H. 956 a, G. 1535, G M T. 780. Cf. Note **68.** 22. It is probably a locative form, meaning "in fact," "really," and limiting ἑκών. Cf. A. J. P. X. 381.

63. 4. ὅτι; v. Note **7.** 3.

5–6. ταπεινοῦντα, συστέλλοντα, χαυνοῦντα, διαθρύπτοντα, "humbling," "reducing," "puffing up," "pampering."

7. ἀγωνιῶντα; v. Note **10.** 33.

9. ἀνέλαβον ἐμαυτόν. The reflexive is more common than the middle voice, when the subject acts directly on itself. Cf. Gorg. 464 C ἑαυτὴν διανείμασα. H. 812 b, G. 1242. 1. It usually implies that the action is unnatural.

13. σμικρόν, "in a low tone."

15. ἐρεῖς. Future for imperative. Cf. Note **55.** 8, Ar. Eq. 483–485, G. 1265. This is really more forcible, since a quiet assertion of the future carries more weight than a request. Cf. A. J. P. XIII. 37.

15. πάντως; v. Note **3.** 4.

18. *ἀνερέσθαι*, sc. *πειρῶ*.

22. *ὅπως ἐπικουρήσεις*; v. App. **5**. 17.

28. *οὐχ ὁρᾷς*; v. Note **18**. 14. On parenthesis, cf. **67**. 28, **75**. 28, **76**. 9.

32. *ἑστιᾶσθον*, *lit*. "feasting." Cf. Rep. 354 A, 571 D, etc.

64. 8. For the Athenian fondness for pet animals, cf. Ar. Av. 1290 ff., Leg. 789 B. *ὄρτυγα* and *ἀλεκτρυόνα* are added unexpectedly to give a comic effect, which is heightened by the mock earnest *ναὶ μὰ Δία* and the use of Socrates' favorite *νὴ τὸν κύνα* (v. Note **22**. 11) just after the mention of dogs.

65. 3–4. *οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν φίλον — οὐδὲν μὴ ἀντιφιλοῦν*. If the sentence had been positive, it would have read *ἔστιν φίλον — μὴ ἀντιφιλοῦν*, but since it is negative, *οὐκ* is added to both copula and participle. The participle is less common than the infinitive in this construction. *μὴ οὐ* implies resistance to pressure. Cf. G. 1617 b, G M T. 818, Gild. in L. and S., A. J. P. VII. 169.

9–10. Socrates wrests the meaning of this verse to suit his purpose. Cf. Note **11**. 29. He takes *φίλοι* as predicate to all the substantives, whereas it is attributive and modifies only *παῖδες*, just as the other adjectives govern their nouns. The quotation is from Solon (23 B'gk); v. Notes **6**. 9, **41**. 25.

9. *μώνυχες*, "with undivided hoof."

66. 5. *ἠρυθρίασεν*; v. Note **6**. 28. He blushes because he said that Socrates had made a mistake.

9. *ἐκείνου*, *i.e.* Lysis.

φιλοσοφία. Here with its etymological meaning, "love of knowledge" (cf. **65**. 6, **70**. 26), manifested by his close attention.

11. *ἐπλανώμεθα*. Cf. Rep. 484 B.

13. *ὥσπερ ὁδός*; v. Note **18**. 20.

14–15. *τοὺς ποιητὰς· — ὥσπερ πατέρες τῆς σοφίας*. Cf. Tim. 28 C *τὸν — ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντός*. The verse in l. 20 is from Od. 17. 218.

22. *τοῖς τῶν σοφωτάτων συγγράμμασιν*. This probably refers to Anaxagoras, whose works were entitled *περὶ φύσεως*, *περὶ τοῦ ὅλου*. Socrates in the Phaedo (97 B) remarks that he has heard selections read from one of the books of Anaxagoras.

23. *τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ* is an old proverb. Cf. Prot. 337 D, Gorg. 510 B *ὅνπερ οἱ παλαιοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ λέγουσιν*.

27. *οὐ συνίεμεν*, "We do not understand," therefore we answer, "perhaps," *ἴσως*.

67. 2. *ἐμπλήκτους καὶ ἀσταθμήτους*, "capricious and unstable."

27. *τὴν ἀρχήν*, "at all."

29. *αὐτῶν*, "of each other." So *ἑαυτούς* l. 31. This use of the reflexive instead of the reciprocal is found when the parties concerned belong to the

same class, and so are, in a measure, identical. Suidas, Ἑαυτοὺς ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀλλήλους οἱ Ἀττικοὶ λέγουσιν. H. 686 b, G. 996. Ἀλλήλους is more ornamental, and appears more in the earlier and later periods of the language.

33. ποτέ του ἤκουσα λέγοντος. This is thought to mean Heraclitus and his school. The poetical quotation is from Hes. Works 25; v. Note **11**. 29.

68. 10. ἀγαπᾶν καὶ φιλεῖν. Cf. **73**. 16–17, **69**. 32; v. Note **7**. 34. φιλεῖν is the general word for love, ἀγαπᾶν is love based upon reflection and reason, "esteem." Cf. the famous distinction in Jno. 21. 15–17, and see commentators on the passage.

22. ὥς γε οὕτωσὶ ἀκούσαι. The infinitive is used absolutely here, as in the very common ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ("in a word") and in ἑκὼν εἶναι; v. Note **62**. 17, G M T. 778.

69. 1. μὴ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς λανθάνει; v. Note **11**. 22.

2. ὡς ἀληθῶς; v. Note **20**. 1.

5. εἰλιγγιῶ, "I am dizzy"; v. Note **3**. 22. Often printed ἰλιγγιῶ.

8. διολισθαίνει, "slips through." For the personification, v. Note **25**. 9.

10. ἀπομαντευόμενος; v. Note **18**. 13.

18. τοιούτου οἷον αὐτό ἐστιν, *i.e.* μήτε ἀγαθὸν μήτε κακόν.

24. καλῶς ὑφηγεῖται, "lead on the right path."

70. 1. σὺ ἔχει; v. Note **3**. 14.

4. τὸ παρόν, "the added quality." Cf. κακοῦ παρουσίαν, just above.

6. ἀλεῖψαι, "anoint."

9. ψιμυθίῳ, "white lead," much affected as a cosmetic. Plin. N. H. XXXIV. 54 tells of its use in whitening the skin.

25. ἦν is the so-called "philosophic imperfect." G M T. 40. It here looks back to **69**. 18, which sets the time referred to.

26. τοὺς ἤδη σοφοὺς μηκέτι φιλοσοφεῖν, cf. Sym. 204 A.

28. οὕτως refers to κατά τινα τρόπον in l. 18.

71. 4. βαβαί; v. Note **2**. 31.

12. ὄναρ πεπλουτηκέναι. A proverbial expression, like our "build castles in the air." Cf. Theaet. 208 B.

14. ὥσπερ ἀνθρώποις; v. Notes **18**. 20, **25**. 9.

17. ἕνεκά του καὶ διά τι. Here ἕνεκα is the object to be gained (cf. Sym. 185 B), διά the existing cause, or motive.

23. ἕνεκα ὑγιείας. ἕνεκα usually follows its noun.

34. τοῦ φίλου τὸ φίλον τοῦ φίλου φίλον; v. Note **4**. 33.

72. 18. ἀντὶ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων χρημάτων. πρό or παρά is more usually employed to express comparison, but cf. Gorg. 526 E, Phaedr. 232 A. For the sentiment, cf. **34**. 15.

21. κώνειον, "hemlock." The poison usually administered to Greek

criminals, that by which Socrates himself was executed. The plant, *Conium maculatum*, grows wild all over Europe, is 3 to 6 feet high, and has small white flowers in umbels. The alkaloid poison is obtained from the fruit and leaves, and produces death by paralysis of the vital organs.

23. Ἆρ' οὖν τότε οὐδέν κτλ. "But he does not therefore value an earthen vessel more than his son, nor yet three measures of wine?" οὐδέν is a stronger equivalent of οὔ and is correlative to οὐδέ. Most editors take οὐδέν as the object of ποιεῖται with κύλικα and κοτύλας in apposition, but the other way is simpler.

27. ἐπὶ τοῖς ἕνεκά του, "the means to an end"; ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ, "for that object."

73. 1. ῥήματι "improperly," *i.e.* in a *word* only, not in fact. Cf. Phaedo 102 B οὐχ, ὡς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν.

13. οὐδὲν ἂν ἡμῖν χρήσιμον εἴη; v. Note **14.** 13.

74. 8. τούτου οὕ. Inverse attraction; v. Note **25.** 6.

21. ὕθλος, "nonsense."

ποίημα Κρόνῳ. Κρόνος had become a contemptuous epithet in Athenian slang, "old fool." Cf. Euthyd. 287 B; so κρονικός (**57.** 14) means "old-fashioned and stupid."

25, 26. ὡς ἔοικεν and ὡς φαίνεται are redundant. Cf. **43.** 14, Phil. 32 C, Ar. Plut. 826 δῆλον ὅτι τῶν χρηστῶν τις, ὡς ἔοικας, εἶ. ἔοικε is neither subjective (δοκεῖν) nor objective (φαίνεσθαι), but midway between, though nearer δοκεῖν. Phaedr. 261 D illustrates the difference.

33. ὁ δὲ Λύσις ἐσίγησεν, since he is reminded that he is himself an ἐρώμενος.

75. 3. Hippothales' reason for happiness is probably the conviction that he is a γνήσιος ἐραστής.

26. ἀναπεμπάσασθαι, "to count over, sum up."

32. ὥσπερ δαίμονες. δαίμονες are gods of lower rank, such as departed heroes, genii, etc. The word has no bad meaning in the classical period, but is here employed to indicate a sudden and startling interruption.

76. 3. ὑποβαρβαρίζοντες, "speaking somewhat (ὑπό) broken Greek." Cf. Note **28.** 11. The slaves were usually taken from wild tribes in the North, from Thessaly, Thrace, and Scythia.

8. γέρων. As Socrates was born about 469 B.C., this allusion puts the imaginary date of the dialogue later than 409.

10. Notice the presence of ὁ φίλος, the subject of the dialogue in the closing sentence. So δικαιοτάτου at the end of the Phaedo and σοφιστήν at the close of the Sophistes. Cf. Apol., Ion., Pol., Crito, Gorg.

APPENDIX.

I. MANUSCRIPTS AND EDITIONS.

A. Principal Manuscripts.

1st Class. — B. Bodleianus, or Clarkianus, of the ninth century, in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, containing the first twenty-four dialogues, according to the arrangement of Thrasyllus, which is followed in Hermann's edition. This Ms. was found in 1801 by Edw. Daniel Clarke in the monastery on the island of Patmos. It is written on parchment in beautiful characters, and bears a subscription dated 895 A.D. Clarke gave it to Porson, who bequeathed it to the Bodleian.

A. Parisinus (1807), of the ninth century, in the National Library at Paris, containing the last fourteen dialogues and the letters. Among the inferior Mss. the most valuable are the Tübingensis of the twelfth century, containing seven dialogues, and the Venetus D (π 185) of the same age, containing eighteen.

2d Class. — T. Venetus, of the twelfth century (or earlier, S), in the Library of St. Mark's at Venice, containing the first thirty-one dialogues (through the Timaeus). No Greek author possesses such ancient and reliable Mss. as these three, A B T. The first class has generally been preferred by the editors, but the Phaedo papyrus recently published in the Flinders Petrie collection has strengthened the authority of the second class, so that some scholars regard the two classes as of equal value. A summary of the literature on the subject and a description of all the Mss. is given by M. Wohlrab, Jahrb. Supp. XV. 643–722; v. also Jowett & Campbell, Rep. II. 70 ff.

B. Principal Editions of the Platonic Dialogues.

Editio princeps. Aldus Manutius. Venice, 1513.

H. Estienne. 3 vols. Paris, 1578. This scholar is generally known by his Latin name, Stephanus, and the dialogues are usually cited according to his pages, subdivided A B C D E. The introductions and notes were by Serranus.

I. Bekker. 8 vols. 1816–1818. The first edition based upon a collation of the Mss.

G. Stallbaum. 10 vols. Gotha and Leipzig, 1827–1877. The only annotated edition of all the dialogues.

M. Schanz. Leipzig, 1875–. The latest critical edition, not yet complete.

C. F. Hermann. 6 vols. Leipzig, 1856–1858. Revised by M. Wohlrab, 1887. The Teubner text edition.

C. PRINCIPAL WORKS TREATING OF PLATO AND THE DIALOGUES.

F. Ast. Lexicon Platonicum. Leipzig, 1855.

Ch. Benard. Platon. Sa Philosophie. 1892.

G. Grote. Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates. London, 1865.

B. Jowett. The Dialogues of Plato translated into English.[3] 5 vols. London, 1892.

W. Pater. Plato and Platonism. London, 1893.

F. Steinhart. Platons Leben (Leipzig, 1873), and introductions to the German translation of H. Müller, 1850–1873.

H. von Stein. Geschichte des Platonismus. Gotha, 1862–1875.

F. Susemihl. Die genetische Entwicklung der Platonischen Philosophie. Leipzig, 1855.

G. Teichmüller. Litterarische Fehden im IV^ten^ Jahrhundert vor Christo. 1881–1884.

G. van Prinsterer. Prosopographia Platonica. Leyden, 1823.

* * * Monographs by Bonitz, Cobet, Goldbacher, Hirschig, Madvig, Schanz, Vermehren, Wolke, and Zingerle for textual criticism, and Becker, Bertram, Bonitz, Hausenblas, Hermann, Knauer, Nusser, Ohse, and Spielmann for exegesis, have also been consulted, as well as Schmelzer's edition of the Charmides and Lysis, and Bertram's, Gitlbauer's, Král's, Jahn's, Schmelzer's, and Tatham's editions of the Laches.

II. NOTES ON THE TEXT.

S indicates the reading of Schanz. His edition contains a fuller critical apparatus, and is followed in the construction of this text unless otherwise stated. Other editors are similarly cited by abbreviation; v. preceding page.

b is the second hand which has corrected B.

γρ. b shows that the reading was added to the margin of B by the second hand, with the admonition γρ.(ἀφε) prefixed.

Bad. Badham.

H. Heindorf.
H. H. Hoenebeek Hissink, Animadv. 17–22.
M. Madvig, Advers. I. 403–406.
Schl. Schleiermacher.

Words that evidently had no place in the text have been omitted altogether, but when there seemed to be some doubt, they have been bracketed. Words not found in B or T are marked by stars, as in Schanz. "Cod." indicates an inferior Ms., "ed." the majority of the editors.

CHARMIDES.

1. 1. Ποτειδαίας S: ποτιδαίας B T. Ποτείδαια is the only form found on inscriptions. Meisth. 41.

2. ἄσμενος S: ἀσμένως B, ἀσμένως T, ἄσμενος Hirschig. The rough breathing with this word is found again in B in **68.** 24, Gorg. 486 D, and often in A. Cf. ἀνδάνω. For the nominative, cf. Crit. 106 A, etc.

3. συνήθεις: ξυνήθεις B T S. The Mss. are very inconsistent in their use of σύν and ξύν. We find ξυν- in **3.** 20, **4.** 12, etc., συν- in **2.** 30, **6.** 6, etc., in fact, both forms in the same line in **25.** 9. Cf. **13.** 28, 30. In the inscriptions (Meisth. 181) ξύν is the rule till 410, after that time σύν is preferred, while after 403 ξύν is used only in legal phrases. Whenever our dialogues were written, their date is certainly later than 403. Moreover, the fragment of the Phaedo recently published in the "Flinders Petrie Papyri" has only σύν, and Mommsen (p. 748) doubts that Plato ever used the older form. Since the testimony of what is decidedly our oldest Platonic manuscript (300 B.C.?) agrees with the evidence of contemporary documents in stone, it seems necessary to write σύν throughout the dialogues. (N.B.—This is done by Král in his edition of the Laches.)

4. Βασίλης B: βασιλικῆς T b S, βασιλείας Urlichs (1857). βασιλικῆς was explained as the Stoa Basileios, but this was not a ἱερόν, and was never called βασιλική. The reading of B was not fully understood until 1884–1885, when an inscription was found at Athens, containing a reference to the ἱερὸν τοῦ Κόδρου καὶ Νηλέως καὶ τῆς βασίλης, also called τέμενος τοῦ Νηλέως καὶ βασίλης (Am. Jour. Arch. III. 45). As this is clearly the ἱερόν to which Socrates refers, the reading of B presents no difficulty.

2. 8. Ἔστιν δὲ B: ἔστι δὲ T. In the Mss. and in the inscriptions before 336 B.C., the movable ν is often found before consonants as well as before vowels. Kroschel (Jahrb. 123. 553) thinks that B uses ν to excess, and that half of the cases should be rejected, but Schanz defends B.

9. ὑόν S: υἱόν B T. Not only is ὑόν more common in inscriptions

(Meisth. 48), but in A we almost always find ὑιόν, which shows that ὑόν was written by the first hand.

24. ἄλλοσ' ἔβλεπεν cod.: ἄλλος ἔβλεπεν B, ἀλλοσέβλεπεν T.

3. 6. ἐμαυτῷ van Prinsterer: ἑαυτῷ B T S. Charmides is too modest to call himself temperate (**7.** 2), and it is wholly unlikely that he valued highly his poetic skill, nor would Critias, in praising him, imply that he was conceited.

12. καλῶμεν cod. H: καλοῦμεν B T.

30. ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ T: ἐπ' ἐμαυτοῦ B. ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ means "in my own," "in my senses," while ἐπ' ἐμαυτοῦ would mean "by myself," "alone" (cf. **4.** 22 ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς), which does not suit the context.

33. μοῖραν αἱρεῖσθαι κρεῶν T: ἀθανατώσῃι θεία μοῖρα κτλ. B: ἐν θανατοέσσῃ θέᾳ μοῖραν κτλ. Sauppe: θανάτου σ' ἧ θέᾳ μοῖραν αἱρεῖσθαι χρεών Hermann, ἀδαμάτῳ σθένει μοῖραν G. Hermann. εὐλαβεῦ δὲ μὴ κατέναντα λέοντος νεβρὸς ἐλθὼν μοῖραν κτλ. Bergk,[4] who thinks that the unintelligible words in B are derived from a gloss, μὴ θανατώσῃ ἡ θέα.

4. 20. ἀναγκαῖον * ἂν * εἴη. ἄν was inserted by M, since an *orat. obl.* optative would not appear after a primary tense. ἄν is often lost after the endings -αν, -ον. Cf. **7.** 9, **18.** 2, also **67.** 3.

34. ἰατροὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες B T: οἱ Ἕλληνες ἰατροί Stobaeus *flor.* 101. 23, οἱ ἰατροὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες H. The Mss. reading can only mean "physicians, *i.e.* the Greeks," and Cobet, feeling this to be awkward, struck out ἰατροί. The real contrast is with Zalmoxis, not with θεός.

5. 18. πείσει cod., H: πείσῃ B T. The Canon Dawesianus, laid down by the English critic Dawes, holds that correct writers use the fut. indic. or 2d aor. subj., but never the 1st aor., after ὅπως, and exceptions to this rule are very few. In fact, there is only one place in Plato (Euthyd. 296 A) where the indicative may not be read. Cf. **58.** 6, **63.** 22. Goodwin (G M T. 283) would explain πείσῃ as due to the analogy of μὴ πείσῃς, but this seems needless. Cf. A. J. P. VI. 71.

21. After χωρὶς ἑκατέρου B T have σωφροσύνης καὶ ὑγιείας, but cod. Laurentianus (85. 6) and H omit these words. We cannot say ἰατρὸς ὑγιείας, and ἑκατέρου must accordingly refer to ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος.

24. ὁμώμοκα T γρ. b: ὤμοσα B. The perfect is used because he is still bound by the oath, just as οἱ δικασταὶ ὁμωμοκότες κάθηνται (Cobet).

6. 1. πλείστοις δοκεῖ σωφρονέστατος M: πλείστων δοκεῖ πολυφρονέστατος B, πάνυ πολὺ | δοκεῖ σωφρονέστατος T, πλεῖστον δοκεῖ σωφρονέστατος Herm. The tragedians sometimes join πλεῖστον with a superlative, but in prose it is very rare, if not unknown.

6. ποῖαι δύο οἰκίαι συνελθοῦσαι Aldine ed.: ποῖαι δυοῖν οἰκίαι συνελθοῦσαι

T, *καὶ νῦν* for *συν* B, *ποίαιν δυοῖν οἰκίαιν συνελθούσαιν* Herm. Plato uses the dual in his youthful works freely and naturally, like Aristophanes. In his later dialogues it gradually passes away, but is revived in the Laws to give antique color.

13. *τἠπείρῳ* S: *τῇ πειρῷ* B, *τῇ ἠπείρῳ* T. Schanz thinks (Prol. Symp.) that the scribes often omit cases of crasis, so he restores it whenever B or T give warrant.

7. 28. *κάλλιόν ἐστιν* S: *κάλλιστον* B T. Cf. E, where *κάλλιον* is used twice. Stallbaum defends *κάλλιστον* as meaning, "Is quickness best, or is slowness best?"

ὅμοια B T and all previous editors: *ὁμοῖα* S. Blass in his new edition of Kühner's Grammar (I. 326. 7) holds that *ὁμοῖος* belongs to the older Attic of Thucydides and the tragedians, but that all other classic authors wrote *ὅμοιος*, and cites Ael. Dionys. ap. Eustath. Il. p. 206, who says *ὁμοῖα —τῶν παλαιῶν Ἀττικῶν*, adding that most people write *γέλοιον*, etc. (The *κοινή* used *γελοῖον, ὁμοῖον*.) The followers of Schanz quote Herodian, 137. 16 L, who assigns *ὅμοια* to *οἱ μεταγενέστεροι τῶν Ἀττικῶν*, and recommends *ὁμοῖον*, the form used also in the *κοινή*. Again, the Schol. ad Dionys. 173. 16, after noting that Homer has *ὁμοῖος*, remarks *οἱ δὲ Ἀττικοὶ ὅμοια λέγουσι*. Cf. Anal. Oxon. II. 54. 3, Eust. 531. 35, 369. 18. The question seems to be whether Plato was considered *παλαιός* or *μεταγενέστερος*, and since Blass with all the other editors takes the latter view and Schanz stands alone, it seems the safest course to follow the Mss., especially since Schneider (ad Rep. p. 14) has noticed that they are as constant in writing *ὅμοια* as they are in accenting *γέλοια* in many places. *ὅμοιος* appears in the texts of all the contemporary orators, and Wohlrab prints *ὅμοιος* in his revision of the Teubner Plato (1887–).

8. 17. *ἡσυχιώτατος* Cobet: *ἡσυχώτατος* B T.

30. *καλλίους* B T: *κάλλει* Schaefer. The latter reading would construe *οὖσαι* with *ἐλάττους* alone, and is easier, but not necessary.

9. 12. After *Ἀρ' οὖν ἂν εἴη* S supposes a lacuna, which he would fill with *κακὸν, ὃ μὴ κακοὺς καὶ*. Schneider reads *εἴη μὴ ἀγαθὸν, ὃ ἀγαθοὺς ἀπεργάζεται*.

21. *δὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν* S: *μὴ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἢ καὶ κακὸν* B T, *μηδὲν μᾶλλον* Stephanus, *οὐδὲν μᾶλλον* Ast.

26. *ἂν εἴη* B T: *εἴη* S. It suits Charmides' nature to keep the more modest potential optative. Cf. **10.** 22, and often in definitions. *Ὅτι* may introduce a direct quotation as well as *orat. obl.*; v. Note **7.** 3.

11. 18. *ἃ νυνδὴ ἠρώτων* B T: *ὅ* H; v. Comm.

13. 10. *εἰς τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι συμβαίνειν*. H omits *εἰς*.

11. *τότε μή* S: *ὅτι μή* B T, *τι μή* M, *ὅτι δή* Bekker, *ὁτιοῦν μή* Cobet. *ὅτι μή* is possible, for the infinitive is found (though rarely) in dependent clauses introduced by *ὅτι* (Leg. 892 E) and *ὡς* (Phaedo 108 E). R. 279. This is due to a conflation of two constructions, *ὅτι* with the indicative and the simple infinitive. *μὴ οὐ* would then be explained as the independent form (cf. **61.** 9, G. 1351) thrown into *orat. obl.*, though the perfect tense is very unusual. The Mss. reading involves such a combination of rarities that it is safer to discard it.

13. 25. *καὶ ἐγώ* B T: *καὶ ἐγὼ ὁμολογῶ* Heusde, but v. Note **12.** 23.

27. *ἐγγύη* and *ἄτη* T: *ἐγγύα* and *ἄτα* t.

34. *νῦν δ' ἐθέλω* T: *δὲ θέλω* B. *θέλω* is the older form, surviving in Attic prose mainly in consecrated phrases, such as *ἂν θεὸς θέλῃ*, our "D. V." Cf. **54.** 34. The orators also use it to avoid hiatus after words ending with a vowel. The inscriptions have *ἐθέλω* almost exclusively (Meisth. 142).

14. 5. *ὁμολογήσοντός σοι* Heusde.: *ὁμολογήσαντός σου* B T; *ὁμολογήσαντος ἢ οὐ* Schl.

23. *ἀλλήλαις* H: *ἄλλαις* B T. Stallbaum defends *ἄλλαις*, but this could only mean "some like some, others like others," which is hardly consistent with Socrates' intention.

15. 2. *κουφοτέρου σταθμοῦ ἐστιν* H: *ἐστιν στατικὴ* B T, *ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη* H H.

24. *σκόπει* H: *σκόπειν* T; *σκοπεῖν* B. The use of the infinitive to convey a direct command is poetic, and, more particularly, Homeric (H. 957, G. 1536, G M T. 784). In Plato it is mainly, if not wholly, confined to *φάναι*, "Suppose that" (Rep. 473 A, etc.). Cf. A. J. P. XIV. 124.

16. 7. *οἶδε καὶ ὅτι* are added by cod. E.

17. 29. *οὐδὲν μὴ* Stallbaum; *οὐδὲν ἂν μὴ* B T.

18. 2. *πάντα δὴ* S: *πάντα αὖ* B T.

5. After *πέφυκεν ἔχειν* the Mss. have *πλὴν ἐπιστήμης*, which Schl. omitted. *ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη* B T: *ἡ ἐπιστήμη* H. The point, however, is not that the science which we call temperance is included, but science, which, as it happens, has been identified with temperance.

16. After *ὅτι δυνατὸν* the Mss. have *ἀποδεῖξαί σε*, which H omits. The discussion is not about the demonstration, but the thing itself.

21. After *ἀπορούντος* Badham omits *ἀναγκασθῆναι* read by the Mss. If the word were allowed to stand, it could mean "tortured" (cf. Xen. Hiero 9. 2), but it interrupts the contrast between *ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἀπορούντος* and *αὐτὸς ἀλῶναι ὑπὸ ἀπορίας*. It is not a question of compulsion, but of sympathy (Cobet).

19. 7. *τὸ αὐτὸ — εἰδέναι* B T: *ἃ οἶδεν — εἰδέναι* H H omits. Since

Socrates accepts *ὅτι οἶδε καὶ ὅτι μὴ οἶδεν*, but rejects *ἃ οἶδε καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν*, we should expect something like *τῷ εἰδέναι ὅτι οἶδε κτλ.* after *τὸ αὐτό*. Schl. accordingly writes *τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ ὅτι τις οἶδεν εἰδέναι καὶ ἃ τις οἶδεν ἢ μὴ οἶδεν εἰδέναι*. But this involves too many changes, and it is safer to let it alone. H inserts *τὸ* after *τὸ αὐτό*.

20. 11. *δεῖν δὲ* Herm.: *δεῖ δὴ* B, *εἰ δὲ δεῖ* H.

23. *οὔτε γε* Naegelsbach: *οὐδέ γε* B T; *οὐδέ γε* Stallbaum, who cites Rep. 398 A *οὐ — οὐδέ* to support *οὐ — οὔτε* here. *οὐ — οὔτε*, however, seems to be confined to the poets, though we find *οὔτε — τε* often, as **18.** 23–24.

22. 2. *ἄρα τι* b: *ἄρτι* B T. Phrynichus § 12 (Ruth. 70) tells us that *ἄρτι* is not construed with the future in the classical period.

12. *ἄτοπ' ἄττ'* Bad.: *ἄτοπαγ'* B T; *ἀτοπά τ'* Bekker.

26. *ἄλλο ἂν ἡμῖν τι συμβαίνοι * ἤ.** Where *ἄλλο* and *τι* are separated in this way, they lose their stereotyped phraseological character, and need *ἤ* to justify their existence; v. Note **16.** 11.

23. 15. *ζῶντα* Schl.: *ζώντων* B T. *σὺ δοκεῖς* Bekker, *εὖ δοκεῖ* B T, *αὖ δοκεῖς* Schl.

21. *φῶμεν* S: *θῶμεν* B T. Both are used by Plato elsewhere. Cf. App. **75.** 13.

24. 10. *ἄλλο τι ἂν εἴη* M: *εἴη ἡ ὠφελίμη* B, *εἴη ὠφελίμη* T, *εἴη ἢ ὠφελίμη* Schl.

14. *Ἢ κἂν* S: *ἢ καὶ* B T. *ἄν* could be supplied mentally from the preceding sentence. Cf. App. **60.** 14; v. examples in R. 67.

29. *εὑρεῖν γρ.* T: *ἔχειν* B T. *τῷ λόγῳ* S: *ἐν τῷ λόγῳ* B T.

25. 23. *ὅσῳπερ* T: *ὃς ὥσπερ* B.

31. *δρᾶ τοῦτο* M: *δρᾷς τοῦτο* B T, *εἰ δρᾷς τοῦτο* cod., Herm. omits.

LACHES.

27. 16. *δὴ* B T: *ἤδη* Bad.

18–19. The words between the stars were supplied by S from **37.** 16.

28. 11. *τούσδε* B: *τοῖσδε* T. *αἰσχύνομαι* w. dat. means "ashamed *of*," w. acc. "ashamed *before* a person." The latter is evidently the meaning here.

20. *τῷ νέῳ* B T: *τὼ νεώ* Bad. If the Ms. reading is kept, the article is generic, but Plato's fondness for the dual (v. App. **6.** 6) lends some plausibility to the conjecture. Cf. **33.** 27 *τώδε* T: *τῷδε* B.

29. 4. *ὀλιγώρως* S: *ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι* B T ed., *ὀλιγώρως ἴεσθαι* Gtlb.

30. *μέμνησθε* Bekker: *ἐμέμνησθε* B T Cron, *ἐπιμέμνησθε* Bad. Gtlb. omits.

30. 5. *ἡμῶν ἡ* B T ed.: *ἡ* S, since *ἡμῶν* is *extra versum* T. The emphatic *ἡμῶν* is very appropriate to Laches' admiration.

10. εὐνουστάτοις B T ed.: εὐνούστατόν S.

11. σε cod. Bekker: γε B T K, Gtlb. omits.

31. 5. τινά Bad.: τι B T J St., που K. οὔ τἂν Herm.: ὅτ' ἂν B, οὔτ' ἂν T, οὔτ' ἄρ' Bad., Gtlb. omits.

21. οὐ — φαίνεσθαι M.: Gtlb. omits, ἄνδρα εὐσχημονέστατον cod., Bad. S suggests that δι' οὗ be read, since ΔΙ might readily fall out after ΑΙ, and διὰ τὴν εὐσχημοσύνην be omitted.

32. 4. 'λελήθειν S: λέληθεν B T ed.

10. ἐπιδείκνυσιν B T ed.: ἐπιδείκνυτ' S. It is true that the active of this verb is rare (but cf. Hipp. I. 286 B, Xen. Sym. 3. 3), yet the elision of αι is also unusual (cf. **65.** 8 ψεύδεθ'), and it seems safe to let the Ms. reading stand.

14. οἳ κἂν T: οὐκ ἂν B.

33. 3. ἐφίει B T: ἠφίει cod., ed., κατηφίει cod. E, St., "He yielded gradually" (though still resisting), whereas ἠφίει (ἀφίημι) would mean "he let go gradually," as ἀφίεται, l. 6. ἐφίει is more forcible and graphic. Cf. Prot. 338 A.

9. ἐκεῖνο cod., S: ἐκείνῳ B T. While the interchange of αὐτὸς and ἐκεῖνος in Plato (as Prot. 310 D, etc.) makes ἐκείνῳ possible (R. 49), the demonstrative of derision (R. 318) is rather more effective with the comical weapon.

11. οὕτω σμικράς ed.: οὕτως μικρὰς S K. σμικρός is the more usual form in Attic, especially after a vowel.

17. ἴσχειν B T ed.: ἴσχοι S; v. Comm.

25. ὥσπερ ἔτι St.: ὥσπερ ἐπὶ B T, ὡσπερεὶ Gtlb. K, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐπιδιακρινοῦντος J.

34. 26. τούτου ζητοῦμεν Jacobs, ed.: τούτου οὖ ζητοῦμεν B T Cron, τούτου οὐ ζητοῦμεν Gtlb.

35. 15. σκοποῦμεν ὅ Cron K: σκοπούμενοι B T J St. Cf. R. 262.

20. ὅστις S: εἴ τις B T ed.

36. 3. καὶ ἐπιδεῖξαι B T ed.: ἐπιδεῖξαι Philol. Anz. 1873, 670, S.

34. γεγονότε B: γεγόνατε T.

37. 4. ὑμετέροις S Cron: νιέσι B T ed. K suggests the omission of τε — παισί.

32. ᾗ λόγῳ καὶ Schl. J: ᾗ λόγῳ, ὥσπερ γένει, καὶ B T S, ᾗ λόγῳ, ὥσπερ δίνῃ, καὶ Jacobs, ᾗ λόγῳ, ὥσπερ ἔρκει, καὶ St., ᾗ λόγῳ τῳ ("in some way"), ὥσπερ γένει, καὶ Keck, ᾗ γένει καὶ Cholava (cf. Apol. 30 A), ᾗ καὶ Cron K.

38. 11. αὐτὸ cod., ed.: αὐτῷ B T Keck, αὐτῷ αὐτὸ Orelli.

28. ἠρμοσμένος εὖ Orelli: ἠρμοσμένος οὖ B T, S Bad. Gtlb. omit, ἠρμοσμένος ed.

39. 25. *ἐάν γε* S: *ἐὰν δέ* B T ed., *ἐάν* cod., Ast K. *ἐὰν δέ* might be defended by assuming an anacoluth or a desire for emphasis, but *γε* is simpler.

40. 5. *ἄριστ' ἂν* B T J Cron: *ἄριστα* cod. E, St. S K.

19. *ταῖς ψυχαῖς* B T ed.: *τὰς ψυχὰς* cod., S K. Gtlb. omits.

42. 2. *Πλαταιαῖς* B T ed.: *Πύλαις* Wohlrab. Nothing of the sort appears in Herodotus' account of Plataea, but something very similar is found in his description of Thermopylae. Still, the same ruse may have been practised at both battles, or Plato himself may have blundered.

8. *ἄρτι* Ast, ed.: *αἴτιον* B T St., Jacobs omits.

44. 1. *ἐκτήσεται* B: *κτήσεται* cod. Bad. The Ionic *ἔκτημαι* is used by Plato fully a dozen times, though almost unknown in Attic.

47. 24. *εἰπεῖν οἷον* Bad. K omit: *εἰπεῖν οἵους τε* H H., *εἰπεῖν οἷόν τι* Stephanus.

48. 9. *προσήκει* B ed.: *προσήκειν* T St. S.

18. *τούτου* S ed.: *τοῦτο* B T, *τοῦτον* Bekker, St. J.

49. 12. Eichler would omit *πᾶσα*, as *οὐ πᾶσα* implies that *some* pigs are wise, whereas the proverb is universal in its application. The proverb, however, is always quoted positively (*κἂν ὗς γνοίη*), and, if we take *οὐκ* with *κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν*, we get good sense. *πᾶσα* merely emphasizes the application, and anticipates its humorous extension in *οὐδὲ τὴν Κρομμυωνίαν ὗν*.

30. *ἀγνοίας* 2d Basle ed., St.: *ἀνοίας* B T K Cron. *ἄγνοιαν* γρ. t: *ἄνοιαν* B T K Cron. Cf. Phil. 38 A, where *ἐπιστήμη* and *ἄγνοια* are unmistakably contrasted, though the Mss. read *ἀνοίας*.

50. 13. *τοῦδε μὴ* Keck ed.: *οὐδὲ μὴ* B T, St., *οὐδαμῇ* Jacobs, *οὐδ' ἐμὲ* Gtlb.

51. 13. *καὶ σύ* S: *καὶ σὺ* (*σοι* b ed.) *δοκεῖ* B, *δοκεῖ καὶ σὺ* (*σοι* t) T.

52. 24. *ὅλην ἀνδρείαν* cod., ed.: *ὅλην ἂν ἀνδρείαν* B T, *ὅλην δὴ ἀνδρείαν* S.

53. 2. *καὶ τὰ μὴ* B T ed.: Bad. omits, Cron suggests *καὶ τὰ μὴ κακὰ καὶ τἀγαθά*, Gtlb. K omit *καὶ τἀγαθά*, Schenkl omits *καί*, and understands *τὰ μὴ καὶ τἀγαθὰ* as in apposition with *δεινά — ᾧμην σε εὑρήσειν*, Bad. Gtlb. omit. J. A. Baumann puts a colon after *εὑρήσειν* and a comma after *ἀποκριναμένου*.

24. *πρὸς αὑτόν* B T ed.: *πρὸς σαυτόν* cod., S, *οὐδὲ πρὸς σαυτὸν* Gtlb. K. *αὑτόν* refers, of course, to mankind in general. *σύ που* B T ed.: *σύ τι* S, *σὺ πολὺ* Gtlb.

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55. 7. *πορεύει* and *πορεύομαι*: omitted by Cobet. Cf. Phaedr. 227 A.

19. *ἴδῃς* Ficinus: *εἰδῇς* B T. *αὐτοῦ* S: *αὐτόθι αὐτοῦ* B T, *αὐτόθι. Αὐτό* Ast.

56. 6. *πορευόμενος* B T: omitted by S. Cf. Euthyph. 4 A *πόρρω που ἤδη σοφίας ἐλαύνοντος* and **64.** 15, where *πόρρω* without *πορευόμενος* has just the opposite meaning, "far from"; here it is "far in."

58. 2. *δοκεῖ* cod., H: *δοκοῖ* B T.

19. *εἰσὶ δὲ* (for *καὶ ἅμα*) *ὡς Ἑρμαῖα — οἱ παῖδες* H puts after *τυγχάνει* a few lines below.

59. 30. **ἂν** *ἄνθρωπος*; v. App. **4.** 20.

60. 8. *τί μήν* S: *τίνα μήν* B T.

14. *πόθεν, ἦ δ' ὅς*: *ἐῷεν* is an echo of *ἐῷεν ἄν* in the sentence preceding; v. App. **24.** 14.

21. *Ὅδε* S: *ὁ δὲ* B T.

63. 22. *ὅρα ὅπως* B T: Cobet omits *ὅρα*; v. Note.

64. 10. After *πολὺ πρότερον ἑταῖρον* B T have *μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτὸν Δαρεῖον*, which S omits. Socrates would hardly care to have Darius, though he might desire his gold.

66. 14. *σκοποῦντας* Schl.: *σκοποῦντα τά* B T, *σκοποῦντα* H. Schmelzer defends *σκοποῦντα* on the ground that Socrates really does all the thinking, and Lysis is only a boy. But Socrates never loses his politeness, even with boys.

67. 3. *ἀνόμοιον εἴη* T: *ἀνόμοιον ἂν εἴη* B. *σχολῇ γ' ἄν* Bekker: *σχολή γε* B T. Stallbaum defends the simple optative by Ar. Eq. 1057, but there the *ἄν* is carried mentally from the preceding clause; v. App. **60.** 14.

12. *ἴδωμεν τί* B T: *ἴδωμεν εἴ τι* H H.

13. *ἔστιν* B: *ἔστι* T; *εἰς τί* Schl.

15. *ἔχειν* B: *ἔχει* T; S omits.

24. *Ὃ — ἀγαπᾷῃ* S: *ὃ — ἀγαπᾷῃ* B T; *ὃ — ἀγαπῶν* Schl.

68. 32. *τῳ φίλον* Ficinus: *τῳ φίλῳ φίλον* B; *τῷ φίλον φίλον* T; *τῷ φίλῳ φίλον* t.

69. 7. *οὕτως* S: *ἴσως* B T.

18. *δήπου* S: *ἄν που* B T; v. Note **4.** 20.

70. 1. *ἔτι ἄν* Salvinius and H: *ἐστιν ἀντὶ* B T. *ἀγαθοῦ* cod.: *ἀγαθοῦ οὖ* B T.

6. *ὁτιοῦν* cod.: *ὁτιοῦν τι* B T.

71. 14. *τοιούτοις* H: *τοιούτοις ψευδέσιν* B T. *εἴη* B T: *ᾖ* Stall.

27. *κακὸν ὄν* H : *κακόν* B T S. *τοῦτο δέ* B T : *τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν* Cornarius, *τοῦτο δὲ κακόν* Ast.

72. 11. *ἢ ἀφικέσθαι* S : *καὶ ἀφικέσθαι* B T, *πρὶν καὶ ἀφικέσθαι olim* Stall.

17. *ὅταν τίς τι* Stephanus : *ὃ ἄν τις τί* B T, *ὃ ἄν τις* H, *ἐάν τίς τι* Bekker. If we retain *ὅ*, we must suppose a change in the antecedent clause (which follows), so that *τοιοῦτος* does not refer to the relative, but to *πατήρ*. Such cases occur in Plato; v. R. 286.

74. 21. *ποίημα Κρόνῳ* M : *ποίημα μακρόν* B T, *ποίημα μάτην* Ast.

75. 8. *ἀποβαλεῖν* T : *ἀπολιπεῖν* B.

13. *φήσομεν* S : *θήσομεν* B T. Cf. App. **23.** 21.

25. *οὐδέν* B T : *οὐδέν*; *Οὐδέν* Ast.

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FROM THE STEPHANUS PAGES TO THE PAGES OF THE PRESENT EDITION.

[N.B. — For the divisions A, B, C, D, E, reckon seven or eight lines to each; in the Laches, often nine lines.]

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
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